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SUMMARY 
Most reputation-based models of sovereign debt assume that a default on a 
loan obligation leads to the imposition of an immediate and permanent credit embargo. 
The first part of this thesis examines the case in which the length of exclusion is 
endogenously determined and may consequently be finite or infinite. In this way, lulls 
in activity followed by enthusiastic lending in the international credit market can be 
modelled. Additionally, examining the optimal exclusion strategy of the creditor 
allows investigation of the consequences of `excusing' default. By not punishing a 
defaulter immediately, it is more likely that a complete loan embargo will be imposed 
in the future. The effect of excusing default on the expected value of the credit 
relationship to the country is also examined. 
A negative externality can arise in the relationship between a sovereign 
borrower and a creditor due to the existence of countries which repeatedly default on 
their debt: a default by one country may make the creditor more cautious in lending 
to others. The effects of this externality are examined in a dynamic model in which 
the bank does not know the type of customer it faces, but can learn its identity over 
time. The equilibrium actions of the players then depend crucially on the borrower's 
reputation for creditworthiness. Even a country which is not an inherent defaulter may 
be tempted to repudiate its debt obligations with this type of incomplete information 
structure. Each successive default causes reputation to fall until a critical level is 
surpassed, at which point a permanent lending embargo is imposed. In this dynamic 
model of debtor reputation, borrowers face an additional problem as they do not 
always possess the funds needed to make a repayment and thus reveal their type. 
In recognizing that borrowing countries can be different by nature, the final 
part of this thesis examines an economy which is driven to borrow externally as an 
endogenous outcome of a political system in which interest groups lobby political 
parties. The amount of borrowing is shown to depend upon the number of 
redistributive policies the parties can use and the attitude of the voters to external 
borrowing. A proposal is put forward for linking debt forgiveness in this type of 
lobbying economy to the level of rent-seeking carried out by the interest groups. lt 
is demonstrated that this proposal is capable of improving the well being of the 
ordinary citizens of the economy who share the repayment cost but may not enjoy the 
benefits of external borrowing. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Precommitment by a sovereign borrower to repay its loan obligations is time 
inconsistent in most instances, so lending policies need to be designed which give 
these countries an incentive to repay. Chapter two examines some of the previous 
work in this area and suggests lines of research which have not been fully explored. 
It is indicated that most of these analyses deal with the incentives of a borrower which 
contracts sovereign loans for investment purposes. Chapters three, four and five 
model this type of debtor whilst the work in chapters six and seven leads to a 
completely different characterization in which debt is contracted as the endogenous 
result of competition for influence in the political system. 
With the theoretically more `traditional' debtor in mind, the following areas 
are highlighted in chapter two as requiring more research; these become the aims of 
this thesis: 
i) To investigate models in which breakdowns (of variable durations) and 
resumptions of voluntary lending can occur as part of an equilibrium; 
ii) To evaluate the extent to which default can be thought of as excusable 
in the sense of not precluding access to future loans and to examine the 
effect of excusing default on the borrower's expected value of the credit 
relationship; 
iii) To present a model of the dynamic evolution of a debtor's 
reputation for creditworthiness over time; 
iv) To incorporate the idea that borrowers are not a homogeneous group 
and that countries which often default may impose an externality upon 
countries which have a high propensity to repay; ' 
v) In the environment depicted in iv), assuming that country type cannot 
be readily observed, to allow the bank to learn the type of country to 
which it is lending and characterize the equilibrium lending and 
repayment strategies under this learning. 
An additional aim, already highlighted is: 
vi) To provide an alternative characterization to the traditional economic 
theory model of a borrowing country. 
Whilst aims i) to v) are grounded in chapter two, some brief remarks are in 
order here. Aim i) reflects the fact that most models of reputation-based sovereign 
debt contracts assume an immediate and permanent credit embargo following default. 
This does not allow depiction of the observed phenomenon whereby lending breaks 
down (often for years or even decades) and can resume again voluntarily. The 
frequency with which these breakdowns occur and the length of time until lending 
' Default by one borrower may make a creditor more cautious in lending to others. 
2 
resumes has obvious implications for the suitability of foreign commercial bank 
lending for development purposes. 
The idea behind aim ii) comes from Grossman and van Huyck (1988) who 
present a model in which the creditor will not actually punish a default by a debtor 
as the borrower has an incentive to repay whatever it can, depending upon the 
verifiable state of nature. If the amount repaid is not the contractually specified 
obligation, the bank knows that this is due to the realization of a poor state of nature 
so that default is `excusable'. The problem with this idea is that when breakdowns 
in lending occur, then a punishment appears to have taken place. It is still possible 
for default to be excusable in the sense of not precluding the possibility of access to 
future loans (weaker than Grossman and van Huyck). Lending equilibria when this 
can occur need to be examined. Whether excusing default is in the borrower's interest 
is also a question to be addressed. 
Following from aims i) and ii) is the possibility that a debtor may lose its 
reputation for being a creditworthy borrower for some time but may regain it, so that 
the dynamics of reputation are important (aim iii)) as this will critically be expected 
to determine the path of a lending equilibrium. This question of the evolution of 
reputation is even more interesting in a situation where the bank knows that borrowers 
are of different types but cannot observe which type it has as a customer (aim iv)). 
Assuming that there are some types to which the bank would not lend under complete 
information, there is the possibility of the creditor learning its customer's type (aim 
v)), whilst the country can optimally reveal its private information through its debt 
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repayment strategy (if it has funds available to make optimal repayments). The 
existence of `good' and `bad' borrowers introduces the possibility that even good 
borrowers can be denied credit, having been "tarred with the same brush" as the bad 
creditors. In order to avoid this externality, one might reasonably expect a good 
borrower to signal its type through some debt repayment. We investigate a more 
interesting scenario in which the debtor may sometimes be prevented from making this 
signal due to a lack of liquidity. 
Having entertained the possibility that borrowers are not alike, aim vi) 
considers a different model of a borrowing economy. Instead of looking at a country 
which invests its borrowed funds (being different can then be interpreted as having 
dissimilar investment technologies), aim vi) is fulfilled by picturing an economy which 
contracts sovereign debt as an endogenous outcome of the functioning of the political 
system. 
After briefly surveying some of the existing literature on sovereign borrowing 
and indicating some areas of weakness in chapter two, aims i) to v) are fulfilled in the 
models of chapters three, four and five, whilst chapters six and seven work towards 
aim vi). The remainder of the present chapter offers a brief overview of what is to 
come. 
Chapter three examines both why some countries are excluded from receiving 
external bank loans and why those which receive funds cannot expect continuous 
access to the international credit market. The focus here is on the type of borrower 
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which is usually analyzed in the literature where funds are borrowed for investment 
purposes. In the model presented in this chapter, it is assumed that the bank is unable 
to observe the investment return in the borrowing country so that there is a natural 
role for the debtor's willingness to repay. Whilst it is the concern about its reputation 
for creditworthiness which induces the borrower to make some repayments, we do not 
assume that default leads to an immediate and irretrievable loss of this reputation. 
Rather, the length of the punishment interval and the extent to which losses of 
creditworthiness are permanent are determined endogenously, parting company with 
most of the sovereign debt literature. To what extent default does not preclude access 
to future loans is also investigated. 
To briefly pre-empt some of the results of chapter three, the international credit 
market depicted there can exhibit two types of equilibrium: a no lending equilibrium 
and multiple lending equilibria. The existence of the lending equilibria is shown to 
depend upon conditions relating to the degree of patience of the players, the 
technological capabilities of the borrower and its willingness to repay the contracted 
debt. Importantly, breakdowns can occur in the relationship with default leading to 
some (variable and not necessarily permanent) period of exclusion from international 
borrowing. Furthermore, the fact that a creditor does not know whether repudiation 
is due to insouciance or simply a bad investment return, means that the borrower can 
choose to default in equilibrium with a positive probability and still the bank can 
achieve zero profits over the longer term. 
Whilst in chapter three the country is constrained to repay all of its obligation 
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or nothing at all, chapter four allows the borrower to decide how much of its 
obligation to repay when it has the funds available. In order to simplify the model, 
the bank is assumed to require to expect to break even each period. Due to this, the 
conditions for the existence of equilibrium are stricter than those of chapter three. 
Additionally, the country is found to repay the optimal amount when funds are 
available so that it must be able to achieve a sufficient surplus after repayment to keep 
it honest and make repayment optimal. 
The lending equilibrium in chapter four indicates that the country can 
guarantee itself a loan by making an optimal repayment, but if a non-optimal 
repayment is made then a punishment interval of exclusion begins; lending 
breakdowns and resumptions thus characterize this lending equilibrium. The most 
efficient equilibrium is the one in which the country has the greatest degree of access 
to the international credit market. The probability of retaining this access is shown 
to depend on how great the chance is of the borrower receiving a loan immediately 
after default. The bank has two options: it can either punish the defaulter immediately 
and allow readmittance after a period of time, or it can moderate the immediate 
punishment by granting a loan following default with a relatively high probability. 
This latter course of action is shown to lead to an eventual credit embargo: `excusing' 
default initially can actually reduce the overall expected payoff of the debtor. 
Chapter five seeks to introduce the fact that borrowers are not a homogeneous 
group. In particular, two types of debtor country are assumed to exist: type I which 
invests its loans and makes optimal repayment decisions (as in chapters three and 
6 
four) and type P, a profligate country which contracts loans and never repays. A 
commercial bank would, under certain conditions, wish to lend to type I but never to 
type P. The problem is that the bank is initially unaware of the true identity of its 
customer and must learn its type. The actions of the `honest' country and the bank 
are to be characterized here under the externality imposed by the existence of a type 
P debtor. Indeed, these actions are dependent upon the degree of certainty with which 
the bank believes it is transacting with a type I country, so that the reputation for 
creditworthiness of a borrowing country will condition its access to loans. As this 
belief changes over time, so a dynamic model of debtor reputation develops. The 
bank wishes to establish its customer type whilst the type I country attempts to reveal 
its private information optimally. 
The results of chapters three and four are tempered in chapter five as lending 
breakdowns and resumptions can only occur up to a point. There is a critical level 
of reputation which imposes an endogenous limit on the tolerance of the creditor to 
default. Once this critical level of belief is surpassed, even the type I country is 
permanently excluded from receiving foreign bank loans. In optimally revealing its 
private information, the type I borrower is tempted to masquerade as type P and not 
repay through choice. As the critical level of belief is neared, this temptation falls. 
The fact that investment has to succeed in order for repayment to be possible lessens 
this temptation still further, the type I borrower sets a high repayment probability each 
time its investment succeeds in case funds are not available in the future to repay the 
loan. 
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Whilst most of the sovereign debt literature seeks to characterize borrowers as 
type I (borrowing for investment), chapters six and seven are aimed towards an 
alternative characterization of a sovereign borrower. Elements of the rent-seeking and 
political competition literature are combined in depicting external borrowing as the 
subject of a struggle among interest groups in an economy. In particular, lobbies 
spend resources trying to get their favoured political party elected and, once in office, 
the government borrows externally to reward the loyalty of its support lobby. The 
basic model is adapted from the literature on endogenous policy theory, but contains 
a flaw which is outlined and corrected in a general model in chapter six for the case 
in which voters are not directly hostile to the parties announcing redistributive 
policies. Chapter seven then demonstrates, in an example, how this flaw affects the 
outcomes when voters are hostile. 
The model is then extended to two periods with borrowing in the first and 
repayment from taxation revenue in the second. The amount of external borrowing 
in this lobbying economy is shown to depend on the hostility of the voters and the 
number of redistributive policy instruments under the control of the parties. We 
therefore have a model in which rent-seeking economies contract sovereign debt as 
an outcome of the political process, with the differences in level of borrowing being 
linked to some of the characteristics underlying the political system. In such 
economies, the lobbies are portrayed as receiving all of the benefits from external 
borrowing whilst the ordinary citizens are burdened with repayment. A debt 
forgiveness scheme which is linked to the amount of lobbying activity is proposed in 
order to reduce the tax rate paid by the ordinary agent. It is shown that unconditional 
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forgiveness will not reduce the tax rate but by linking the amount of forgiveness 
(inversely) to the amount of lobbying it is possible, in principle at least, to relieve the 
ordinary citizens of a part of the debt repayment burden. This scheme also reduces 
the amount of resources spent on lobbying; if these can be channelled into productive 
activity, the economy can grow faster. 
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CHAPTER 2. THE INTERNATIONAL CREDIT MARKET 
2.1 Introduction 
The recent general history of lending to sovereign nations through the 
international credit market is well documented (see, inter alia, Lindert and Morten 
(1989) and O'Brien (1986)). Historically, there have been several episodes where 
initial lending surges have culminated in eventual default. ' The latest of these began 
in the early 1970's and has evolved into the debt crisis in which the developing 
nations and international banks are still embroiled. Whereas the 1950's and 1960's 
witnessed most lending to Less Developed Countries (LDCs) coming from official 
sources, the recycling of OPEC oil surpluses by the international banks in the early 
1970's led to the eruption of private, voluntary lending. Market forces coped well at 
first in channelling funds to parts of the world in which opportunities were numerous 
and returns high. The bubble finally burst in 1982 when Mexico and then Brazil 
suspended payments on foreign debt. 
Explanations for the ensuing crisis have been many. Some attribute the blame 
largely to external shocks to the borrowing economies (see Allsopp and Joshi (1986)), 
whilst others point out the irresponsibility of the borrowing and lending policies of 
those involved. Massive borrowing by the LDCs can be rationalized by examining 
Complete accuracy would define default to be a declaration on a borrower made by the 
creditor in the event of repudiation. By this definition, default is a rare occurrence. In 
common with much of the other literature on sovereign debt, repudiation and default shall be 
used interchangeably. 
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some of the uses, both legitimate and illegitimate, for borrowed funds. These could 
be used, for example, for investment and development, to shelter an economy from 
temporary income and trade fluctuations or to reduce the costs of adjusting to a 
permanently lower income stream. Among the less legitimate grounds for contracting 
debt are unsustainable government policy support, greed on the part of the rulers (e. g. 
The Philippines in the Marcos era), fuel for an import or consumption boom or to 
increase military strength (e. g. Argentina - see Williamson (1986)). 
The banks are often regarded as having loaned recklessly due to the lure of 
generous returns, failing to accurately assess the risk involved in lending to sovereign 
states. 2 Hellwig (1977) partially rationalizes continued lending in presenting a 
theoretical model of the (domestic) credit market which suggests that the contracting 
of an initial loan will necessarily entail the lender `throwing good money after bad'. 
In this model, the borrower initially has zero income which is expected to jump to a 
permanently higher level at some unknown future date. Consumption is financed 
through loans which, if by the time income rises the debtor has not defaulted, are 
repaid up to some maximum. After a credit line has been exhausted prior to the jump 
in income, the debt goes into default unless more credit is forthcoming to prevent the 
borrower becoming bankrupt. The lender therefore has an incentive to make loans 
which may yield a loss themselves but retain the solvency of the borrower and hence 
the possibility of repayment. Realizing this, the borrower contracts debt at a rapid rate 
thereby raising the probability of reaching the maximum feasible repayment, at which 
2 Guttentag and Herring (1985) suggest reasons for what they term `disaster myopia' on 
the part of the banks. 
point the bank must cease lending. By failing to precommit to a credit ceiling, the 
creditor places itself in a situation in which an initial loan will necessarily lead to 
further loans. This situation can only be avoided by not lending in the first instance. 
2.2 The enforcement of international loan contracts 
Lending in credit markets, both domestic and international, is subject to the 
complications of moral hazard and adverse selection. Moral hazard can arise as the 
creditor often does not know the exact utilization of any extended credit. The 
employment of borrowed resources naturally has consequences for the prospects of 
servicing the debt, although, in the international context, funds are usually available 
to meet debt servicing requirements. This is not to suggest that moral hazard is not 
a potentially great problem in international lending. Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz 
(1986) indicate three situations in which moral hazard can arise in the international 
arena: (i) when borrowers can affect their susceptibility to default penalties; (ii) when 
they can affect the likelihood of the penalty; (iii) when the total amount borrowed 
cannot be observed by individual lenders. Adverse selection relates to the difficulty 
of identifying the characteristics of the borrower which are relevant for designing an 
incentive compatible repayment schedule. In this case, it is possible that borrowers 
are attracted who know that their prospects for repayment are poor (see section 2.4 for 
more on information related problems). 
Undoubtedly, the feature which most distinguishes the international credit 
market from its domestic counterpart relates to the enforceability of cross-border loan 
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contracts. The non-existence of a supranational legal authority to enforce such 
contracts apparently grants sovereign debtors the option of repudiating their loan 
obligations if such action is to their advantage. On this subject Keynes (1924)3 states, 
"Indeed, it is probable that loans to foreign governments have turned out badly on 
balance... The investor has no remedy - none whatever - against default. There is, on 
the part of most foreign countries, a strong tendency to default on the occasion of 
wars and revolutions and whenever the expectation of further loans no longer exceeds 
in amount the interest payable on old ones. " Worrall (1990) points out that, whilst it 
is possible in principle to obtain a default judgement through the courts4 against a 
foreign government, enforcing such a judgement is more difficult. Depicting the 
relationship between an international bank and a sovereign debtor therefore involves 
designing a contract which will induce both the bank to lend and the country to repay. 
At a practical level, there are three constraints on the repayment of sovereign 
debt - solvency, liquidity and the willingness to repay. A debtor is solvent if it has 
the resources to meet its agreed stream of debt servicing repayments without the need 
to borrow forever in order to make the interest payments. As the outstanding debt of 
the LDCs represents a small proportion of their national income, insolvency does not 
appear to be an issue of great importance in lending to foreign governments. When 
capital markets are imperfect, a solvent borrower may find that it is unable to raise 
enough reserves to meet a due repayment. Thus the liquidity situation of a country 
3 This reference is taken from Eaton (1990). 
4 In the USA under the Foreign Sovereigns Immunities Act 1976, and in the United 
Kingdom under the State Immunity Act 1978. 
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can constrain its debt repayments. Finally, and most reflective of the unenforceable 
nature of sovereign debt contracts, a debtor can be thought of as performing a cost- 
benefit calculation when deciding on debt repayment so that its willingness to repay 
is an obstacle to debt servicing. This evaluation of the costs and benefits of meeting 
obligations need not be carried out purely in economic terms, as political 
considerations may also be a factor in determining the amount and timing of any debt 
payments. 
In most of the theoretical models of the credit market, lenders are taken to 
operate in a competitive environment and be risk neutral so that they maximize their 
expected profit. If a creditor has complete information in a domestic setting without 
uncertainty, then collateral requirements can be used to eliminate default risk. ' In this 
case, an amount will be lent at the market rate of interest up to a maximum 
determined by the level of collateral. The supply of credit is therefore perfectly elastic 
up to a point, after which it becomes perfectly inelastic. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) 
demonstrate the possibility of credit rationing in equilibrium in the domestic market 
due to uncertainty arising from informational imperfections. In this model lenders 
cannot observe the risk associated with the investment project undertaken by the 
borrower. In seeking to charge a profit maximizing interest rate on its loans, the bank 
affects the riskiness of the loans through adverse selection and incentive effects. 
These authors prove that, for a given interest rate, a level of risk above some critical 
level is necessary for the borrower to wish to borrow (adverse selection). 
5 Complete information in this case means all of the characteristics of the borrower 
relevant to the loan contract. With this information, the creditor can accurately assess to 
incentives of the borrower in all situations. 
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Additionally, the higher the interest rate, the more attractive the borrower finds riskier 
projects (incentive effect). As increasing the interest rate can increase the riskiness 
of the loan portfolio, it cannot necessarily be used to equate the demand and supply 
of funds. Credit rationing in this case manifests itself in the form of restrictions on 
the number of loans granted. 
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) is the seminal theoretical work on the supply of 
loanable funds to a sovereign nation in the presence of repudiation risk. Lenders in 
this model are assumed to be risk-neutral, competitive and earning zero profits from 
one period debt contracts. Whilst retaining the option of defaulting on a debt if in its 
interest, a recalcitrant borrower suffers a loss of income and a permanent embargo on 
future loans (for more on default penalties see section 2.3). Increasing the debt 
servicing burden of a borrower is shown to raise the probability that the debtor 
reneges on its contractually specified obligations. This gives rise to a maximum credit 
level beyond which a debt will be repudiated with certainty. The credit ceiling in the 
Eaton and Gersovitz model is endogenously determined as a function of the 
probability of default, the obligation imposed by the loan and the banks' opportunity 
cost of funds. To achieve a zero profit level when default is possible, the banks 
charge an interest rate which rises with the size of the loan, so that the supply of 
funds to the sovereign borrower is upward sloping until the credit ceiling is reached, 
at which point it becomes infinitely inelastic. 
If a sovereign borrower could make a binding pre-commitment not to default 
on any loan, then the functioning of the international credit market would mirror its 
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domestic counterpart. Such a precommitment is usually time inconsistent, however, 
so the bank must take default risk into account when designing an international loan 
contract. A broad classification of the models of sovereign debt is possible according 
to the incentives used to ensure cooperative behaviour and the punishments to 
recalcitrance, although models also exist which combine the incentives/punishments 
given below. 
2.3 Modelling sovereign debt - carrots versus sticks 
2.3.1 Direct penalties 
The assumption of a direct penalty following default represents the `stick' 
approach. Penalties can take several forms, for example asset sequestration, loss of 
production (Cooper and Sachs (1985) and Cohen and Sachs (1986)) or trade sanctions 
(Krugman (1985)). To demonstrate the general structure of purely penalty-based 
models under certainty, assume a single good economy which lasts for two periods. 
In period one a loan of L units of the good is granted which must be repaid in amount 
R(L) in the second period. A credible penalty of P units is the punishment to 
repudiation. The borrowing economy has a utility function which is increasing in the 
amount of the loan and decreasing in the amount of the repayment so that the utility 
from fulfilling the terms of the contract is Urep = U(L, R(L)), whilst the default utility 
is Udef = U(L, P). The debt will therefore be repaid if Urep >_ Udef . Assuming that 
lenders are competitive and risk-neutral with i representing the opportunity cost of 
funds, the required repayment will be set at R(L)=(l+i)L. Substitution gives the result 
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that the loan will be repaid if P >_ (l+i)L. 
Whilst undeniably simple, this model illuminates several important features of 
the stick approach. The borrower is credit constrained if it wishes to borrow more 
than P/(l+i), with the size of the penalty crucially determining the credit ceiling. In 
this framework, the constrained borrower benefits from an increase in the penalty as 
this raises the ceiling, whilst the existence of the ceiling prevents default and hence 
the penalty is never imposed. This mirrors the working of the domestic credit market 
under certainty and collateral requirements described earlier. 
Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz (1986) introduce uncertainty into this simple 
model by means of a state-dependent penalty P= P(s), where s is the state of nature. 
Utility may depend on s in other ways than through the penalty so the utilities of 
repayment and default become UP = U(L, R(L), s) and Udef =U (L, P, s) with 
Urep >_ Udef again defining the repayment criterion. Repayment states are sr= S and non- 
repayment states are sr= S'. Letting f(s) denote the probability of state s occurring, the 
probability of repayment is n= fs f(s)ds S1 and %R(L) = (l+i)L is set by the bank. 
It follows that states may exist in which default will occur and the penalty will be 
imposed. Whilst increasing the amount of the penalty will generally increase the 
amount lent, it does not follow that the expected utility6 of the borrower will increase 
as this higher punishment must be paid for se S'. 
Most theoretical models which employ penalties are actually hybrids of the 
6 The expected utility of the borrower is JS U,,. P f(s)ds + 
is' UJef f(s)ds. 
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carrot and stick approach. Cohen and Sachs (1986) offer an infinite-horizon growth 
model under certainty of an economy with access to the international credit market. 
Repudiating a debt constrains the borrower to financial autarky (continued access is 
thus the `carrot') and imposes a direct loss of production. Specifically, it is assumed 
that capital is less productive after a default, which could be thought of as reflecting 
the increased difficulty a recalcitrant borrower may have in conducting trade. In 
making optimal decisions, the social planner in the borrowing economy can choose 
to repudiate its repayment commitments if to its advantage, giving rise to the 
possibility of repudiation. Assuming sufficient linearities to achieve a closed solution, 
an endogenous credit ceiling can be derived in the form of a critical debt-to-capital 
ratio. This critical level depends upon the production technology in the borrowing 
economy and also the parameters in its intertemporal utility function. The Cohen- 
Sachs economy proceeds through two stages of growth. In the first the credit 
constraint is not binding and the economy grows initially at a rapid rate, declining as 
the debt/GDP and debt/capital ratios rise. A binding credit constraint characterizes the 
second stage of growth where the debt and economy grow at the same rate which is 
below the growth rate in stage one. Significantly, the credit ceiling reduces the 
productive efficiency of the borrower as the growth rate in the second phase is below 
that which maximizes productive wealth. During the second stage, debt repayment 
is less than the due amount but outright default is prevented because the lender 
refinances the interest payments. 
The possibility of outright default in the international credit market is 
considered in the model of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) mentioned earlier. The crucial 
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element which distinguishes between threatened and actual default is the presence of 
uncertainty in the borrowing economy. It was noted earlier that the supply of funds 
to a sovereign borrower in this model is upward sloping until the (endogenous) credit 
ceiling is reached. Two characterizations of the borrowing economy are considered. 
Income can be high or low and in the deterministic version of the model income 
alternates between being high in one period and then low the next. Borrowing is 
undertaken in periods when income is low and is repaid in the following period when 
income is certain to be high. Failure to meet the repayments imposes a direct penalty 
and financial autarky on the borrower. Default is avoided by setting the credit ceiling 
low enough that the debtor never finds it profitable to renege on the agreed debt 
servicing. In the second characterization, stochastic income determination permits an 
actual default to occur in the Eaton and Gersovitz model. In this case, income can 
again be high or low but according to an uncertain pattern. Borrowing may only 
occur in low income states and must be repaid in the next period regardless of income. 
A realization of two successive low income states may then lead to an actual default. 
Instead of assuming that the default penalty is a direct one on income or 
production, penalties could take the form of trade sanctions. Krugman (1985) 
introduces the notion of uncertain future trade penalties into a model of rescheduling 
of debt commitments with trade sanctions. Decisions taken today therefore depend 
upon the expectation of the penalty in the future. Aizenman (1989) suggests that trade 
sanctions could be employed to move the creditor-debtor relationship towards a first 
best no-default precommitment equilibrium. This outcome could be achieved by 
increasing the openness of an economy so that trade sanctions become a more potent 
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punishment in the event of default. In his two period model, borrowing countries can 
invest in different activities with different degrees of exposure to international trade. 
The creditor should encourage the borrowing government to implement a tax policy 
which will reduce default risk by directing investment to more open sectors. 
Borrowing for investment purposes thus has two effects: (i) marginal borrowing raises 
total indebtedness so raises the probability of default; (ii) investment in exposed 
sectors increases the openness of an economy thereby lowering the probability of 
default. The optimal tax would balance these two effects. 
Calvo (1989) asks why penalties are not effective enough to achieve moral 
hazard free equilibria. The simple theoretical analysis presented earlier suggests that 
a large penalty will enforce repayment whilst not imposing a welfare loss as it never 
needs to be implemented. He notes that theory and practice appear distanced in this 
respect as actual penalties are not very large and cases of repudiation do occur. In a 
two-period model of loan and repayment, Calvo finds two reasons for the existence 
of small penalties. Firstly, a penalty may impose costs on the lender so that its 
resolve to punish a deviant borrower is diminished. This will tend to either place an 
upper bound on the penalty or reduce the credibility of large penalties. Alternatively, 
the penalty could be related to the degree of monitoring carried out by the creditor in 
the borrowing country. If loans are closely monitored then a penalty could be 
automatically incurred on default, whereas less than perfect monitoring, with a 
possibility that even good loan prospects are refused refinancing of problem debts, 
could lead to the emergence of an upper bound on the penalty. Creditors would not 
wish to punish `good' debtors but may lack the ability to distinguish between a good 
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and bad debtor. Additionally, Calvo indicates the potential time inconsistency of ex- 
post optimal penalties as lenders may be tempted to increase them after a loan contract 
has been agreed. This temptation is especially great if the cost of careful monitoring 
is high. 
2.3.2 Purely reputation-based models 
Sustaining sovereign debt contracts solely through penalties in effect causes the 
international credit market to almost mimic the market for domestic debt with 
bankruptcy and collateral requirements. In contrast to the hybrid direct 
penalty/continued access models presented in the previous section, one branch of the 
sovereign debt literature considers models in which continued access to the 
international credit market can be a great enough incentive to generate voluntary 
repayments on sovereign debt. Under this approach, the debtor is concerned with its 
reputation for creditworthiness. In a reputational equilibrium, the borrower must care 
enough about its future credit standing in order that the short-run gains from not 
servicing debt are outweighed by the long run losses associated with financial autarky. 
Furthermore, the withdrawal of credit must be in the interest of the lender to be a 
credible punishment. Although the credit embargo need not be permanent, this is 
often the assumption made in the literature (see, inter alia, Eaton and Gersovitz 
(1981), Kletzer (1984), Worrall (1990) and Atkeson (1991)). ' A situation of no 
lending is the harshest equilibrium punishment available to the creditor in a pure 
7 Grossman and van Huyck (1988) present a reputational equilibrium in which the lender 
can `forget' previous repudiation by a sovereign. Rather then endogenizing the length of 
memory, however, it is assumed to be random. 
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reputation model so provides the greatest incentive for debt repayment. However, 
models making this assumption miss an important class of equilibria in which lending 
can break down and resume again as part of the equilibrium. Chapters three and four 
of this thesis endogenize the length of the punishment interval and investigate the 
punishment structure which leads to the most efficient equilibrium. Chapter five looks 
at the evolution of a debtor's reputation over time in the presence of a negative 
externality due to the existence of inherent defaulters in the international credit market. 
Complementary to chapters three and four, the model of chapter five also exhibits 
lending breakdowns of varying durations. 
Sceptics of pure reputation as a debt repayment mechanism deny the existence 
of reputational contracts in the international credit market. Bulow and Rogoff (1989) 
model a situation in which competitive creditors lend to a small developing country 
whose production depends upon investment and a shock, which are both observed by 
the lenders and borrower. There is no private information. Two types of debt 
contract are considered: (i) an implicit contract based on reputation; (ii) a cash-in- 
advance contract. This latter contract involves the country becoming a creditor itself 
and lending to a bank in return for a non-negative repayment in the following period. 
An arbitrage argument belies the proof of the non-existence of a pure reputational 
contract. Once the country receives a loan from bank A, it should default and 
therefore be barred from receiving future reputation-linked funds. This saving on debt 
service is then used as a deposit with bank B which yields a return next period. The 
country then continues to reinvest in further cash-in-advance contracts which cost it 
less than repaying the original loan. Realizing this, bank A will not extend a 
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reputation-based contract in the first instance. This non-existence result appears 
powerful in the confines of the model used by Bulow and Rogoff, but relies on the 
existence of outside investors offering enforceable cash-in-advance contracts. Worrall 
(1990) notes that if an enforceable contract cannot be made with bank B, then 
insurance purchased by the country is less than perfect as bank B may renege on the 
agreement if it finds such action optimal. 
Rosenthal (1991) presents a proof of the non-existence of purely reputation- 
based sovereign debt contracts which is not based on the assumption that the borrower 
can become a creditor. He uses a one-sector neo-classical growth model under 
certainty to look at the sovereign's incentives for repaying a debt contract which 
specifies a time profile for capital flows to the country (loans) and repayment 
obligations. The result is that if the borrower is sufficiently impatient8 then a time 
comes when the debtor would prefer to default on the debt contract and follow its 
stand alone path afterwards (as default leads to the exclusion of the borrower from the 
credit market). Knowing the certainty of eventual default would prevent the lender 
offering the initial debt contract. When the borrower is more patient, then this result 
need not hold. Additionally, allowing the debtor to be a lender following default 
produces the Bulow and Rogoff (1989) result which is independent of the discount 
factor. 
It is possible that default may not lead to the imposition of a complete credit 
8 This is the requirement that ß <_ 1/(1+r) where (3 is the borrower's discount factor and 
r is the risk-free rate of interest. 
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embargo. The notion that default by a sovereign borrower may be excusable, in the 
sense of not precluding access to future loans, is due to Grossman and van Huyck 
(1988), who view sovereign debt as a claim contingent on a verifiable state of nature. 
The lender sets the state contingent repayment schedule in such a manner that the 
borrower always prefers to pay as much of the debt as it can afford. Due to the 
problems of writing a state contingent contract which allows for every eventuality, 
only the maximum repayment in the best state is specified in the contract. As this 
contractually specified amount can only be repaid in the best state and the sovereign 
is induced to pay as much as possible in other states, the lender knows that any failure 
to make the contractual debt repayment is due to a (verifiable) bad state of nature. 
Therefore when the sovereign makes only a partial repayment on its debt (or no 
payment at all in the worst state) its access to further loans is not affected. This result 
does not appear surprising in this model, for information is complete and perfect as 
the lender knows the identity of the borrower and the state of nature is verifiable. The 
extent to which default is excusable and the effect on the expected payoffs of the 
borrower in more complex environments are issues which are examined in this thesis. 
Specifically, chapters three and four investigate these questions when the bank is 
aware of the identity of the borrower but its investment returns are the private 
knowledge of the debtor and chapter five analyzes the case in which the bank is 
informed about neither the identity of the borrower nor its investment return. 
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2.4 Information and learning 
In the international credit market, the borrower is likely to have some private 
information as it seems reasonable to assume that the debtor will know more about 
its own situation than will the creditor. This can lead to moral hazard and adverse 
selection effects which have been discussed earlier with reference to the market for 
domestic credit. In the international arena these problems serve to compound the non- 
enforceability of sovereign debt contracts. 
The stochastic version of the model in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) is extended 
by Kletzer (1984) to highlight the role played by the informational structure. Debtors 
make optimal repudiation decisions but face financial autarky forever after non- 
repayment. Prior to default, lenders offer a loan contract (principal and interest rate) 
every period. Loans may be contracted from many banks and two cases are examined 
according to the information an individual bank has on the total indebtedness of the 
borrowing economy. If lenders can observe this total amount of indebtedness, then 
the loan contract specifies the rate of interest to be repaid as a function of total 
borrowing. An equilibrium always exists at the tangency of the set of loans giving 
a non-negative expected profit and a country indifference curve. Typically, the 
equilibrium will entail credit rationing. Assuming an informational asymmetry, so that 
each individual bank does not know the total borrowing undertaken in the country, 
means that contracts conditioned on this magnitude are no longer possible. Indeed, 
as the probability of repayment depends upon the total amount of indebtedness, it can 
only be observed when the debtor refuses loans at the market rate of interest. An 
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equilibrium in this case will occur along the demand curve for loans. Non-existence 
of a lending equilibrium is possible if, along the demand curve for loanable funds, 
only loans are possible which yield negative returns to the bank. Whilst the case with 
observability of total indebtedness gives rise to a constrained equilibrium, 
unobservability leads to more debt being contracted at a higher rate of interest. 
Atkeson (1991) uses a dynamic game of international borrowing in order to 
investigate the optimal pattern of capital flows between a lender and a borrower when 
optimal default decisions are made and moral hazard exists. In this model, moral 
hazard arises due to the lenders' inability to observe and monitor the proportion of a 
loan which is used for investment and that which is consumed. With the assumed 
punishment to default being financial autarky, the optimal contract overcomes the 
problems of repudiation and moral hazard. A noticeable feature of the optimal 
contract is that it prescribes a capital outflow and fall in consumption and investment 
after the lowest realizations of output if this low output is a strong enough indicator 
of low past investment. 
When a model includes some incomplete or imperfect information as part of 
its structure, learning of the informational asymmetry becomes a possibility. Lang and 
Nakamura (1989) develop a model of the credit market with two types of loans - 
riskless and risky in the sense that default is a possibility. Supply and demand for the 
two kinds of loans depends upon the expected returns to the borrowers and lenders, 
which in turn depend upon the level of information possessed by these agents. 
Returns on risky loans are comprised of a permanent and transitory component and 
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lenders do not initially know the expected returns of the risky loans but use a Kalman 
filter to learn the permanent element over time. The larger the number of loans at any 
time, the greater the amount of information there is available to aid inference of future 
returns. Increasing the amount of risk/uncertainty associated with a risky loan is 
shown to lead to a lower number of loans so that less information is released which 
leads to a further increase in risk/uncertainty and so on in a vicious circle. Similarly, 
the effects of an adverse shock to the credit market can be magnified by the learning 
process due to lower information levels. Multiple long-run equilibria are a feature of 
the Lang and Nakamura learning model so that an adverse shock can move the 
economy away from one equilibrium and towards another. Consequently there are 
two channels through which a shock can affect the credit market. 
In a credit market, borrowers may not be a homogeneous group. Cole, Dow 
and English (1989) consider a sovereign borrower with two different types of 
government - stable and unstable - neither of which can be observed by the lenders. 
An unstable government is more myopic than the stable one and is consequently more 
prone to default on a debt obligation. Furthermore, the transition of these 
governments evolves over time according to a first-order Markov process. A large 
number of risk-neutral lenders make loans according to their belief about the type of 
government currently in power. Two classes of Bayesian Perfect Equilibria are 
investigated: (i) those enforced by a fixed punishment interval; (ii) a signalling 
equilibrium.. 
When default is followed by a fixed period of exclusion from the credit 
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markets, both separating and pooling equilibria are found to exist. In a separating 
equilibrium, the stable government is induced by the punishment to repay its loan 
whereas the unstable is not. Therefore, default is assumed by the bank to indicate an 
unstable type and the punishment interval begins. During the punishment interval, the 
type of government is changing so that the lenders belief gradually reverts to the 
population mean. When the belief in a stable government is sufficiently strong, loans 
will again be forthcoming. In the model, the default decision is such that if a stable 
type defaults, then so does an unstable type. As a result, two types of pooling 
equilibria can be supported by a fixed punishment interval: a no lending equilibrium 
and a no default equilibrium where the punishment induces the unstable government 
(and hence the stable one) to repay. 
According to the fixed punishment interval equilibria, a country cannot receive 
a loan until the end of the punishment even if a stable government has gained power. 
A signalling equilibrium allows the stable government to indicate that this change has 
occurred and regain access to the credit market before the exclusion period ends. The 
signal used is a partial repayment of a loan in default. Furthermore, the equilibrium 
signal size is just greater than a signal which the unstable type would be willing to 
make. Therefore an unstable government will never signal so that partial repayment 
indicates a stable government. In the signalling equilibrium, partial repayment is the 
only way that readmittance to the credit market can be gained, for reputation does not 
evolve during the exclusion period in this type of equilibrium. Using the Cho-Kreps 
(1987) intuitive criterion, the existence of a signalling equilibrium allows the fixed 
punishment equilibria to be ruled out. The stable government will always prefer to 
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signal its type and end the period of punishment, whereas the unstable type will never 
make a repayment. Therefore an observed signal indicates to the lenders that the 
stable government is in power and the punishment interval should cease. Equilibria 
supported by a fixed punishment interval can therefore be ruled out as the punishment 
will end as soon as a stable government evolves. This is used to explain why 
defaulters can borrow again after a (variable) period of exclusion. 
In the model of Cole, Dow and English (1989), a problem arises with the 
suggested signalling equilibrium if the stable government does not have sufficient 
funds to make the signal. The model of chapter five of this thesis presents a model 
of the international credit market in which a bank attempts to distinguish over time 
between two borrowing countries who have different inherent attitudes to debt 
repayment. In particular, one country always defaults (unstable) and the other makes 
optimal default decisions but may be constrained in its attempts to reveal its type 
through illiquidity (stable). This model analyzes the manner in which the presence of 
the unstable inherent defaulter and this liquidity constraint affect the dynamics of the 
reputation of the stable debtor. As in Cole, Dow and English (1989) lending 
resumptions are found to follow default but, in contrast to their paper, the model here 
suggests that this can only happen up until a critical level of reputation below which 
no loans are forthcoming. Illiquidity may cause the stable borrower to fail to make 
the signal in time and so fall below the reputation threshold even though this may not 
have been its intention. Additionally, chapters three and four investigate lending 
breakdowns and resumptions when the type of borrower is known. Here, the 
punishment to default is found to be a variable length of exclusion from the 
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international credit market. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at some of the literature on sovereign debt and 
indicated several of the problems which have been encountered and overcome in 
modelling this phenomenon. Despite the volume of work, there are still areas open 
for research. Chapters three and four examine the pattern of sovereign loans in a 
reputation-based model when the type of borrower is known whilst chapter five 
explores a reputational model in which borrowers can be heterogeneous and the bank 
does not know the type of borrower it faces. Customer type can be learned over time 
in this framework. A common feature of these three models is that a default is not 
assumed to lead to an immediate and permanent credit embargo. Rather, the length 
of the punishment interval following default is determined endogenously in 
equilibrium. Following from this, the type of punishment which maximizes the 
expected payoffs of the players can be characterized and compared to the assumption 
usually made in the sovereign debt literature. Furthermore, the phenomenon of 
lending breaking down for varying durations can be depicted. 
Whilst most of the literature deals with a country which borrows for 
investment purposes, chapters six and seven work towards a different characterization 
where sovereign borrowing is seen as an endogenous outcome of the interaction of the 
economic and political systems where interest groups lobby the political parties to 
borrow in order to fund government transfers. The amount of borrowing undertaken 
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in the equilibrium of a two-period model is determined by both of these systems. 
Debt forgiveness linked to the level of lobbying is considered as a means of 
improving the welfare of the ordinary citizens and increasing growth in this rent- 
seeking economy. 
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CHAPTER 3. LENDING TO A KNOWN SOVEREIGN BORROWER 
Chapter two suggests the lack of a theoretical model depicting the 
discontinuous nature of loans to a sovereign borrower through time. Phases of 
enthusiastic lending are observed, followed by eventual default and the drying up of 
loans for a (variable) period of time, after which credit is again extended. 
Eichengreen (1989) states: " After 1970 a period of inactivity first gave way to a surge 
of bank lending, followed by the development of debt servicing difficulties and finally 
the curtailment of foreign lending. To a surprising extent, the recent rise and retreat 
of foreign lending resembles previous historical episodes in which surges of foreign 
lending were abruptly terminated by waves of default, only to start up again after a 
lull of several decades". Much of the existing theoretical work has neglected to model 
this series of events. This chapter presents a reputational model of sovereign 
borrowing in an attempt to fill this apparent gap in the literature. 
Presented here is a model involving the interaction of one competitive bank 
and one sovereign borrower through time. The bank must decide whether to lend to 
the borrower, given the inherently unenforceable nature of sovereign debt contracts. 
If the country receives a loan, then it invests in its investment technology which 
produces uncertain returns. Should a high enough return be generated, then the 
country has the option of repudiating or repaying the loan, whichever is optimal. A 
failed investment leads to non-fulfillment of the terms of the debt contract. Both 
players have the same information, except that the bank cannot observe the realized 
investment return. This is an important feature of this model of the international 
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credit market, for it allows a role for the country's willingness to repay a debt as the 
bank cannot discern whether default is due to country insouciance or, more 
legitimately, failed investment. In the presence of this informational imperfection, the 
bank cannot control the repayment action of the borrower. Therefore it must lend in 
such a manner that the borrower is given the correct incentives to repay when able. 
Cole, Dow and English (1989) state that, empirically, the most recent default 
will have the greatest effect on the bank's lending policy. This observation is used 
to justify concentration on Markov strategies and Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE). 
With Markov strategies, the past has an effect on current actions only in as much as 
it affects the current state variable which summarizes the past history of the economic 
system. Given this definition of the state variable, if one player uses a Markov 
strategy, then the opponent can do no better than to use a Markov strategy also 
(Maskin and Tirole (1988)). Essentially, the model presented below is a stochastic 
game in which the state of the system follows a first-order Markov process. In this 
case, the state of the system in the next period depends solely upon the current state 
and current actions. 
As the bank is competitive, solutions are examined in which it achieves an 
expected return of zero over the long run. Two types of MPE can be distinguished - 
those in which there is lending and those in which there is not., Naturally, the former 
is the more interesting and necessary conditions are given for this type of equilibrium 
to occur. In order for a country to get a loan, it must pass some very strong criteria. 
Specifically, the investment technology in the borrowing nation must be capable of 
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producing high enough returns to facilitate repayment. Additionally, given that the 
bank cannot observe realized returns, the country must be able to avoid being tempted 
to fool the bank by claiming that investment has failed when, in reality, it did not. 
In short, the bank will only loan to a country which it considers will be able and 
willing to repay the contracted debt with a high probability. Even then, a lending 
equilibrium requires the bank to be sufficiently far sighted not to be panicked into 
closing credit lines completely after an isolated case of default. ' 
There are several interesting implications of the lending equilibrium if it exists. 
For any set of permissible parameter values, there are multiple equilibria. Whilst 
equilibria do exist in which default is punished by a permanent credit embargo, this 
is not a feature imposed on the solution in contrast to much of the reputational 
sovereign debt literature examined in chapter two. Furthermore, equilibria are found 
to exist in which a repudiation of an obligation may not lead to an irreversible loss 
of the borrower's reputation for creditworthiness. Specifically, it is possible in 
equilibrium that default could be followed by a loan in the very next period or, failing 
this, after a finite period of exclusion. ' This finding is in a similar vein to the 
`excusable default' result of Grossman and van Huyck (1988) in that default does not 
necessarily preclude access to loans. Excusable default in the strict sense of no 
punishment to non-repayment is not a feature of the equilibria in this model, however. 
'A weaker form of `excusable default' than Grossman and van Huyck (1988). 
I The expected length of the embargo is determined endogenously as a function of the 
model parameters. 
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Some numerical analysis suggests that non-repayment of debt is punished very 
strongly with a long lasting, but possibly not infinite, credit embargo likely to follow 
default. In some periods therefore, the sovereign is credit constrained whilst in others 
it is not. This idea of credit rationing contrasts with most existing models in which 
a sovereign faces a credit ceiling in each period. Allsopp and Joshi (1986) ask 
whether private lending to LDCs is suitable for development purposes. The volatile 
time path of credit rationing found in this model would tend to suggest that it is not. 
We now turn to details of the model. 
3.1 The environment 
The credit relationship to be modelled here is between a competitive, 
risk-neutral bank and a risk-neutral sovereign borrower who both operate in a 
stationary economic environment. We shall restrict attention to situations in which 
the bank has a zero expected level of profit over the infinite time horizon. The 
borrower is taken to be risk-neutral as we are concerned with incentive rather than 
risk-sharing issues. There is assumed to be one (perishable) good in existence which 
is best thought of as the output of the borrowing country. For simplicity, all loans are 
normalized to be one unit of the good for the duration of one period at an 
exogenously fixed rate of interest r. Most of the existing work in this area focusses 
on one period debt contracts (see, inter alia, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Kletzer 
(1984), Cole, Dow and English (1989)). O'Brien (1986) notes that short-run 
maturities are often perceived as carrying lower risk than longer term ones, for it gives 
35 
the creditor an earlier option of non-renewal than do long-term contracts. This option 
is found to be of particular significance for the incentive structure designed by the 
bank in the present model (see section 3.5 for details). 
In order to generate the funds necessary to make required repayments on any 
granted loan, we assume that the borrowing nation has at its disposal a non-divisible 
investment technology in which it always invests the whole loan. Stochastic returns 
are produced by this investment technology in that with fixed probability 0<y<1 
the return is `high' and with probability 1-y `low'. In particular, we assume that in 
a period of high returns the country regains its invested unit of the good plus some 
positive constant x>0, but should a low return be realized, this shall be taken to 
indicate the loss of the borrowed unit of the good. ' Both the country and the bank 
are taken to know the value of y The repayment options of the borrower are 
simplified by requiring either all obligations or none at all to be repaid upon 
realization of the investment return. 
At this point it is necessary to introduce an informational asymmetry into the 
model, for if the bank were able to observe the investment return achieved by the 
borrowing country, then it could immediately discern whether any non-repayment of 
debts was due to borrower insouciance or simply bad luck. The former would be 
punished and the latter possibly not. The task of the bank is made more difficult here 
as it is assumed that the creditor has imperfect information about the actual realized 
3 The role of y can be interpreted more widely as anything which affects the value of the 
output of the borrowing country, e. g. a terms of trade shock. 
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investment return in as much as the return is not directly observable by the bank. In 
this way, we build into the model a role for the borrower's willingness to repay. ' 
Providing the borrower with the correct incentives to prevent insouciance can only be 
achieved through the rationing of loans over time. 
A final assumption is that the borrowing country cannot become a depositor 
with any financial institutions. This is necessary due to the point by Bulow and 
Rogoff (1989) demonstrating that the possibility of making such deposits can lead, in 
some settings, to the non-existence of reputational sovereign debt contracts. 
3.2 The play 
The play of the game in any one period is described in Figure 3.1. At the 
beginning of the period, the bank makes a decision on whether to extend a loan of one 
or zero units of the good. If no loan is granted, the period ends with a current period 
payoff to both parties of zero. Should the bank decide to grant a loan, it purchases 
one unit of the good at a price of unity and the country invests this unit in its 
investment technology. Next the return is realized and revealed to the country only. 
If the investment has failed, then no repayment can be made so the bank loses its 
loaned unit and the country achieves a zero payoff in the current period. When the 
investment succeeds, the debtor chooses whether to repay its obligations to the 
creditor. Repayment yields a current period payoff of x-r to the country and r to the 
4 The willingness of the borrower to repay is taken as an economic decision in this 
model. Of course in practice, political considerations may be an important influence, for 
example the willingness or ability of the government to raise taxation revenue to repay a debt. 
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bank, whereas default in this case generates 1+x and -1 respectively. Naturally, it is 
assumed that x>r in order to facilitate any gains from trade. 5 After repayment or 
repudiation of the obligation, the period ends. 6 
Figure 3.1 
return repay 
_invest y1+x consumption loan 1 aef.... I. 
period loan 0 return 0 period 
time 
begins II ends 
period period 
ends ends 
The unique solution to the one period game is easily verified by backwards 
induction to be a situation where no lending and no repayment takes place. Extending 
the model to any finite number of periods under this setup generates the same result. 
To avoid such problems of backwards unravelling, we assume that the game is 
repeated infinitely many times. 
5 In fact, we would expect an equilibrium with lending to have y(l+x) > l+r. 
6 Notice that all of the action takes place inside one period. There are no explicit 
connections between periods which makes the repeated game easier to solve. 
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3.3 Strategies 
In the model it is assumed that the Markov property holds so that, given the 
present state of the system, all information concerning the past of the system is 
irrelevant for its future behaviour. It is possible to identify four states depending upon 
actions taken in the previous period: 
1) no loan made last period; 
2) loan granted which was not repaid through choice; 
3) loan granted which was repaid; 
4) loan granted which was not repaid due to low investment return. 
The strategies which we shall consider here are Markov strategies where the 
repayment/lending decisions in the current period depend only on the payoff relevant 
history. In this model, the payoff relevant history is summarized by the state of the 
system so that if one player uses a Markov strategy then the opponent can do no 
better than to also employ a strategy of this type. This leads to the following 
definition: 
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Definition 3.1 Let p represent the probability that a loan is granted by the bank 
and s; (i = 1,2,3) denote the possible states of the system. 7 A Markov strategy for 
the bank is a state dependent lending rule p(s)E [0,1] which selects a loan probability 
for each of the three states. Similarly, a Markov strategy for the country is a state 
dependent repayment probability a(s, )e [0,1] which is defined when investment 
succeeds. 
Markov strategies can be used in situations where the most recent actions have 
a strong bearing on current and future payoffs (see Maskin and Tirole (1988)). Cole, 
Dow and English (1989) argue that this is the case for the international credit market. 
In using this type of strategy, players' actions are still rational and we may expect the 
solutions obtained to be simple and thus easier to study and more likely to arise in 
practice than complex equilibria. 
3.4 Expected payoffs 
The assumptions about the economic environment and the play of the game 
lead to the following expression for the present value of the expected payoffs for the 
bank in each state (denoted V). $ To ease notation, we represent the state dependence 
of the players' strategies simply by p, and a;. 
' Notice that we do not need the fourth state in what follows. This becomes subsumed 
into state two as the bank observes repudiation without knowing the cause. 
8 Time subscripts are omitted as the equilibrium path is state and not time dependent. 
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V; = (1 - p; ) SV1 + p; {(1 - n; )(-1 + SV2) + n; (r + SV3)} (3.1) 
Here, 0<5<1 is a discount factor assumed common to both players and n; = ya, 
indicates the total probability that a loan will be repaid in state i. Notice that this 
equation expresses the loaning preferences of the bank, for SV1 is the expected return 
from not extending funds whilst the term in braces indicates the expected return from 
lending. The relative magnitudes of these two terms determines the bank's lending 
policy. 
We can similarly state an expression for the present value of the expected 
payoffs for the borrower in this stationary environment. These are given as Ui in 
equation (3.2). 
U1=(1 -p) SU, +pi (ni(x-r+SU3)+y(1 -aß)(1+x+SU2)+(1 -y)SU2} 
(3.2) 
The repayment preferences of the country can be seen from (3.2) to depend upon the 
relative magnitudes of the return from repudiating (1 +x+ SU2) and from repaying 
(x -r+ SU3). The term (1 - y)SUZ reflects the expected continuation payoff achieved 
if investment fails. 
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3S Equilibrium 
We are now in a position to state the conditions which a Markov Perfect 
Equilibrium (MPE) must satisfy. 
Definition 3.2 Assuming that both players are rational, a stationary MPE 
consists of a pair of strategies p; ' and a; ' such that p; maximizes equation (3.1) given 
a, * and the current state and a, * maximizes equation (3.2) given p; ' and the current 
state. Additionally, we require that p3' > p2 and p3 > p1 in a lending equilibrium. 
This definition ensures that, for each state, the strategy employed by one player 
is an optimal response to the strategy of the opponent. The restriction p3* > p2` 
prevents the bank from rewarding a country more (in terms of a higher loan 
probability) for non-repayment than for fulfilling the terms of the debt contract. 
Additionally, p3 > p1* is needed in order that the country does not find it optimal to 
default when receiving a loan in order to miss out on a loan next period and then 
receive a loan with a high probability in the following period. 
The solution of the model is stated in the following proposition: 
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PROPOSITION 3.1 There are two possible types of MPE in which the bank has a 
zero expected return: 
(I) if i) T? I/(I+r) 
and ii) y(1+x) > 1+r 
and iii) 8 2- (1+r)/7(1+x) 
then a; = 1/[7(1+r)] `d i, and the p; ' satisfy 
80 + r) p, * + 8[7(1 + x) - (1 + r)] p2 - &Y(1 + x) p3* + (1 + r) =0 
(3.3) 
such that p3 > p2 and p3 > pl'. 
(II) If any of i), ii), iii) above do not hold then 
P1=a=O Vi 
Proof Let the term in braces in equation (3.1) be represented by M. Then it is 
clearly the case that (A) 8V1 >M implies pi = 0; (B) when 8V1 <M then p; = 1; 
(C) SV =M gives bank randomization so that p, e [0,11. The repayment preferences 
of the country are given from (3.2) by: 
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(X) x-r+ SU3 =1+x+ SU2 implies a; E [0,1]; 
(Y) x-r+ SU3 >1+x+ SUZ indicates a; = 1; 
(Z) x-r+ 8U3 <1+x+ SU2 yields a; = 0. 
I. Assume that conditions (C) and (X) hold so that p; E [0,1] and a; E [0,1]. 
From condition (C) and equation (3.1), bank randomization indicates that V; =0 
V i. Substitution of this fact back into equation (3.1) gives a; ` as in equilibrium I of 
the proposition. Condition i) is needed to ensure 1 >_ a, *. 
Now use condition (X) to eliminate U3 from the three equations given by (3.2), 
viz 
[8(1 - p, ) - 1] U, + [Sp, ] U2 =-p, T(1 + x) (3.2a) 
[8(1 - p2)] U, + [5P2 - 1] U2 =- p270 + x) (3.2b) 
[8(1 - p, )] U, + [Sp3 - 1] U2 = ((1 + r)/S} - p3^y(1 + x) (3.2c) 
The three equations (3.2a), (3.2b) and (3.2c) form a system in two unknowns (U1 and 
U2) so can be solved only if one of the equations is redundant i. e. iff 
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(1 pl)-1 6p1 -Y(1+x)Pl 
8(1 p2) ape-1 -Y(l+x)P2 0 
1 +r-8P3Y(1 +x) b(1 p3) ap3-1 a 
This yields 
(1-5)[p, (1 + r) -P2(1 +r - y(1 +x))+ (1 +r-p3YS(1 +x)1/5]=0 
which implies (3.3) since 5#1. From (3.3) it is the case that if 1+r> 7(1 + x) then 
P3. > 1, so condition ii) is needed (although this condition is actually implied by iii)). 
Next let pl' = P3 -a and P2 = P3' - ß, where 1z a> 0 and 1? ß>0 by 
Definition 3.2 and the fact that the p; are probabilities. 9 Substituting this into (3.3) 
delivers 
a(1 +r)+ß['y(1 +x)-(1+r)]=(1+r)/S 
Rearranging (3.4) gives an expression for ß: 
ß= (1 + r) (1 -a ac) 
a [r (1+x)-(1+ r)] 
(3.4) 
9 In fact, it can readily be established from (3.3) that 0>ß is impossible in a lending 
equilibrium so that the condition p, ' > p2 is derived endogenously in equilibrium. 
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In order that I? (3, the following restriction on 5 is necessary 
az1 +r 
y (1 +x) -0 +r)(1 -ac) 
(3.5) 
The minimum 8 thus consistent with equilibrium (I) occurs when a=1 in (3.5) as 
indicated by condition iii). 
H. Firstly we assert that p; = a; =0 is an equilibrium and then verify this 
fact. Notice that this strategy combination implies that conditions (A) and (Z) above 
must hold. Substituting p; = a; =0 into payoff equations (3.1) and (3.2) yields 
V, ' = U; =0Vi. Clearly then only conditions (A) and (Z) can obtain so this is 
indeed an equilibrium. 
Finally, we must check that no other combinations of conditions (A), (B), (C) and 
(X), (Y), (Z) is a candidate for equilibrium. This is easily done by contradiction. 
Take, for example, the combination of conditions (A) and (Y) where we assume 
p; =0 and a, =1 is an equilibrium. From equation (3.2), the expected payoff for the 
country is U; =0Vi. Using this, we have 1+ SU3 <1+x+ ßU2 which gives 
ai = 0, a contradiction. Contradictions can similarly be derived for all other condition 
pairs.   
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3.6 Remarks 
Equilibrium 11 is one in which there is no lending and no repayment. If the 
bank knows that its loans will not be repaid, then clearly it will never loan. Similarly, 
if the bank will not loan regardless of country actions, then there is no reason for the 
country to set a positive repayment probability in any state. In this case both the bank 
and the country have an expected return of zero. 
Equilibrium I is more interesting as it depicts some potential activity in the 
international credit market. The intertemporal properties of this equilibrium indicate 
that there may be -periods of lending and repayment, lending with default or no 
lending activity. In other words, it is quite possible that breakdowns in the 
relationship can occur for an endogenously determined length of time. The lending 
equilibrium only exists, however, if three conditions are met. Condition i) is required 
in order that 1za; '. Table 3.1 gives an indication of the interest rate conditions 
prevailing in the period 1974-89 in the international credit market, indicating the 
highest and lowest interest rates and the period average. 
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Table 3.1: 
Average annual interest rate terms of new commitments by private creditors 1974-89 
(%)" 
HIGH r LOW r PERIOD 
AVE. r 
ALL DEVELOPING 11.1 6.4 7.98 
COUNTRIES'o 
BRAZIL 16.2 7.8 10.63 
Source: World Bank World Debt Tables, various editions. 
Given the values of r in Table 3.1, Table 3.2 then gives the minimum value 
of y which satisfies condition i). 
Table 3.2: Minimum y values given r from Table 3.1. 
y (high r) y (low r) y (ave. r) 
ALL DEVELOPING 0.9000 
COUNTRIES 
0.9398 0.9261 
BRAZIL 0.8606 0.9276 0.9309 
10 As defined by the World Bank in the World Bank Debt Tables. 
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For the interest rate conditions which occurred over the period 1974-89, the 
probability of an investment succeeding in the borrowing country would have to be 
very high in order for a loan to be granted. 
Condition ii) states that the expected investment return should be greater than 
the actual debt to be repaid. In other words, the investment technology in the 
developing country must be potentially capable of producing the returns necessary to 
repay the debt. This too is a difficult criterion for a borrower to meet. Take, for 
example, the period average interest rate from Table 3.1 and y= . 95: condition ii) then 
requires x> 13.66% for the all country sample and x> 16.45% for Brazil. 
The third condition which must be fulfilled in order for there to be a lending 
equilibrium in the international credit market implies that both parties must have 
sufficient regard for the future. This restriction derives from the equilibrium lending 
policy of the bank so that the creditor must be able to overlook current default to 
some extent in anticipation of future fulfillment of loan obligations. Additionally, the 
debtor must value the future enough that the short run gains to default do not 
outweigh the benefits of continued access. From equation (3.3), the intuitively 
appealing and common result obtains that the larger the discount factor, the greater 
the number of equilibria which can be supported. 
Turning to the equilibrium actions themselves, the current mixed strategy of 
the bank makes the country indifferent in the current period between repaying and 
defaulting whilst the current mixed strategy of the country renders the bank indifferent 
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in the current period between loaning and withholding funds. From equation (3.1) it 
can be seen that the bank is only indifferent in all states if a; is the same in all states. 
This is reflected in equilibrium I. Furthermore, the form of the repayment probability 
is intuitively appealing, for the higher the interest obligation, the less willing is the 
country to repay. Similarly, an increase in the probability of a successful investment 
requires a low willingness to repay, a, to preserve bank indifference. Notice that the 
lender in this environment cannot make loan contracts completely free of the risk of 
repudiation caused by insouciance. Whilst some other models of the debtor/creditor 
relationship may permit default only due to a poor state of nature, a; ' <1 in this 
model indicates that default may be chosen in equilibrium, in the good state. The bank 
can still achieve zero profits in the long-run, however. 
Table 3.3 gives the equilibrium a; given the interest rate conditions in Table 
3.1, taking y=0.95. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 suggest that a lending equilibrium will occur 
only if the country has an `adequate' investment technology and is extremely willing 
to use returns generated by investment to finance debt repayment. 
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Table 3.3: Equilibrium repayment action (a, *), given y= . 95 and the 
interest rate 
conditions from Table 3.1. 
a; (high r) a, * (low r) a; (ave. r) 
ALL DEVELOPING 0.9475 0.9893 0.9748 
COUNTRIES 
BRAZIL 0.9059 0.9765 0.9515 
For the bank, any pi -c- [0,11 represent an equilibrium lending strategy if they 
satisfy equation (3.3) and the additional constraints from Definition 3.2. An appealing 
feature of equilibrium I is that current lending decisions are linked to previous 
repayment performance. It follows from p3' > pl* and p3' > p2 that all default is 
punished to some extent in this setup because the bank cannot discern whether non- 
repayment is due to country insouciance or failed investment. The equilibrium lending 
strategy in this case is to punish all default through a reduced loan probability. This 
conflicts with Grossman and Van Huyck's (1988) notion of excusable default which, 
in the context of this model, would require p2' = p3* (> 0). To see why this is an 
impossible outcome for this game, notice from the proof of Proposition 3.1 that, in 
equilibrium, condition (X) is satisfied so that x-r+ SU3 =1+x+ SU2. Given that 
a; is constant across states in equilibrium, P2 = p; implies U2 = U3. From condition 
(X) again, this equilibrium is only valid if r= -1, a contradiction. In this model it is 
impossible, in equilibrium, to make the country willing to repay in all states. This fact 
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precludes the Grossman and van Huyck (1988) result in a strict sense. 
Whilst all default is punished through a lower loan probability, a weaker form 
of the Grossman and van Huyck (1988) result can arise in this model. Specifically, 
although the loan probability is reduced after non-repayment, it is still possible to 
observe a loan being granted in the period directly following default if this is the 
outcome of the bank's randomization process. Naturally, this turn of events is most 
likely when the immediate punishment is weakest. To examine the minimum 
punishment to default in a lending equilibrium, the following definition is adopted. 
Definition 3.3 The `most excusable default' lending equilibrium satisfies 
Definition 3.2 and has the least distance between p2 and p3 (i. e. the minimum value 
of ß). 
In other words, the most excusable default lending equilibrium has the highest possible 
loan probability following a default. 
PROPOSITION 3.2 The most excusable default lending equilibrium has a lending 
strategy for the bank 
X 6y(1+x)-(1+r) pl=0: 8 [Y(l+x)-(1+r)]' P3=1 
and is valid if conditions i), ii) and iii) in Proposition 3.1 are satisfied. The 
equilibrium repayment action for the country is as in equilibrium I of Proposition 3.1. 
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Proof 
From (3.4), the minimum value of 1 (= (3"') occurs when a is at its largest 
(= 1) so that 
ßi, _ 
(1+r)(i -a) 
8 IY(1 + x) - (1 + r)] 
As, by definition, p1 = P3' - Cr" P3 must equal one and p1 = 0. Also p2 = p3' -0 
=1- ß''° in the most excusable default lending equilibrium which gives p2 as in the 
proposition. The action of the country is given in Proposition 3.1.   
Essentially, Proposition 3.2 gives the minimum equilibrium punishment 
immediately following a default. In this case, repayment of a loan is rewarded by a 
loan for certain next period. Non-repayment is punished according to P2% and if there 
was no loan last period, then lending ceases altogether. " In other words, lending is 
terminated with probability r. Assuming r= . 
08,5 = . 99, y= . 95 and x= . 15 gives 
ßmm = . 873. Therefore, whilst the most excusable 
default lending equilibrium gives 
the case in which a loan is most likely to follow a non-repayment, a defaulter runs a 
great risk of losing its access permanently, for once reputation is lost in this 
equilibrium, it cannot be regained. This result is endogenously derived in this model 
and not assumed as in, for example, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Kletzer (1984) and 
Atkeson (1991). 
" Due to this feature, the most excusable default equilibrium is unlikely to be the most 
efficient equilibrium. This is demonstrated in the numerical example of the next section. 
53 
PROPOSITION 3.3 If constraints i), ii) and iii) are satisfied, then the harshest 
punishment in a lending equilibrium has pl' = pi =0 and p3' _ (l+r)/&y(l+x). 
Proof The harshest punishment available to the bank is to withhold funds i. e. 
pis = p2 = 0. By Definition 3.2, it must be the case that p3' >0 in a lending 
equilibrium - substituting Pl' = P2 =0 into (3.3) delivers p, ' as stated.   
If this harshest punishment lending equilibrium is played then, lending is terminated 
with a high probability, 1- p3', and repayment does not necessarily guarantee a loan 
next period. This is the lending equilibrium in which the country most easily loses 
its access to the international credit market and consequently is the least efficient. 
Indeed, it is this equilibrium which imposes complete financial autarky following 
default, which corresponds to those investigated in most of the sovereign debt 
literature. This is the only equilibrium of the current model in which at least one 
breakdown and resumption of lending cannot occur. 
It appears that the equilibria which could arise from this simple model are 
capable of capturing a wide range of situations. On the one hand, when pl' >0 and 
pi >0 it is possible that a defaulter will receive a loan in the next period or after a 
finite period of exclusion depending on the outcome of the bank's randomization 
process. When pl' = p2 = 0, not only does a defaulter lose its creditworthiness 
irretrievably, but this can also happen to a country which has repaid its debt. As debt 
repayment does not guarantee a loan for certain in this case (Proposition 3.3), even 
if a country meets its obligation it may fail to obtain a loan immediately afterwards. 
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The system then reverts to state 1 in which no loan is ever granted as p, ` = 0. In 
addition to the most excusable and harshest punishment lending equilibria, situations 
are depicted in which there are periods of enthusiastic lending followed by periods of 
inactivity. Moreover, the transition between these different phases of lending activity 
is governed in equilibrium by the repayment actions of the country. Additionally, the 
expected length of the punishment period is determined as part of the equilibrium 
without recourse to a priori restrictions. 
3.7 Numerical analysis 
In order to examine possible lending equilibria more closely, equation (3.3) has 
been evaluated numerically using 3= . 99, 'y = . 
95, x= . 15 and r= . 08. These 
parameters satisfy the conditions necessary for a lending equilibrium to exist. In this 
equilibrium, the country repays with probability a, * = 0.9747. The lending actions of 
the bank are presented in Table 3.4, where the cells of the table represent p3'. In 
deriving these values, p, ' and p2 were allowed to range between zero and one in steps 
of 0.001 for pl' and 0.01 for p;. 
For this set of parameters, it is apparent that the equilibrium lending policy of 
the bank will involve p, ' being no more than 0.001 and p2 assuming its largest value 
at 0.12. Giving the country enough of an incentive to repay any sovereign debt which 
it incurs leads to very high equilibrium values for P3 *1 the equilibrium probability of 
a loan following repayment. 
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Table 3.4: Equilibrium values of p3 , given 
6= 
. 99, y= . 95, x= . 15 and r= . 08 and 
values for p1 and p2 
P, PZ 
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 
0 . 9985 . 9988 . 9990 . 
9992 . 9995 . 9997 . 9999 
0.001 . 9995 . 9998 1.000 + + + + 
Note: A `+' indicates a value of p3 > 1. 
The most excusable default lending equilibrium has p, * = 0, p2 = . 12 and 
P3* = . 9999,12 with a high probability that the debtor loses its reputation permanently. 
Indeed when p, ' = 0, the debtor should expect at some stage to be permanently 
excluded from the credit market. This mirrors existing reputational models of 
sovereign debt. However, there are equilibria in which p, * >0 implying that 
reputation is never lost permanently but can be regained after a period of punishment. 
Periods of renewed lending after variable exclusion intervals are thus captured by 
these equilibria. 
Corresponding to the equilibria in Table 3.4, Tables 3.5,3.6 and 3.7 indicate 
that the expected payoff of the country (U1) is low in states one and two but 
12 This does not exactly equal one due to the coarseness of the grid used to search for 
equilibria. 
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comparatively high in state three. The expected return of the bank is zero in all cases. 
Table 3.5: U, ' for the equilibria in Table 3.4. 
P, PZ 
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 
00000000 
0.001 . 1091 . 1113 . 1136 ++++ 
Table 3.6: U2 for the equilibria in Table 3.4. 
Pig Psi 
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 
00 . 0223 . 0455 . 0697 . 0949 . 1213 . 1488 
0.001 . 1081 . 1325 . 1580 ++++ 
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Table 3.7: U3' for the equilibria in Table 3.4. 
pi P2 
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 
0 1.0909 1.1132 1.1364 1.1606 1.1858 1.2122 1.2397 
. 001 1.1990 1.2234 1.2489 + + + + 
The steady state probabilities for these equilibria are p, = . 627, p2 = . 0276 and 
P3 = . 346 for the case of most excusable default and pl = . 
6672, p2 = . 02463 and 
P3 _ . 3082 for the harshest punishment. Multiplying the payoffs 
in the preceding three 
tables by their steady state probabilities leads to Table 3.8 in which the total payoffs 
of the country in each equilibrium are represented. 
From this Table 3.8, it is clear and unsurprising that the harshest punishment 
lending equilibrium is the situation in which the country achieves the lowest expected 
payoff. This is due to the high probability of a total exclusion from receiving external 
funds. It is exactly this equilibrium which is often presented in the sovereign debt 
literature. 
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Table 3.8: Expected payoffs for the equilibria in Table 3.4. 
Pig Pz 
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 
0 . 3362 . 3507 . 3656 . 
3812 
. 3976 . 4147 . 4330 
. 001 . 4456 . 4623 . 4795 + + + + 
Although the most excusable default lending equilibrium is the one in which 
the country faces the least immediate punishment for default, this is not the most 
efficient outcome. Indeed, it is dominated by all of the equilibria in which reputation 
is never lost permanently following default (in other words where pl' > 0). The most 
efficient equilibrium sets pl' = . 001, pi = . 
04 and p3' =1 so that repayment is 
rewarded with a loan for certain whilst p2 is at the highest level consistent with a 
non- zero p, '. In other words, the most efficient equilibrium is the one in which the 
borrower has the most access to the international credit market. 
An efficiency argument may be applied in order to reduce the multiple 
equilibria of this model to a unique equilibrium. 13 Before the lending game is played, 
imagine that a number of banks compete with each other over the right to lend to the 
sovereign. Each bank offers a contract and the sovereign selects the one its prefers 
13 1 am grateful to Norman Ireland for pointing this out. 
59 
(that is the one which offers the highest expected payoffs). If it is possible to offer 
loan contracts which specify a loan probability in each state, then the competition 
among the banks will ensure that the contract is offered which provides the sovereign 
with the greatest possible expected payoff. In terms of Tables 3.4 and 3.8, the bank 
which offers the contract specifying loan probabilities of . 001, . 04 and 1 in states one, 
two and three respectively will gain the right to lend to the sovereign. Assuming that 
this contract legally binds the bank, the lending game will then possess a unique 
equilibrium. 
3.8 Comparative statics 
If binding state-dependent contracts are not possible, then it is interesting to 
look at how the size of the equilibrium set varies in response to changes in the model 
parameters. The comparative statics of the lending side of the model are easily 
evaluated to be"' 
api # 3 <u är <0 är 
ä 
>0 
1 ! 
aPs 
>0 
& 
>Ü 
äz 
< GÖC 
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'a Economic interpretation of these comparative statics is not meaningful due to the 
existence of multiple equilibria. 
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with the interaction of the p; having the following signs: 
ap 
0 O-P; <U 
ý2 81 
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>0 
X1°2 
>0 
ap3 83 
>0 
ý3 
>0 
ap1 ap2 
This interaction of the lending probabilities seems to suggest that, in a lending 
equilibrium, the bank must set an appropriate distance between the loan probability 
in the reward state (state three) and the loan probabilities in the other two states. 
Also, if r increases or y or x falls, equilibria with p3 close to one may see this 
probability increase above one and hence will cease to be equilibria. The same 
applies to p, ' or p2 close to zero. The intuition here is straightforward: as r 
increases, the country becomes less inclined to repay unless the bank provides the 
correct incentive by increasing the distance between the reward (state three) and 
punishment (states one and two) loan probabilities. For equilibria at the edge of the 
original equilibrium set this is not possible without driving the loan probabilities above 
one or below zero. Similarly, as the technology in the borrowing country deteriorates 
(x or 7 fall), the larger the required repayment becomes as a proportion of the 
expected investment return so the less willing the country is to repay. Making the 
country want to repay by adjusting the gap between punishment and reward again 
shrinks the set of possible equilibria. 
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3.9 Conclusion 
In the type of international credit market modelled here, many countries will 
be refused sovereign loans. Even those which pass the criteria and receive loans 
cannot expect continuous access to external funds. The special feature of the model 
of this chapter is that it does not assume that default necessarily leads to a complete 
future lending embargo. An endogenously determined length of exclusion results as 
the punishment to default in equilibrium. Depending on the exact equilibrium played, 
this punishment can be either infinite or finite. Models assuming a permanent loss of 
reputation after default necessarily rule out the latter class of equilibria. Specifically, 
equilibria have been demonstrated to exist in which reputation may not be lost 
irreversibly in that a default may be followed by a loan immediately or after a period 
of exclusion. The lulls in activity in the market for sovereign debt suggested earlier 
in this chapter by Eichengreen (1989) can thus be captured, at least in principle, by 
this model. Whether the international credit market is in a phase of lending or non- 
lending was shown to depend critically on the action of the borrowing country. An 
interesting feature of the model is that some defaults are due to country insouciance 
and not just caused by a bad state of nature. 
The most efficient lending equilibria are achieved when the country retains the 
possibility of access to external funds. The least efficient lending equilibrium was 
found to be the one which constrains the borrower to permanent financial autarky 
following default. A numerical example was presented, however, which suggested 
that sovereign borrowers should expect default to lead to extremely long, possibly 
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permanent, periods of financial isolation. Even the most efficient equilibrium exhibits 
this characteristic, implying that commercial bank lending is not suitable for the 
purposes of development - the flow of funds is likely to be much too volatile. 
Although the model presented above is quite rich in implication, it is very 
simple and shall be extended in the next two chapters. Chapter four investigates the 
relationship of the punishment interval and access to the international credit market 
in determining the payoff of the borrower when the country has the flexibility of 
choosing the amount of its obligation it wishes to repay. The benefits of excusing 
default are also examined. Chapter five introduces heterogeneous borrowers into the 
international credit market so that the bank is not aware of the inherent characteristics 
of the borrower but must learn them over time. 
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CHAPTER 4. EXCUSABLE DEFAULT AND ACCESS TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL CREDIT MARKET 
In the lending equilibria of chapter three, the country sometimes defaults even 
when it has funds available to repay its debt. Also in some of the equilibria, it is not 
certain that repayment of an obligation will generate a loan for certain in the next 
period. This chapter uses the concept of self-generation of payoffs introduced by 
Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1986) to solve a model similar to that of chapter three 
when the country can decide how much of its obligation to repay and the bank must 
break even in each period. This gives the country a greater freedom of choice than 
in the previous chapter, for its action set is expanded. Using this model, the precise 
correlation between the size of the expected country payoff and the level of access to 
the international credit market is investigated. We shall demonstrate that the outcomes 
of this model imply that the country always repays the optimal amount when able and 
the bank always rewards this repayment with a further loan immediately. That the 
bank can design an incentive scheme which ties the borrower to a policy of always 
being honest means that the debtor loses its incentive to cheat so that it never 
repudiates when it has funds to repay the debt. This is comparable to the incentive 
compatible state-dependent repayment schedule in Grossman and van Huyck (1988) 
where the borrower pays what it can. 
Furthermore, it is demonstrated that the equilibria of this model can be 
achieved using Markov strategies. The conditions which guarantee the existence of 
a lending equilibrium are stricter than those of chapter three. In particular, the country 
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will always repay more than the gross rate of interest in order to compensate the 
(myopic) bank for the possibility of default. For a lending equilibrium to exist, the 
investment technology of the country must be able to generate sufficient returns for 
the borrower to achieve a great enough surplus after repayment that the honest policy 
is always dominant. 
A numerical example is presented to illustrate the findings for an economy 
which has potentially greater investment returns than that of chapter three. The 
country analyzed previously is found not to pass the criteria required for receiving 
loans in this new framework. Using the definition from chapter three, the most 
excusable default lending equilibrium is examined and found to imply that a borrower 
will lose its access to the international credit market eventually, making it the least 
efficient equilibrium in this model. This contrasts with the result in the previous 
chapter that the most excusable default lending equilibrium was relatively efficient. 
There, each equilibrium prescribed different expected payoffs in each state so that the 
most excusable default equilibrium could still be quite efficient in spite of its predicted 
credit embargo, for the benefits of continued access in other equilibria were smaller 
than the potential benefits of having default `overlooked' in the most excusable default 
lending equilibrium. In the model of the present chapter, the different MPEs are 
found to give the same payoff following repayment and the same payoff following 
default, so the most efficient lending equilibrium is the one in which the country has 
the greatest degree of access to external funds. 
The results on the efficiency of the most excusable default lending equilibrium 
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stand in contrast to the excusable default equilibrium of Grossman and van Huyck 
(1988). It appears that the crucial difference between the two models is that 
borrowers repay what they can in their model and when they can in the current 
chapter, but the bank cannot observe whether default is attributable to insouciance or 
investment failure. Designing an incentive compatible repayment scheme in the 
presence of this constraint on funds available for debt service gives the bank a series 
of options in its lending policy. At one extreme it may excuse default as much as 
possible in a lending equilibrium but at the same time increase the chance of a 
complete credit embargo, or at the other extreme it can implement the harshest 
equilibrium punishment after default whilst potentially maintaining credit lines open. 
The latter case - the least excusable default lending equilibrium - is shown to be more 
efficient for the country. Indeed, excusing default will actually harm the borrower in 
the long run. 
4.1 The model 
The economic environment is assumed to be that described in chapter three, 
section 3.1 and the play conforms to section 3.2 with the exception that the country 
decides how much of its obligation to repay after it has obtained a loan and 
investment has succeeded. Specifically, we assume that the action of the country at 
time t is to repay Rte [0, l+x]. The time horizon is infinite. Denote the probability 
that an amount Rt'E [0, l+x] is repaid as a(RL')e [0,1] so that EK1a(R) =1 and 
yER, a(RJR, is the expected repayment made. The value a(0) is then the probability 
that no repayment is made at all. 
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A strategy for the bank selects a loan probability at each time period depending 
upon the history up to that point. Similarly, a strategy for the country, defined only 
when investment succeeds, selects a repayment probability `a' for each Rye [0,1+x] 
at time t depending upon history. 
4.2 Payoff self-generation 
The concept of self-generation of payoffs is due to Abreu, Pearce and 
Stacchetti (1986,1990) and has previously been applied to a game involving sovereign 
debt by Atkeson (1991). Let E(S) be the set of equilibrium payoffs for a game, given 
discount factor S, and let W be the set of continuation payoffs. Further, denote by 
B(S, W) the set of payoffs generated by 8 and W. 
Definition 4.1 W is self-generating if Wc B(S, W). 
Definition 4.1 states that the set of continuation payoffs is self-generating if the set 
of payoffs which can be achieved through continuation payoffs from the set W 
includes all of W. The following theorem relates W and E(S). 
THEOREM 4.1 (Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti 1986,1990): 
If W is self-generating, then Wc E(S). 
If the set of continuation payoffs is self-generating, then the set of continuation 
payoffs is contained in the set of equilibrium payoffs. We shall use this to solve the 
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model of this chapter. 
Let em be the maximum expected equilibrium payoff achievable by the debtor 
nation and let e1E [0, em] be a particular payoff which we seek to achieve. The 
following lemma demonstrates that any e1 [0, em] can be supported as an equilibrium. 
LEMMA 4.1 ee [0, em] can be supported as an equilibrium. 
Proof eye [0, em] can be supported as an equilibrium if there exists a lending action 
for the bank, pte [0,1], and an action for the borrower, a(R)E [0,1], and future 
country utilities e,, L if there is no loan in period t and e(R, ) if RL is repaid, such that 
the following three conditions, (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3), hold 
et = (1 - P) 8eNL + Pc [(1 - Y) 8e(O) +y{ ixt a(R) (1 +x- Rt + Se°(RJ) )l 
(4.1) 
where e`NL, e°(0), e(R)E [0, e°']. 
y, a(R)Rt = 1+r for p, >0 
y 4, a(R)P., 5 1+r for p1= 0 (4.2) 
I+x-R, + Se`(R1) =1 +x-R' + SeC(Rt') >1+x+ Se°(0) 
V R, R, ' in the support of a(. ) 
(4.3) 
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We must show that [0, em] is an interval. Set e`,, a, =0 for simplicity and assume that 
em requires p, = 1. Let eý = aem for 0 <_ ?51 be a particular payoff which we seek 
to achieve. From (4.1), eý is achieved by setting pt = ?. implying that lending is 
terminated with probability (1A). Repeating for all permissible ? establishes that 
[0, e°'] is indeed an interval.   
Essentially, Lemma 4.1 demonstrates that the set of payoffs [0, e°'] self- 
generates and hence belongs to the set of equilibrium payoffs by Theorem 4.1. As 
there are no other country payoffs in this model by definition, this is the entire set of 
equilibrium payoffs i. e. E(S) = [0, em]. In solving the model at time t, both a current 
and continuation payoff for the borrower is selected from the set E(S). In other 
words, the set of equilibrium payoffs E(S) does not vary between periods. The time 
subscript is therefore dropped for the remainder of this chapter. 
Equation (4.1) is the expected payoff of the borrower and is comparable to 
(3.2), although is more general as the level of repayment can be chosen by the debtor. 
The per-period zero profit condition for the bank is (4.2) which states that if a loan 
is granted with positive probability, the expected repayment must be equal to the gross 
interest rate. A loan will not be granted if the expected repayment is below this 
level. ' Condition (4.3) reflects the fact that for all R played with positive probability, 
i. e. for all R in the support of a(R), 1+x-R+ 8e°(R) must attain the maximum. If 
the country sets a positive probability on two different repayment levels, then it must 
' Indeed, (4.2) demonstrates that it is possible for a loan not to be granted even if the 
expected repayment is high enough. As shown below, a loan needs to be granted with 
certainty to achieve e°'. 
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get the same expected payoff from each of these actions. If not, one of the 
repayments would strictly be preferred. 
4.3 Characterization of the equilibrium payoff set E(S) 
We have demonstrated that the equilibrium payoff set for this game is 
E(S) = [0, em], so now we attempt to characterize this set. This is carried out by 
establishing several claims, the first of which demonstrates that a country will never 
renege on its debt contract if it is able to repay. 
Claim 4.1 There is a unique We [0,1+x] for which a(R) >0 and e`(R*) = em. In 
fact, for R' = (1+r)/?, a(R) = 1. 
Proof The expected country payoff in (4.1) is increasing in the choice of continuation 
payoffs e(R) so, in order to achieve em, the country must be rewarded as much as 
possible for some repayment. From Lemma 4.1, there must exist some R` with 
a(R') >0 and e(R) em. To see that this R' is unique, consider the following 
argument: assume that there exists R' 9& R* with a(R') >0 and 6°(R') = em = e`(R*). 
Equation (4.3) is immediately violated indicating that R* is unique and hence 
a(R) = I. With a(R') = 1, (4.2) implies that for the bank to make zero profits, the 
average value of R' (conditional on a loan being made and investment succeeding) 
must be R' = (1+r)/'f.   
Claim 4.1 states that in order to achieve the maximum payoff, the country must 
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repay R' when able. Notice that we require y(1 + x) >1+r, for this repayment to 
be feasible and to ensure that the bank does not capture all of the country's surplus. 2 
Furthermore, an amount greater than the gross interest rate is repaid in order to 
compensate the bank for repudiation due to investment failure. Such compensation 
is necessary in this model as the bank must expect to break even each period, in 
contrast to chapter three where the repayments were 1+r as it could take a longer 
term view. 
Achieving em requires that the bank loan with probability p* =1 as long as 
(1 - y) Se`(0) +y[1+x -{ (1 + r)/y} + Sem] > Se°NL (4.4) 
which simply states that the country should expect, in the best equilibrium, to achieve 
more by obtaining a loan in the current period than by not receiving credit. Indeed, 
this must hold at least for the equilibrium delivering em if there are to be non-trivial 
solutions to this model (equilibria with lending). As (4.2) is clearly satisfied in the 
best equilibrium, the bank is indifferent between lending to the sovereign borrower 
and not. We can therefore set p=1 as required to achieve the highest equilibrium 
payoff for the borrower. In the numerical example of chapter three, the most efficient 
equilibrium also had repayment being rewarded with a loan for certain in the 
following period. 
2 This condition was one of the pre-requisites in chapter three for a lending equilibrium 
to occur. 
71 
The following two claims help to characterize E(S), the equilibrium payoff set 
for the borrower. 
Claim 4.2 e(0) = em - (1+r)/&y. 
Proof With e`(R*) = e°', it must be the case that the return from repaying this amount 
is at least as good as that from making no repayment at all, viz. 
1 +x - R'+Be°'>_ 1 +x+&C(0) (4.5) 
From (4.1), the expected payoff of the borrower is increasing in ec(0) so achieving the 
best country payoff involves (4.5) holding with equality. This establishes the claim 
using R' from Claim 4.1.   
Claim 4.3 
e"` =118 [Y(1 +x) - 
(l Týý 
(4.6) 
Proof In (4.1) set p=1, R* = (1+r)/y, a(R) =1 and e°(0) from Claim 4.2 to obtain 
em=(l -Y)a lea- 
(1+r)l+Y[1+x- (1 +r) +ae"`] aY Y 
Rearranging this yields (4.6) as claimed.   
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Notice that for the existence of a lending equilibrium, we require that 
e`(0) >_ 03 so that borrowers with small 7 or x will be denied loans. The fact that the 
least technically advanced countries will not receive commercial bank loans was a 
feature of the model of chapter three. The condition which ensures the existence of 
a lending equilibrium can be derived from Claims 4.2 and 4.3 as 8y(1 + x) > R' 4 
The discounted expected value of the country's investment must be at least as large 
as the repayment made in the best equilibrium. In other words, the country will only 
want to repay anything (and hence be rewarded with a further loan) if the discounted 
expected return next period from receiving and investing a loan is at least as great as 
the loss incurred this period due to repayment. With (4.4), the best expected country 
payoff is attainable only if a loan is made with certainty. Furthermore, e' is the 
normalized expected difference between investment return and the optimal repayment. 
4.4 Lending equilibrium in Markov strategies 
In restricting attention to Markov strategies, we require that the bank selects 
its current loan probability depending upon what has happened in the previous period. 
Similarly, a Markov strategy for the country, defined only when investment succeeds, 
selects a probability for each feasible repayment depending upon actions in the 
previous period. In fact we have already established in Claim 4.1 that the country will 
I If e°(0) <0 then Claim 4.2 implies &m < R' so that the country would maximize its 
payoff by not repaying. Consequently the bank would not lend. 
4 Earlier, it was noted that y(l+x) > 1+r is needed for a lending equilibrium to exist. As 
R* = (l+r)/y, the condition &y(1+x) > R' is the strictest condition which must be met for the 
existence of a lending equilibrium. 
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always repay R` when able. 
The following lemma shows that a lending equilibrium of this model exists in 
Markov strategies. 
LEMMA 4.2 Payoff eE [0, em] can be achieved using Markov strategies. 
Proof Notice that expected payoff e=? em with 0: 5 X: 5 1 can be attained by setting 
p=) and eNL= 0. In this case, lending is terminated with probability (1-k). This 
strategy is Markovian and works in the following way: if R* is repaid, then a loan is 
extended next period with probability one; if R' is not repaid then a loan is extended 
next period with probability ? and if no loan was granted last period, no loan shall be 
forthcoming this period. For the country a(R) =1 is a weakly dominant strategy in 
all states by construction.   
Given that, under certain conditions, a lending equilibrium in Markov strategies 
exists, the set of equilibrium actions is straightforward to characterize. The country 
sets a(R) = 1, R* = (1+r)/y when investment succeeds, conditional on a loan being 
made. This is a weakly dominant strategy irrespective of actions in the previous 
periods Using Claims 4.2 and 4.3 yields 
5 In chapter three, it was weakly dominant in all states to set a constant probability of 
repayment. Here, a constant repayment amount is set. 
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e`(0) = 
ay2(1 + x) - (1 + r) 
6y (1 - 8) 
(4.7) 
From equation (4.1), the bank action, p, which gives this value of ec(0) can be found 
to be 
8y [y(1 + x) - (1 - 8)Se ]- (1 + r) 
Pxx = 
8y [y(1 + x) - (1 - 8)8eß ]- 8(1 + r) 
(4.8) 
where p',,, R indicates the probability of a loan following a non-optimal repayment of 
debt 
In order to induce the country to want to repay R*, the bank must reward 
repayment as much as possible. Setting p=1 is only a reward for the country if it 
attains a higher expected payoff from obtaining a loan than from being refused credit. 
In other words, we require that em > eINL. Furthermore, an upper bound can be set on 
e°NL so that p'NR z0 in (4.8). A lower bound on 6'NL occurs when p=0 in (4.1) 
giving eNL = 0. Therefore, it must be the case that 
n> -1 
(1 + r) I by 
(4.9) 
In order to achieve some d NI, in this region requires 
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s eß (1 - 
b) 
Pere = 
be`(O) + Y(1 + x) - beNL 
(4.10) 
When &y(1+x) > (l+r)/y and (4.9) is met, a multiplicity of lending MPEs exist. 
This mirrors the findings in chapter three where the country again had a weakly 
dominant strategy and the bank had many ways of achieving zero profit. Notice that 
Sy(l+x) > (1+r)/y is a stronger condition than ii) and iii) in chapter three. In the 
present model, not only must the country have the potential for generating returns in 
order for the bank to be induced to lend, but the technology must be able to 
compensate the borrower for making debt repayments which exceed the gross interest 
rate. Recall that repayments were equal to the gross rate of interest in chapter three. 
That the requirements for the existence of equilibrium are stricter than in the previous 
chapter should not be surprising, for the bank is taking a shorter term view here, 
breaking even each period. Additionally, the equilibria are such that the country must 
have a great enough surplus after repayment that it is not tempted to renege on the 
grounds of insouciance. These facts combine to prevent more countries obtaining 
loans in this framework than the one presented in chapter three. 
The Markov strategy for the bank works in the following way: for some e NL 
in the region given by (4.9), 
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if R' is repaid then p'+, =1; 
if R# R* is repaid then p*,, = P*rrx ; 
if no loan this period, then p +, = P*xL 
where p'+, is the equilibrium loan probability in the next period. There are a number 
of MPEs corresponding to different levels of punishment for a non-optimal repayment 
of debt. The `most excusable default' lending equilibrium as defined in chapter three 
occurs when there is least distance between the loan probability following a repayment 
and the loan probability following default. This distance is increasing in d NL so that 
the most excusable default lending equilibrium sets dCNL = 0. Notice that if eNL = 0, 
then there is always a positive probability of the credit relationship terminating as 
p',, a, =0 so that the bank terminates lending in this case with probability 1-p ,, R. 
Possible termination of credit was found to be a part of the most excusable default 
lending equilibrium in the previous chapter. The `least excusable default' lending 
equilibrium sets the loan probability at its lowest level following a default i. e. e NL is 
at its maximum level in (4.8). 
The economy depicted in the numerical analysis of chapter two does not pass 
the criteria set in this model to obtain loans. If 'y = . 95,8 = . 99 and r= . 
08 as in 
chapter three, it must be the case that xz . 2088 in order for a lending MPE to exist. 6 
To illustrate the extreme points of the model of this chapter, consider a potentially 
more productive economy than has been used so far with the parameter values 
6 Alternatively, if y= . 95,8 = . 99 and x= . 15, a lending equilibrium would only exist 
if 0.0275 > r. 
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y= . 95,8 = . 99, r= . 08 and x= . 25. This yields em = 5.0658 and e`(0) = 
3.9175. 
The most and least excusable default equilibria for these parameter values are given 
below (p'R indicates the loan probability following repayment of R' last period and p, 
are the steady state probabilities of being in state j in the two equilibria, where 
j=R, NR, NL, indicating the states `loan and optimal repayment', `loan and sub- 
optimal repayment' and `no loan'): 
Most excusable default lending equilibrium: 
e NL = 0; p'R = 1; p"NR= . 7733; P 
*NL = 0. 
PR = . 5615 pNR = . 
0296 pNL = . 4089 
Least excusable default lending equilibrium: 
e`NL = 3.957; P *R = 1; p'NR= . 00003; p'N, = . 0345. 
PR = . 3276 pNR _ . 
0172 PNL = . 6552 
Although these equilibria lie at opposite extremes of the set of lending options 
open to the bank, they both deliver em if optimal repayment was made in the previous 
period and e(0) following a non-optimal repayment. The crucial difference between 
the two equilibria is that the most excusable default lending equilibrium precludes 
further loans if ever the bank withholds credit for one period, whereas the other 
equilibrium maintains the possibility of retaining access to external funds indefinitely. 
It should not be surprising then that the expected value of the game to the country in 
the most excusable default lending equilibrium (2.9604) is smaller than in the least 
excusable default lending equilibrium (4.3196). This apparent paradox is caused by 
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the definition of the most (least) excusable default equilibrium to be the smallest 
(largest) distance between the loan probability following repayment and that following 
default. In other words, the degree to which default is excusable is measured only in 
the state directly following the default with no regard for the future. Although the 
most excusable default lending equilibrium has the largest loan probability following 
repudiation, when seen as a whole this equilibrium will be highly inefficient as it 
prescribes the eventual termination of credit. By punishing a default strongly, on the 
other hand, there is no need for the bank to threaten a total embargo in order to keep 
the country honest. Overlooking default actually harms the country in the longer term. 
As suggested in chapter three, the most efficient equilibrium will be the one 
in which access to the international credit market is greatest and this will be the 
unique equilibrium if the pre-play contracting process outlined in chapter three is 
carried out among the banks. In the present model, the equilibria are distinguished 
by the value of d NL chosen. Recall that e°N, is the continuation payoff if no loan was 
granted in the previous period so that the most efficient lending equilibrium occurs 
when this value is greatest. In contrast, when eNL = 0, access to the international 
credit market can be lost permanently so this is the least efficient lending equilibrium. 
4.5 Summary 
The model of this chapter has relaxed the assumption made in chapter three 
that debt repayment is all or nothing, whilst the bank must expect to break even each 
period. The conditions which guarantee the existence of lending MPEs in this case 
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are stronger than for the case analyzed in chapter three. Indeed, the economy 
analyzed numerically previously would not receive loans in the current framework. 
In equilibrium, the country has no incentive to renege on its debt obligation unless it 
has experienced a bad state of nature. The investment technology must therefore be 
capable of generating returns which leave enough of a surplus after debt repayment 
that the country is not tempted to cheat. Complete repudiation of obligations when 
the country can choose how much to repay is due to a bad state of nature in the 
borrowing country. Knowing this, the bank rewards loan repayments with another 
loan for certain in the next period and punishes non-optimal repayment in the form 
of a reduced loan probability. 
The equilibrium payoff set of this game is easily characterized using the 
concept of self-generation and we have shown that these payoffs can be achieved as 
Markov Perfect Equilibria. As in the previous chapter, some parameters were used 
in order to examine the MPEs more closely. In the worst lending equilibrium for the 
country - paradoxically the most excusable default equilibrium - there is likely to be 
a complete loss of the country's reputation for creditworthiness and hence a permanent 
credit embargo will be imposed. The best outcome - the least excusable default 
lending equilibrium - indicates that losses of reputation are only temporary. Indeed, 
several periods can pass in which no loan is made and then lending can resume. This 
was also found in chapter three. The apparent paradox in the relative efficiency of the 
most and least excusable default lending equilibria was indicated to be caused by the 
definitions adopted for these two equilibria. 
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The MPEs found in this chapter resemble the outcomes in Grossman and van 
Huyck (1988) as the country has no incentive to cheat. In the current setting, when 
the country may be constrained in the frequency of repayments it is able to make and 
the bank cannot observe the realized investment return, the country is most likely to 
face a permanent credit embargo when default is excused most. Indeed the borrower 
does better in terms of its total expected payoff when the bank implements a policy 
of harsh punishment of default whilst retaining the possibility of further loans in the 
future. The difference between the results here and those of Grossman and van Huyck 
is attributable to the fact that debt repayments in the current model can only be made 
if investment succeeds but this is not observed by the bank. In this setup, the bank 
must design its lending policy to make the country repay even though its investment 
return is private knowledge. As the payoffs to repayment of the optimal amount (e°') 
and complete repudiation (6°(0)) are the same in all equilibria, it is the payoff 
following a no-loan state (e°N) which determines the overall expected payoff. By not 
punishing default strongly initially, the bank must compensate by reducing e`NL in 
order to induce the country to follow the honest policy. This reduces the overall 
expected payoff of the borrower so that excusing default is actually the action which 
harms the country the most. 
Reinforcing the findings of chapter three is the important result that lending 
to a sovereign nation can temporarily break down and then resume as part of the 
equilibrium. Previous work has tended to assume that policies need to be 
implemented to ensure the resumption of commercial bank lending to developing 
countries (for example, Aizenman and Borensztein (1989)). The results of this and 
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the previous chapter suggest that, in some cases at least, this is a false presumption. 
Whilst it is clearly not the case that lending to all sovereign borrowers will resume 
automatically as it were, it is also not true that all breakdowns in lending are 
permanent. 
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CHAPTER 5. LEARNING AND THE DYNAMICS OF REPUTATION IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL CREDIT MARKET 
5.1 Heterogeneous borrowers 
The previous two chapters have characterized the relationship between a bank 
and a known sovereign borrower. The task of the bank is straightforward in this case, 
for it loans only to countries which are willing and technically capable of generating 
funds to service the debt. In this chapter, we introduce two `types' of borrower and 
examine the outcomes when the bank does not know which type of borrower it faces. 
A type P country is assumed to be profligate as a received loan is never invested but 
is always consumed immediately. ' Thus this debtor is forced into always defaulting 
on its obligations assuming that the one good in existence cannot be stored. No loans 
would be granted to type P if its type were known. The second type of borrower, type 
I, has identical characteristics to the one dealt with in chapters three and four. This 
debtor always invests its loans in the same stochastic technology described previously 
and makes optimal repayment decisions. 2 
At the outset of the game, a creditor identical to the one dealt with in chapter 
three is matched with a debtor of unknown type with whom it transacts for the 
' Williamson (1986) documents that Argentina, for example, used her excursions into the 
international credit market not for productive purposes, but to purchase arms. 
2 These two types of debtor are comparable with the assumption by Calvo (1989) that 
a country can invest in `legitimate' or `illegitimate' activities. In the present framework, type 
P invests in the illegitimate activity (consumption) and type I invests legitimately. 
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remainder of the (potentially infinite) game. Again, the realized investment return in 
the type I debtor country is unobservable by the bank. The creditor thus has 
incomplete and imperfect information in this model as compared with complete but 
imperfect information in chapters three and four. Repayment is again dichotomized 
to be all or nothing. We are interested in capturing both the behaviour of the bank 
in the face of this uncertainty and of the type I borrower who wishes optimally to 
reveal its private information. 
The play of the game in each period is as described in chapter three, section 
3.2. The difference in this scenario is that actions will depend upon the belief of the 
creditor that it is transacting with a type I debtor. This belief can be interpreted as 
a borrower's reputation for creditworthiness. As the belief changes through time, we 
develop a dynamic theory of debtor reputation. Naturally, the bank would not wish 
to lend if it knew that its customer were type P. If there has been a loan this period 
which the debtor repays, the game becomes the one of complete information in 
chapter three, for repayment is only made by type I. If the loan is not repaid at the 
end of the period, the bank will revise downward its assessment that the borrower is 
type I. If there is no loan in the present period, the bank has no new information so 
cannot revise its beliefs. The task of the bank is to establish its borrower's type, 
whilst the type I country wishes to optimally reveal this information. The type P 
country merely accepts loans and never repays its obligations. ' 
3 In the exposition and solution of the model, it should be clear that, unless otherwise 
stated, a type I country is being referred to. A type P borrower makes no decisions. 
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The results suggest that lending breakdowns and the resumption of voluntary 
lending can occur in equilibrium. This feature is common with the previous two 
chapters. At least up to a point, default does not preclude access to future loans. This 
appears to extend a weaker form of the excusable default result of Grossman and van 
Huyck (1988) to an incomplete information structure with potential country 
insouciance. In contrast to chapters three and four, there is an endogenous limit on 
the tolerance of default by the bank, for once the reputation of a country sinks too 
low, a complete and permanent loan embargo is imposed. 
A numerical example, taking the economy from chapter three, suggests that 
parameters satisfying the criteria for the existence of a lending equilibrium are likely 
to deliver a high critical reputation threshold. Consequently, only a small number of 
loans are made until debtor type is learned by the bank. Whilst it is possible in 
principle that a creditworthy country can masquerade as an inherent defaulter, the 
example shows that this is likely to happen only with a small probability due to the 
threat of a loan embargo. Nevertheless, some default occurs due to country 
insouciance and not a realization of a poor state of nature. The temptation to 
repudiate through choice decreases, however, as the critical level of reputation, and 
hence the complete embargo, is neared. 
This chapter can be regarded as complementing the work on learning in the 
international credit market by Cole, Dow and English (1989). They also examine the 
possibility that borrowers may be inherently different, although in their case it is the 
government in a single country which is capable of being two different types, stable 
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and unstable (more prone to default). These governments evolve continuously in their 
model according to a first-order Markov process so that the `learning' is carried out 
even in a period of non-lending. In common with this chapter, loans are made 
according to the belief that the borrower is stable. In the Cole, Dow and English 
model, the only reasonable equilibrium is of the signalling type where a stable 
government indicates that it has taken power by means of a partial repayment of 
outstanding debt. ' 
Naturally, in order to make the signal, a stable type must have the funds 
available. In the context of a two borrower model, the present chapter examines the 
case in which the stable type of borrower (type I) may be prevented from making this 
signal by lack of funds. In the Cole, Dow and English model lending resumes 
following default after the stable type has signalled that it is in power. In the model 
of this chapter, the presence of a constraint on repayment means that lending 
resumptions only follow default up until a critical level of belief. Once this level of 
belief has been surpassed, even the stable borrower will permanently lose its access 
to external funds. The uncertainty caused by the presence of the unstable borrower 
can have a profound effect on the borrowing capabilities of the more stable type. 
° See chapter two for details. 
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5.2 Beliefs and strategies 
Denote by qE [0,1] the creditor's assessment that it is dealing with a type I 
country at time t (the time horizon is potentially infinite). 5 This assessment is the 
state of the system containing all of the payoff relevant history so that attention can 
again be focussed on Markov strategies. ' Let z(q1) be the probability that a loan is 
granted at time t and y(q) be the repayment probability by a type I country which is 
defined when investment succeeds. 
Definition 5.1 A Markov strategy for the bank selects a loan probability ze [0,1 ] 
for each level of belief qE [0,1] i. e. {z(q))' 1. A Markov repayment strategy for the 
type I country is defined when investment succeeds and selects a repayment 
probability yE [0, I] for each level of belief i. e. { y(qr) } `°t-1. A type P country never 
repays its debt irrespective of time or state. 
At the end of each period, the bank updates its belief according to the action 
which the country has taken on receiving a loan. If no loan is granted, no revision 
of the prior belief can occur. Following a loan, repayment of a debt immediately 
reveals the borrower to be type I and the game becomes the one of complete 
information in chapter three. If a loan is granted and not repaid, the bank rationally 
updates its belief downwards according to Bayes' rule. This gives rise to the 
following rule for the updating of prior beliefs: 
5 In effect, q, is the borrower's reputation for creditworthiness. 
6 In the setup of the model, history matters only to the extent that it affects beliefs. 
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ql+l = qt if no loan 
qt+l = gý[i-Yy(gt)] if loan + no repayment 1- 4t y y(qt) 
qt+l =1 if loan + repayment 
(5.1) 
From this updating rule, it is clear that the sequence of beliefs will depend 
upon the sequence of country actions and the prior belief with which the bank begins 
the game. For any sequence of (y(q))-t_- , conditional on a loan being made, 
investment succeeding and default being observed, there will be J+1 revisions of the 
belief, where J depends on the prior at the beginning of the game and the sequence 
of type I country actions. Assume for now that there exists a level of belief q' which 
is so low that if q< qq the country will face a complete lending embargo as the bank 
believes it to be type P. That such a q' exists is shown later. Denoting the belief at 
the beginning of the game by q°, the sequence of beliefs generated by a sequence of 
country actions with default observed will be Q= (q°, q', , q', q"') where q' > q'+'. 
If repayment is made at level of belief q', then qJ+' =1 and the game of complete 
information from chapter three is played. 
Although the sequence of q is determined by the country's action, the length 
of the time interval between jumps in the sequence is determined by the action of the 
bank, for only when a loan is granted is the belief updated. Let the belief of the bank 
that it faces a type I debtor at the beginning of the game (time t= 0) be denoted by 
q°o. This prior is held for as many time periods as it takes for the first loan to be 
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issued. Assume that a loan is granted in the s(0)'th period' so that the prior is 
updated to qi in period s(O)+l. Assuming that default is observed, this q' is then held 
for a further s(l) periods until a loan is again forthcoming. The j'th revision of the 
belief, delivering q' in the sequence (contingent on no prior repayment), occurs after 
S(j-l)+l time periods$ where SO-1) =1+ EE''k s(k). This belief is then held for so) 
periods until a loan is granted. 
The belief qJ is arrived at in time period S(J-1)+1 and is held for s(J) periods 
up until a loan is made. When this particular loan is made, either the country repays 
its loan, revealing it to be type I, or it repudiates. This latter action causes the bank 
to impose a complete loan embargo by the definition of q'. The game of incomplete 
information therefore lasts a total of S(J)+l periods, which depends upon the lending 
strategy of the bank .9 The total number of 
loans which will be made until the belief 
falls below the critical level will be J+1. 
We shall denote the j'th revision of the prior belief to q', occurring at time 
SO-1)+1 and lasting for s(j) time periods, by so that t(j) represents any time period 
between SO-1)+1 and S(j). 
It is apparent from the updating rule in (5.1) that the distance between each q 
7 s(O) +I thus denotes the length of time for which q° is held. 
$ SO-1) is thus the total time which elapses before the j'th revision of the belief. 
9 S(J)+l has the potential to be infinite. 
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in the sequence Q will be determined by Bayes' rule. `° 
Definition 5.2 Let and q', » be two beliefs in the sequence Q such that qJ, (, ) 
directly follows The j'th step locus gives combinations of and y(4"'w"1) 
from (5.1) which deliver 4t(, ). 
Rearranging Bayes' rule gives the equation of the j'th step locus as 
q tU-t) 4 r(/) 
y(qJt(il 
Y4 t(1-1) [ 1- Q 
i(/) 
(5.2) 
The reason for the construction of these step loci is as follows. Assume that Qý 
represents an equilibrium sequence of beliefs. Naturally, any action taken by the type 
I country must be consistent with this path of beliefs being followed. Equation (5.2) 
gives exactly these actions. 
5.3 Expected payoffs 
Assume that the level of belief for any single time period tE t(j) is q1. If a loan 
is granted and not repaid, then this belief is revised downwards to q'+', +, where t+l = 
So)+1. If the loan is repaid, then the bank sets qt,, =I and the country gets a 
continuation payoff of 8U(1), the discounted value of playing the game of complete 
10 Recall that the sequence Q is defined when default is observed. 
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information from chapter three. The probability that a loan is granted is z(q') and the 
country wishes to repay with probability y(q', ). As 7 is the probability that funds are 
generated for repayment, yy(q') is the total probability of repayment. l 
As in chapter three, 8 is a discount factor and ra fixed interest rate earned by 
the bank in the event of a repayment. The present value of the type I country's payoff 
at time t(=- t(j) with level of belief q', is 
U(c) = (1 - z(c )) SU(q) + z(q) 
{yy(c (x -r+ SU(1)) 
+ y(1 - y(q')) (1 +x+ SU(q'+`t+ý)) + (1 -'Y) SU(q'+', +, )} (5.3) 
If no loan is granted in period tE t(j), then beliefs remain at q'ý and the expected 
payoff of the country gets discounted one period. If a loan is made and investment 
fails, as it does with probability (1 - y), then beliefs are updated and the country 
receives nothing in the current period and a continuation payoff of 8U(0+1, +, ). if 
investment succeeds, then the type I country obtains x-r+ 8U(1) if it repays and 
1+x+ SU(q'+`t+, ) if it repudiates. The action of the country in period t will depend 
upon the relative magnitudes of its payoff from repudiating and repaying. 
Letting V(1) be the payoff which the bank expects from the complete 
information game, the present expected value of the bank's payoff at time to to) can 
" Instead of characterizing the types of country by their underlying willingness to repay, 
a type I country could be thought of as having a high y, whereas a type P country has y=0. 
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be written as" 
V(q) = (1 - Z(ce)) V(q) + 
z(c) 
( (1 -c 'YY(9')) - 1) + q'1YY(q (r + SV(1))} 
(5.4) 
If no loan is granted in period t(: - t(j) then beliefs remain at q', and the expected payoff 
of the bank gets discounted one period. If a loan is made and is not repaid, then the 
bank receives a payoff of SV(ý+`1+, ) -1 due to the loss of the loaned unit and 
consequent updating of beliefs. The probability that this return is achieved is 
(1-q3) + 4, (1-7y(4)) which is the probability that the bank assigns to the customer 
being type P plus the probability that a type I country does not repay (through either 
choice or bad luck). The bank achieves a payoff of r+ SV(l) if the loan is repaid as 
this indicates that the customer is type 1. The probability of repayment is q', yy(ýý, the 
probability that the country is type I and is able and willing to repay. 
Notice that (5.4) reflects the loaning preferences of the bank as the payoffs 
from extending and withholding a loan are compared when it makes its decision. The 
following result proves useful: 
12 Chapter three suggests that V(1) = 0, but is retained here as a constant for generality. 
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Result 5.1 The bank is indifferent between loaning and not at time tE t(j) 
(i. e. z(41)E [0,1 ]), j=0,..., J, if 
Y (9t) =1 
Y4i(1 +r+8V(1)) 
(5.5) 
Proof Bank indifference requires that the expected return from lending be 
equal to the expected return from withholding funds. This requires in (5.4) that the 
term in braces equals SV((q) which implies V(q )=0, Vj=0,..., J, to t(j). Therefore 
0= z(q') { (1 - 4, y Y(9')) (-1) + 
4, 'Y y(q) (r + 6V (1)) } 
which rearranges to give (5.5).   
Corollary The bank strictly prefers to lend at time tEt(j) i. e. z(q) = 1, if y(q) is 
greater than that in (5.5), whilst a repayment probability below this level implies a 
preference for withholding funds (z(q) = 0). 
Equation (5.5) permits a simple intuitive interpretation. As the level of belief 
that the country is type I falls, the country must be extremely willing to repay its debt 
when able in order to induce the bank to lend. A low value of y implies that funds 
will be generated infrequently to facilitate repayment. Again the bank is only 
motivated to lend if there is a high likelihood that any return from the country's 
investment will be used to repay a debt obligation. Similarly, as the return to lending 
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falls, the bank requires compensation in the form of a low repudiation probability. 
Let q'"', ý", ý(X) denote the level of belief at which the j'th step locus crosses the 
line of bank indifference given by (5.5). It is easily determined that, for j=1,..., J 
4tc; -, )(X) _ 
1+q (J) [r +8 V(1)] 
1+r+8 V(1) 
(5.6) 
Letting 4(W) denote the level of belief at which the j'th step locus reaches the point 
y=1, the j'th step locus begins at the point q'(X), y(q'(X)) =0 and ends at q'(W), 
y(q(W)) = 1. This locus crosses the bank indifference line at q'"` (X). 13 
Notice that (5.6) does not define q'(X), for which we adopt the following 
notation. Let q't for tE t(J) denote the lowest level of belief at which a loan will still 
be forthcoming with positive probability. 14 
Result 5.2 
9rer(/) 
Y ý1 +r+8V(1)] 
(5.7) 
13 The level of belief q(W) is held in periods to-1), as the j'th revision of the belief will 
be constructed to take the belief to q'(X) for time periods to). 
14 In fact it should be clear that q' = q(X), which shall simply be referred to as q', 
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Proof By the definition of q', this is the lowest level of belief at which the country's 
action can still induce the bank to be indifferent between lending and not. Result 5.1 
and its corollary indicate that a loan is most likely to be granted when the country 
repays with certainty if able. Setting y(q') = 1, for to t(J), into (5.5) delivers (5.7). 
At any level of belief q< q', the bank requires y(q) >1 in order to be induced to lend 
with positive probability.   
Result 5.2 is important, for it is the lowest level of belief in the sequence Q 
at which a lending equilibrium to the game of incomplete information can exist. 
Given that the sequence Q is defined for observed default, any q'+' < q' is too low for 
lending to occur. The level of belief q' is thus critical. Immediately, we have an 
explanation for why some countries cannot obtain bank credit. If q° < q' then no 
equilibrium exists in which lending takes place. Furthermore, q' is likely to be 
different for each country so that we have the potential for explaining, through a 
reputation argument, why some countries enjoy short-lived credit relationships with 
commercial banks whilst others may last longer. Notice also that q' depends upon y 
and that a lending equilibrium requires y> 1/[l+r+8V(1)] in order that q' is bounded 
below one. 15 
Figure 5.1 draws together findings so far. The line AB represents the locus 
along which the bank is indifferent between extending and withholding credit. Above 
and to the right of this curve is the region in which the bank strictly prefers to lend, 
whereas a loan will never be forthcoming in the area below and to the left of the bank 
15 This also ensures that Bayes' rule revises beliefs downwards. 
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indifference locus. 
Figure 5. l 
Sten locus J 
y : ýr 
r (i 
0 
90 
locus J-1 
Bank indifference 
line 
The step locus J, indicated in the figure by Cq'un, gives the combinations of 
the belief preceding q'un, i. e. q, (,., ), and corresponding country action y(q, _, )) which 
are consistent with a default causing the prior to be revised to exactly q'un. The 
curvature of the step loci reflects the fact that the bank learns more about its customer 
when the willingness of the type I country to repay is relatively high. A type I 
country which chooses y(q',, )) =0 is indistinguishable from a type P debtor so that an 
observed default imparts no new information to the bank so that beliefs remain at q ). 
The largest downward revision of the belief occurs when type I sets y(q',, )) =1 as this 
96 
-t (i) .t V_4' , -t V-h) - 
is the situation in which the bank can be most certain that default indicates a type P 
borrower. 
5.4 Existence of a Markov Perfect Equilibrium with lending 
Definition 5.3 A Markov Perfect Equilibrium of this game of incomplete 
information consists of a sequence of beliefs Q* = {q(O)* (o), """"", q(J+l)* (j+, )}, conditional 
on default being observed, and bank actions Z' ={ z(q(O)*(o)), , z(q('+')*«J 1)) } and type 
I country actions Y' ={ y(q(O)%(O))....... y(q('+`)`u, +, ) } such that Z* maximizes (5.4) given 
Y' and Q*, and Y' maximizes (5.3) given Z` and Q*. The equilibrium sequence of 
beliefs is determined by (5.1) and is such that Q* is the equilibrium belief path until 
repayment is observed. An observed repayment ends the game of incomplete 
information, so that the level of belief becomes one for the duration of the complete 
information game in chapter three. 
This definition of an MPE ensures that each player's action at each stage of 
the game is an optimal response to the action played by the opponent. Furthermore, 
the equilibrium sequence of beliefs is determined by the rational updating procedure 
of the bank. Given an equilibrium sequence of beliefs, the equilibrium actions must 
be consistent with this sequence being followed. This means that if, in Figure 5.1, 
q'un and q'"'«J_, )(X) are in the equilibrium belief sequence, the equilibrium action of the 
type I country at time tEt(J-1) must bey (q'-', (,., )(X)) with the bank randomizing 
between loaning and not. 
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Before proceeding to a full solution of this game, several observations are 
useful. Notice, from Result 5.1, that for time period tE t(j) and belief q',, it is the 
action of the type I borrower at time t which makes the bank indifferent between 
loaning and not at time t. From (5.3), however, the country randomizes between 
repaying and repudiating its debt only if x-r+ SU(l) =I+x+ SU(gi+l, +, ), t+l = 
S(j)+1. Clearly, U(q'+'t,., ) depends on the action of the bank at time t+l, z(q'"'t+, )" 
Therefore, the bank can only induce the borrower to be indifferent between repaying 
and repudiating in period tE t(j) through its action in periods t(j+l ). 
An intuitive explanation of the construction of an MPE for this game can be 
gained by examining Figure 5.1. The level of belief qt(j) is critical, so we can begin 
at this point and work backwards through time and the belief sequence. Assume that 
q', (n forms part of the equilibrium sequence of 
beliefs and that default causes a 
revision to the next (arbitrary) equilibrium belief in the sequence e'»* < q, (n At 
q'«, ), the only country action which can secure a 
loan with positive probability is 
y(q'un) = 1, rendering the bank indifferent between lending and not. To form part of 
an equilibrium, y(q'«n) =1 must be an optimal action for the country at this level of 
belief. Indeed, this action weakly dominates all others if SU(l) _> 
l+r. To see this, 
notice that the expected return from y(q, (n) =I is 'y(x-r+8U(1)), whereas any other 
action y' <1 yields 'yy'(x-r+8U(1)) + y(1-y')(l+x). For y(q', (n) =1 to be optimal 
requires that the country cannot unilaterally switch from this action in order to achieve 
a better payoff. Clearly, the return to always repaying when able at level of belief 
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Q'un is always at least as good as that from any other action as long as 8U(1) ? 1+r. 16 
Assuming that this condition is met, then gqun and y(q', (n) =1 can form a part 
of the lending equilibrium. If gqt(n is a part of the equilibrium, Definition 5.3 states 
that this level of belief must be reached following revision of the prior qt(, _, ). 
In other 
words, the country action at level of belief q, (, _, ) must 
lie on the J'th step locus. We 
can choose z(q', (n) in order to ensure that the type I borrower has the correct incentive 
to play on the J'th step locus. " 
Imagine now that the level of belief q'''u, _1)(X) 
in Figure 5.1 is part of the 
equilibrium sequence Q`. In order for the pair q', (n, y(q'un) =1 to be a part of the 
equilibrium, we must ensure that beliefs are revised from q'-`u, -, )(X) to q', n. Clearly 
this involves the country selecting action 0<y (q'''(, _j)(X)) <1 
in the figure. Such 
an action is only optimal if the country is indifferent at this level of belief between 
repaying and repudiating. Country indifference requires that x-r+5U(1) _ 
1+x+SU(q'un) which can be ensured by appropriate setting of z(qun) which determines 
U(q'un)" Again, y'(q", J_, )(X)) is at least as good as any other action as long as 
8U(1) >_ l+r. When the country plays yý(qJ lgJ. lý(X)), the bank is indifferent between 
extending and withholding credit when it holds belief q '«J., )(X). This implies that 
z(q'"'u, _, )(X)) can 
be set to make the country indifferent at the level of belief 
immediately preceding q'-%p_l)(X) in the equilibrium sequence of beliefs. 
16 If this were not the case, then even the type I country would never wish to repay so 
that a lending equilibrium could not exist. 
17 Recall that z(q', (n) affects the repayment preferences of the country at level of belief 
q, (, _, ). 
As we have constructed bank indifference at q'«n, we can choose z(q', (n) as required. 
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We must next examine what will happen in Figure 5.1 if the belief 
immediately preceding q't(n falls in the region between q'«, ) and q-`u, _, )(X). 
Clearly, 
attention should be restricted to points on and above the line of bank indifference as 
we wish the equilibrium to exhibit lending. In this region, it is easily verified that the 
optimal country I action is to repay with certainty when able as long as 8U(1) >_ l+r. 
Notice that if the initial prior belief in time period 0 falls in the region between q'un 
and q'"`u,., )(X), then q'«n will not form a part of the equilibrium sequence of beliefs. 
For all other starting values of q, the equilibrium can be constructed so that q', (, ) is a 
part of the equilibrium belief sequence. 
The recursive method outlined above can be used to determine actions and 
beliefs which satisfy Definition 5.3. We have seen that unless 6U(1) _> l+r, there will 
be no MPE which exhibits lending. One further problem with the existence of this 
type of equilibrium also occurs for some initial levels of belief q°°. From the previous 
argument, the pair y'(q'"'u, _1)(X)) will 
form a part of the equilibrium, but 
only if this level of belief can be reached from all levels of belief which immediately 
precede q'''uJ_, )(X). In Figure 5.1, it is possible that the initial level of belief is q°0. 
In this case, it is not possible to reach q'"', (J_j)(X) as so doing requires a country action 
of y(q°°) which is below the bank indifference line. This action is inconsistent with 
a loan being granted, so that any lending equilibrium would break down at this point. 
This existence problem occurs as q°° falls in the region between the point where the 
J'th step locus reaches y=I and the point where the J-1 'st step locus crosses the line 
depicting bank indifference. In general, this problem of non-existence of a lending 
equilibrium occurs for q°(X) > q° > q2(W) >_ q(W), as in Figure 5.2, where q'(W) 
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indicates the level of belief at which the j'th step locus reaches y=1. 
Figure 5.2 
Y (ý 
2nd steh locus 
step locus 
Bank indifference 
line 
0 
9 
Solving this problem requires imposing a parameter restriction which 
effectively `bends' the step loci according to Figure 5.3. 
Assume again that q'"',, _, )(X) and q', (, ) 
form a part of the equilibrium sequence 
of beliefs and that the prior belief at the very beginning of the game q°° does not fall 
' 3, 
_3(X) and q' 
2, 
(,. 2(X), between these points. For any initial level of belief between q« 
the equilibrium sequence of q''`ýý., ý(X) and q', (n can be continued by the type I country 
selecting the action on step locus J-1 which corresponds to the current level of belief. 
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An observed default would then take the game along the equilibrium path via points 
D and then A if default is observed again 
Figure 5.3 
-2 Y (qt) Step locus Jqt ý1-2)(X) 
A 
1 
E 
J J-1 J3 
qt (J) 9t (J-1)(X t (J-3)(X) 1t 
J 
qt (J. 1)ffl 
Step locus J-2 
Bank indifference 
line 
Assume now that the level of belief is q'" u1_2)(X). The equilibrium then follows 
points F, D and A if default is observed after each loan. In the situation depicted in 
Figure 5.3, a lending equilibrium can exist which will not completely break down until 
the critical level of belief is passed. Apparently, the crucial difference between 
Figures 5.1 and 5.3 lies with the points where the step loci cross the line of bank 
indifference. Solving the problem means that the first step locus (j = 1) crosses the 
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bank indifference line at a lower level of belief than where the second step locus 
(j = 2) reaches the point y=I. In Figure 5.3, g1-2, (J_2)(X) < q'u, _, )(W). 
18 Therefore, 
the parameter restriction which gives rise to Figure 5.3 restricts the size of the jumps 
between the members of the belief sequence. '9 The restriction needed for this 
situation to obtain is given in Lemma 5.1 
LEMMA 5.1 For q3«» < q°° < qu, _, )(W) or q'«0)(W) 
? q°0 ý q°«0)(X), a MPE with 
lending exists if a lending equilibrium exists with a type I country in the game of 
complete information and 
(1) 5U(1) ? 1+r and 
(2) y> 1/[1+r+5V(1)]. 
For all other values of q°°, i. e. q°«O)(X) > q°° > g2«1)(W) >_ q't(J_1)(W), the existence of 
a MPE with lending requires additionally that 
[2+r+8V(1)][1 +2(r+8 V(1))] -[1 +r+aV(1)]2 Y[1+r 
+8 V(1) ][1+ 2(r +8 V(1) ] 
(5.8) 
Proof See Appendix 5.1. 
18 The reason that q3(W) has a t(J-1) time subscript is that the J'th revision takes beliefs 
to q' at time S(J-1)+1. When beliefs are at q'(W), the J'th revision has not yet occurred. 
19 The weakest requirement is that q°° = g2ul)(W). 
103 
5.5 Markov Perfect Equilibrium with lending and learning 
We are now in a position to state the main result of this chapter. 
PROPOSITION 5.1 Let q'+' be the equilibrium level of belief which follows q, 
with q', (n defined as in Result 5.2. Assuming that the existence conditions from 
Lemma 5.1 are met, a MPE with lending and learning has the following bank and type 
I country actions and expected payoffs at each level of belief. 
i) q= q'un ; for tE t(J) 
z(4ý) = [1 - 
8] [8U(1) - (1 + r)] 
8 [1 +x-(1 -"y)(x-r+8U(1))] 
Y(q, ')=1 
V(q; ) =0 
U(9ý) = U(1) - 
(1 r) 
8 
Beliefs revised to q'+' on default (game ends). 
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ii) q'« < qt < q'"', (,. 1)(X) ; for tE t(J-1) 
z(q, ) =1 
y(4t) =1 
V(4t) = 4i y (1 +r+8 V(1)) -1 
U(q)=y(x-r+8U(1)) 
Beliefs revised to q'+' on default (game ends). 
iii) q= qQ)(X), j=1,..., J-1 ; for tE t(j) 
z(qi (X)) 
[8U(1) - (1 + r)] 
8y (1+x) 
Y(gt(X)) =1 
yq! (X) (1 +T+a V(1)) 
V(gt(X)) =0 
U(4e(X)) = um ' 
(1 + r) 
8 
Beliefs revised to q'+1 on default (if q4+' = qJ then (i), if not then 4' = 4+'(X) so (iii)) 
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iv) q'-'w_1)(X) < q< < ýw)(X), j=1,..., J- 1; for tet(j) 
z (q, ) =1 
y(qt) = 
j+t 
4t - 4((/+1) (X) 
Y4t [l - 4i(J+l) (X)1 
V(9t) = 4t y Y(9t) (i +r+8 V(1)) -1 
U(qt) = Y(1 + x) - (1 + r) + 8U(1) 
Beliefs revised to q'+' on default (if q'+' = q' then (i), if not then 4" = q; +, (X) so (iii)). 
Proof See Appendix 5.2. 
Let us examine how these strategies work. The action and belief sequences 
depend crucially on the level of belief at the beginning of the game, q°o (held for 
s(O)+l periods until a loan is granted). Assume for example, that q°° coincides with 
q'-2(X). The equilibrium belief sequence, assuming that each loan is repudiated, is 
Q* ={ gJ-2(X), q'-'(X), q3, q'+' } Initially, the players choose their action according 
to iii) in the proposition. The bank randomizes between loaning and not and a loan 
is made after s(O)+1 periods. The type I country repays with the probability given in 
iii), and the belief is revised to q! -'(X) where iii) is again used as part of the 
equilibrium strategy. The next revision of the belief is to q'(X) in period S(J-1)+l so 
that actions are chosen according to i). 
Assume now that q''2(X) < q°° < q'-3(X). The play accords initially to iv) so 
that the first revision of the belief leads to q3-'(X) and the players play according to 
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iii). The equilibrium belief sequence is thus Q* =( q°, qr-'(X), qJ, qr+i ). The 
strategies work then by making the equilibrium belief sequence correspond to those 
levels of belief at which the bank indifference line is crossed by the step loci. The 
exception to this is the case where q' < q° < qJ-'(X) which gives rise to the sequence 
of beliefs Q* ={ q°, q'+' }, and play according to ii). In this case only one loan will 
be made until the game of private information ends. 
In Figure 5.4, heavy lines depict the equilibrium country I actions for all values 
of q up to q'-3(X). The equilibrium country I actions which conform to the 
equilibrium belief sequence are marked by the intervals AC, DE, and FG for values 
of q below q'-3(X). These intervals are closed on the left and open on the right. The 
country prefers F to E as this gives it access to at least three loans whereas E gives 
only two until the incomplete information structure ends. 
At each stage of the game, except possibly the first period if q°° # q°(X), the 
bank is indifferent between loaning and withholding funds. Each successive default 
causes the reputation of the borrower to fall. As this reputation falls, so the country 
seeks to repay with a higher probability. The temptation to masquerade as a type P 
country is greatest at high levels of belief, and falls progressively as the critical level 
of belief and the complete credit embargo are neared. Breakdowns and resumptions 
of voluntary lending can occur until the critical belief is passed, in which case the 
country faces financial autarky. 
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Figure 5.4 
y (qt ) 
Step locus J 
J-2 
ACqt (J-2) 
1 
:E 
B 
5.6 An example of a lending MPE with learning 
Step locus J-2 
Bank indifference 
line 
9t 
In order to see exactly what this model predicts, it is useful to carry out some 
numerical analysis. This section takes some parameters for the type I borrower and 
examines the MPE which arises for different levels of initial belief q°o. 
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Example 5.1: V(1)=0, U(1)=5, y =. 99, x=. 25, r=. 15,5=. 99 
The conditions in Lemma 5.1 are satisfied so a lending equilibrium exists. These 
parameters yield q' =. 8783, qJ-'(X) =. 9841, q'"2(X) =. 9979 and q''3(X) = . 9997. The 
equilibrium path depends upon the initial belief held by the bank. We take three cases 
here, corresponding to q° in the region defined by ii), iii) and iv) in Proposition 5.1. 
Case 5.1.1: q° = . 98 
This initial value corresponds to ii) in Proposition 5.1 as q' < q° <q '(X). The 
equilibrium sequence of beliefs, bank and type I country actions are (for any 
qJ+' < . 8783): 
Qý _{ . 98uo> ,q t(, ) ) 
Z'= { 1(0) 2 O«1)1 
Y'={ 1«O)y +} 
(following default) 
(+ indicates undefined) 
where t(O) = 10 }, t(1) ={1,.., }. In this case J=0 as beliefs fall immediately 
below the critical level on the first revision. The expected payoffs are V(. 98) = . 
1157, 
U(. 98) = 4.9995. 
The initial level of belief in this case corresponds to a point somewhere 
between A and C in Figure 5.4. In the first period, the bank expects a positive profit 
so grants a loan with certainty and the country repays if it is able. Default, caused 
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only by investment failure in this equilibrium, leads to an irreversible breakdown of 
lending from period two onwards. This leads to the fact that U(98) < U(l). 
Case 5.1.2: q° = . 9997 
This initial belief corresponds to the point where the J-2nd step locus crosses 
the bank indifference line. Therefore iii) from Proposition 5.1 is used until the belief 
is revised as far downwards as q' when i) is then used. This gives rise to the 
following equilibrium: 
Q' _{ . 9997ao) , . 9979K1), . 984l), . 
8783u3) ,q t(4) } 
Z' { . 031« , . 031u1) 7 . 031g2) , . 
032«4 , Oua) 1 
Y' =( . 8786uo) , . 8802u, ß , . 89250 , 
1g3) ,+} 
The number of belief revisions until the critical level of belief is reached is J=3 in 
this case, indicating that a maximum of four loans will be made until the game of 
incomplete information ends. A loan is made initially with a small probability so that 
t(O) ={0,..., S(0) }, t(1) _{ S(0)+1,..., S(1) ) and so on until 
t(4) =( S(3)+1,..., o ). 
In terms of Figure 5.4, the game begins at H and proceeds through F, D and 
A assuming default is observed. From the outset, the bank is indifferent between 
loaning and not. Indeed a loan is forthcoming with a small probability so that the 
time which elapses between loans may be long. Bank indifference throughout the 
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game gives the bank an expected total payoff of zero. Notice that at the critical 
belief, the loan probability increases slightly. This is due to the fact that, with a 
permanent credit embargo imminent, the bank can only induce good behaviour in the 
previous period by a higher setting of the loan probability at the critical level of the 
belief. 
Knowing that at most four loans will be made until borrower type is revealed, 
the type I country increases its willingness to repay with each successive loan. It does 
this in order that it will not lose access to the credit market by attempting to reveal 
its type before the level of belief is below the critical level. Notice that country 
insouciance may be partly responsible if any of the first three loans are repudiated. 
The total expected country payoff in this case is 3.834 which is below U(. 98) and 
U(1) as long periods may elapse between loans. 
Case 5.1.3: q° = . 9985 
This initial level of belief lies between q2(X) and q''3(X) so that the initial 
actions are prescribed by iv) in Proposition 5.1. After an initial loan, the type I 
country plays an action on the J-1st step locus taking the game to q"(X) and iii) in 
the proposition. The next revision of the belief is to q(X) so that the actions then 
correspond to i). 
With this initial belief, the equilibrium is as follows: 
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Q' _{ . 9985uo) , . 9841«) , . 
8783uz), q t(3) } 
Z' ={ 1« , . 031, (1 , . 032u2) > 
O« } 
Y" _{ . 9162uo) , . 8925u1) , 1t(z) ,+I 
where t(O) ={0}, t(1) ={1,..., S(1) }, t(2) ={ S(1)+1,..., S(2) }, 
t(3) ={ S(2)+1,..., oo }, J=2. 
The starting point for this equilibrium is above the bank indifference line so 
that it strictly prefers to lend in period one. At level of belief q°, the bank expects a 
payoff of . 0415. The first loan is repaid with a 
high probability in order to conform 
to the equilibrium belief path. The bank makes two further loans as outcomes of its 
randomization process. The country sets a high probability of repayment in order to 
avoid an embargo, with a small chance of it masquerading as a type P borrower. 
5.7 Remarks 
In order that a lending equilibrium can exist when the bank has incomplete 
information about its type of debtor, the conditions in Lemma 5.1 must be satisfied. 
This cannot be achieved unless U(1) > 0. In other words, the existence of a lending 
equilibrium to the game of complete information in chapter three is a pre-requisite for 
a lending equilibrium under incomplete information. Indeed, when the bank 
randomizes, corresponding to levels of belief at i) or iii) in Proposition 5.1, the loan 
probability is increasing in U(1). As there are likely to be multiple equilibria in the 
game of complete information, the most efficient outcome in the complete information 
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game yields the best outcome in the incomplete information structure if the 
equilibrium proceeds through i) and/or iii). " 
The example presented indicates that parameters satisfying all of the conditions 
are likely to give a high critical belief which is reached after a small number of loans, 
so that there is an endogenous limit placed on the tolerance of the bank to default by 
a debtor. The equilibrium is dependent upon the level of belief with which the bank 
begins the game. Indeed, for each initial belief there is only one lending equilibrium 
which contrasts with the multiple equilibria found in the learning model of Lang and 
Nakamura (1989). The overall expected payoffs are thus dependent on the initial 
belief, with the bank being able to expect to earn a small profit when the initial belief 
is above the line of bank indifference. With such a prior, the country achieves a 
relatively high expected payoff as the bank loans with certainty in the first period. 
When the prior lies on the bank indifference line, long lengths of time may elapse 
between loans which reduces the expected payoff of the country due to discounting. 
Alongside the initial belief, the number of loans preceding an embargo depends 
on the distance of the jumps in the belief sequence. From (5.6) it is easily seen that 
the distance between the intersections of the step and bank loci is increasing in the 
interest rate. As these intersections crucially determine the path of the equilibrium, 
beliefs are revised down quicker the larger is the interest rate. This appears to suggest 
a reaction to adverse selection on the part of the bank. As the interest rate 
20 Other comparative statics are identical to chapter three. 
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increases, 21 the less willing is the type I country to contract debt so that it is most 
likely that the bank is lending to a type P customer who does not care about the 
interest rate as it never repays. Thus the belief is revised down quickly. 
The equilibrium sequence of bank actions indicates that lending breakdowns 
and resumptions can occur, at least up until the critical level of belief is surpassed. 
This is important as it is a feature which will certainly be missed by models of 
sovereign lending which assume that default calls forth an immediate credit embargo. 
Indeed, the fact that, at least up to a point, default does not preclude further loans, 
suggests that this model has extended a weaker version of Grossman and van Huyck's 
(1988) excusable default to a scenario with incomplete information and possible 
country insouciance. A country can fail to repay through choice and not be totally 
excluded from future loans until the critical level of belief. Default is always 
punished, however, in the form of a small loan probability in the following period. 
As the example predicts that only a small number of loans will be made, a type 
I country sets a high repayment probability in order to reveal its type before the 
critical belief is surpassed. In the complete information case of chapter three, the 
country examined repays with a high constant probability in every period. The model 
presented in this chapter looks at the dynamics of the country's reputation for 
creditworthiness so that the repayment probability changes through time. It is still 
possible, in principle, that a type I country will wish to masquerade as a type P debtor. 
21 At some stage the interest rate will be so high that a lending equilibrium will cease 
to exist altogether. 
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This temptation falls over time as the critical level of belief, and permanent credit 
embargo, is neared and the type I country becomes more concerned with its reputation 
for creditworthiness. 
5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has extended the model of chapter three to allow for the 
possibility that the bank can lend to a sovereign nation without knowing its inherent 
`type'. Type can be interpreted in a variety of ways. Here, a type P country was 
assumed not to invest its loan whereas type I responsibly invested its funds obtained 
from the international credit market. Alternatively, one could think of type as relating 
to political stability so that debt repudiation by a type P country is due to political 
instability. A further possibility is that a type P country is inefficient and 
characterized by unproductive redistributional activity carried out by interest groups. 
This idea is explored in the next two chapters. 
We have shown that in order for a lending MPE to exist when the bank has 
incomplete information, a lending MPE must exist when the bank knows its customer 
type. The bank, in other words, must want to learn its borrower's type. An additional 
existence condition, which is stronger than those in the model of chapter three, must 
be met in order to generate a lending MPE with incomplete information from some 
levels of initial belief. 
When lending takes place, the bank has an opportunity to learn its type of 
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customer. Therefore, we have been able to examine the dynamics of a country's 
reputation for creditworthiness over time when an externality is imposed by the 
existence of inherent defaulters. A feature of the MPE is that lending can break down 
and resume as part of the equilibrium, at least up to some critical level of belief. 
Models which assume the imposition of a credit embargo immediately following a 
single default will miss this important point. Indeed, it is possible that a period of 
non-lending can be followed by voluntary commercial bank loans. Thus, not all 
lending following a temporary lapse is defensive in the sense of Krugman (1985). 
Additionally, `renewed' lending may not just be observed after a lending equilibrium 
has broken down as in Aizenman and Borensztein (1989). The model presented in 
this chapter has as its equilibrium the feature of `renewed' lending after a period 
where funds have been withheld. This has also been found by Cole, Dow and English 
(1989) in a different context. 
The existence of uncertainty regarding the type of borrower makes it possible, 
in principle at least, for a type I country to masquerade as an inherent defaulter in 
order to save on its debt repayments. Indeed, some default may be through choice 
rather than necessity. As the critical level of belief is neared and the bank believes 
to be close to learning its type of customer, the type I country will wish to reveal its 
type in order to avoid a credit embargo. The possibility that even a type I borrower 
is excluded from future loans is not ruled out as it may be prevented from revealing 
its type in time due to investment failures, contrasting with Cole, Dow and English 
(1989) where the stable borrower always has funds to reveal its type. 
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APPENDIX 5.1 - Proof of Lemma 5.1 
We shall suppress time subscripts for ease of notation. That 8U(1) >_ 1+r is 
required for a lending equilibrium to exist is explained in the text. That this is 
necessary for a lending equilibrium to exist if q' <_ q00: 5 q'(W) is also explained in the 
text. For q'(W) >_ q° > q°(X), the game proceeds along the intersections of the step 
loci and the bank indifference line after the first action which may lie on the first step 
locus. Therefore, the game eventually arrives at point A in Figure 5.3. At this point, 
the type I country can only persuade the bank to loan if y=1 which, as explained in 
the text, is an optimal move if 8U(1) > 1+r. 
We now derive equation (5.8). Let q (W) denote the level of belief at which 
the j'th step locus attains the value y(q(W)) = 1. For the existence of a lending 
equilibrium we must rule out the case q°(X) > q° > q2(W) >_ q'(W). We can do this 
by ensuring q°(X) <_ q2(W). 
From q°(X), the next belief in the sequence in a lending equilibrium will be 
constructed to be q'(X). From Bayes' rule 
Qi(ý = 
(X) [1 - ry(Q°(X))] 
1- 4°(X)YY(4°(X)) 
(A5.1) 
and by bank indifference at q°(X) we obtain y(q°(X)) which can be substituted into 
(A5.1) to yield 
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qi(X) = q°(X)(1 
+r+ 8V(1)) -1 
r+8 V(1) 
(A5.2) 
From q'(X), the next belief in the equilibrium sequence will be q2(X) so that 
Q2(X) = q2 
(W) (1 - y) = 
41(X) (1 +r+8 V(1)) -1 
1- Y92(W) r+8 V(1) 
(A5.3) 
Substituting (A5.2) into (A5.3) yields 
q0(X)=[r+8V(1)][1+g2(W)[(1-Y)(r+8V(1))-Y]]+ 
(1 -Y42(W)) (1 +r+8V(1))2 
Clearly q°(X) <_ q2(W) if 
q2(W) (1 - i') (r + 8V(1))2 
1 
(1 +r+8V(1)) 
<_ (1 - yg2(W)) [g2(W)(1 +r+ 5V(1))2 - 2(r + SV(1)) - 1] 
(A5.4) 
Let (A5.4) be written as L <_ R. For q2(W) = 1, L=R. The following can be shown 
to be the case. 
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Figure A5.1 
L 
0 
L 
4 
There is an interval from 0 to q(d) where L>R. As we can construct a 
lending equilibrium for q' < q° < q'(W) by the discussion in the text, the fact that 
L>R for the interval 0 to q(d) is of no consequence as long as q'(W) >_ q(d). The 
value of q(d) can easily be determined in (A5.4) using q2(W) =1 as one root, so that 
4(d) =1+ 
2(r + 8V(1)) 
"y (1 +r +8 v(1))2 
(A5.5) 
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Using Result 5.2 
q'(W) = 
1 
Y C(1 - Y) (1 +r+8 V(1)) + 1] 
A necessary condition for a lending equilibrium to exist if q°(X) > q° > q2(W)>_ 
q'(W) is that q'(W) >_ q(d) which is given as equation (5.8). This ensures that if 
q° > q'(W), it cannot be the case that q°(X) > q° > q2(W) because equation (5.8) 
restricts q°(X) and q2(W) so that q°(X) <_ q 2(W). " 
APPENDIX 5.2 - Proof of Proposition 5.1 
i) q= q'un reached at time S(J-1)+1. 
Fix an action for the bank z(q 1) and country y(q'+') at level of belief q'+' < qr, 
reached in time period t= S(J)+1. By the definition of q'un, it must be that 
0 and hence U(q'+') =0 
It was established in the text that y(q'un) =I is optimal for the type I country 
if SU(1) >_ l+r. From Result 5.1, this makes the bank indifferent between lending and 
not at level of belief q'un. Therefore, as explained in the text, z(q'un) is chosen to 
ensure that the country randomizes between repaying and repudiating at the previous 
level of belief. This requires that x-r+ SU (1) =1+x+ 8U (q'«J)) which can be 
written as 
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az(Q(>>) [Y (x-r+6U(1))] 
1 +x+ =x-r+EU(1) 
1- 8[ 1- z(4 fir)) ] 
which delivers z(q'un) as stated. The expected payoffs are a consequence of bank and 
type I country indifference. 
ii) q'un < q< < q-'u,. 1)(X) ; to t(J-1) 
For this q, it is the case that the revised belief on default is q'+' so that 
z(q'+') = V(q'+`) = U(q'+`) =0 on updating of the belief. Again repayment is optimal 
i. e. y=1 as long as SU(1) >_ l+r. The corollary to Result 5.1 and the fact that 
0 imply that the bank's optimal response is z(q) = 1. Payoffs are obtained 
by substitution. 
iii) q= qw)(X), j=1,.., J-1; tE t(j) 
This states that the belief is at one of the points at which the step locus crosses the 
bank indifference line. We prove the case for j= J-1 with other cases being 
analogous. From q''', (1_1)(X), the next belief in the equilibrium sequence is q'«1). We 
have already set z(q'un) so that the country is indifferent between repaying and not at 
any level of belief which directly precedes q', (j). Given this indifference, the type I 
country can do no better than to play y(q'"'uJ_j)(X)) at the intersection between the bank 
indifference line and the J'th step locus. This makes the bank indifferent between 
lending and not at level of belief so z(q''', (, _, )(X)) 
is set in order to make 
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the type I country indifferent between defaulting and repaying at the preceding level 
of belief ggJ_2). This gives the action stated in the proposition. Payoffs are again due 
to player indifference. 
iv) 4-', (i-1)(X) < q< < q'w>(X), j=1,.., J-1; tE t(j). 
Again we prove the case j= J-1 so that q'-29J-2)(X)< q, < q'-'l(,. j)(X). The next belief 
in the equilibrium sequence for such aq is again gqun. By the proof to i), the country 
is thus indifferent between repaying and defaulting at this level of belief, so that y(q) 
is chosen to ensure that q'un is reached upon default. The type I country action is thus 
on the J'th step locus which induces the bank to lend with certainty as this action is 
above the bank indifference locus. Payoffs are obtained by substitution.   
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CHAPTER 6. EFFICIENT ENDOGENOUS POLICY IN A LOBBYING MODEL 
As indicated briefly in the previous chapter, the type P country can be thought 
of as an economy characterized by `rent-seeking' activity. ' This and the next chapter 
seek to depict a rent-seeking economy in political equilibrium. In particular, the 
approach adopted here combines some of the elements of rent-seeking theory with 
some ideas from the literature on political competition to produce a model of 
endogenous policy based on Brock and Magee (1978). 2 To this end, some of the 
central results from the rent-seeking literature are firstly discussed, followed by a brief 
account of the theory of political competition. Combining these two elements is the 
probabilistic voting model of Brock and Magee (1978) and Magee and Brock (1983) 
which forms the basis for the work undertaken in the remainder of this thesis. A 
general representation of this model is presented and a major problem is indicated in 
its underlying framework. In adjusting the model, some of those authors' conclusions 
are demonstrated not to hold. 
I am grateful to Professor William A. Brock, University of Wisconsin-Madison, for this 
interpretation and for arousing my subsequent interest in this topic. 
2 An excellent summary of endogenous policy theory is Magee, Brock and Young 
(1989). 
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6.1 Rent-seeking and DUP activities 
The tern `rent-seeking' originates in Krueger (1974). In a survey article, 
Tollison (1982) indicates that `rents' can emanate from two sources: i) naturally in the 
price system by, for instance, shifts in demand and supply; ii) rents can be artificially 
contrived through, for example, government action. The theory of rent-seeking studies 
the competition among agents for these contrived rents. 
Agents can act individually or be organized into interest groups or lobbies who 
collectively fight for political influence and a share in the rent created. Terrones 
(1990) analyzes a one-good neo-classical growth model in which individual agents 
divide up their labour time between work, human-capital investment and engaging in 
activity to capture a government transfer. The amount of the transfer obtained 
depends positively on the agent's own level of `influence' activity and negatively on 
the total emanating from all other agents. He demonstrates that both the level and rate 
of growth of output in the economy are related inversely to the amount of 
redistributive activity undertaken, so that cross-country differences in growth can be 
partially explained by the presence/absence of rent-seeking activity. Instead of acting 
individually, agents may get together into interest groups or lobbies in order to achieve 
political pressure. A proof of the existence of a lobbying economy in competitive 
general equilibrium has recently been provided by Coggins, Graham-Tomasi and Roe 
(1991) in which agents are not price takers but rather a central authority sets prices 
on the basis of lobbying pressure from two groups with opposed interests. 
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The welfare implications of agents attempting to capture an artificially 
contrived rent have been extensively examined. Tollison (1982) illustrates the 
negative effect on welfare in the case of a government granting a monopoly right to 
one of a number of firms. Traditionally, the welfare loss was taken to be small - the 
Harberger (1954) triangle at less than 1% of U. S. GNP in the U. S. manufacturing 
sector in 1929. Tullock (1967) suggested a further welfare loss which would be 
caused due to the resources spent by the firms on trying to capture the monopoly 
right. Indeed, Krueger (1974) shows that if there were perfect competition for this 
rent, then the total amount spent on rent-seeking will equal the total value of the 
monopoly right. She estimates that these rents may be high: 7.3% of national income 
in the Indian public sector in 1964, with the rents for Turkish import licences being 
worth 15% of GNP in 1968. Posner (1975) finds that approximately 3% of GNP must 
be added to the Harberger triangle in order to get a true picture of the welfare losses 
due to monopoly. It is further possible that consumers could join together in an anti- 
monopoly lobby in which case these costs too must be added to the Harberger and 
Posner type losses. 
Krueger (1974) presents a model of competitive rent-seeking among firms for 
a fixed number of import licences in a small country which produces and exports food 
and imports consumption goods subject to the quantitative restriction. 3 In her model, 
labour can be used to produce food, distribute goods or it can be employed in 
attempting to capture an import licence. Under free trade, the economy operates 
efficiently on the consumption possibility frontier, whilst an exogenously imposed 
3 Bhagwati (1982) labels this `premium seeking'. 
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tariff or import restriction also yields an equilibrium on this frontier, albeit at a lower 
level of imports. The case of agents competing to obtain an exogenously fixed 
number of import licences is then considered under the assumption that there is free 
entry into rent-seeking°; labour is devoted to rent-seeking activity and the economy 
operates inside its feasible region in equilibrium. Under the free entry assumption, 
such competitive rent-seeking is shown by Krueger to lead to a welfare loss equal to 
the total amount of the rent. 
There has been much debate in the literature about the welfare effects of rent 
seeking activity; Olson (1982) speaks of the welfare reducing effects of political 
competition over redistribution, but Pryor (1984) fails to find empirical evidence to 
support this and Brock and Magee (1984) examine three theoretical models in which 
the Olson conjecture fails to hold. Indeed, Bhagwati (1980) reverses the welfare 
results of Krueger (1974), creating the apparent paradox that lobbying actually 
increases welfare. The problem is that Krueger compares the equilibrium with an 
exogenous import restriction and lobbying to the (first best) case of free trade, whereas 
Bhagwati (1980) notes that the lobbying solution should be compared to the (second 
best) situation in which the distortion already exists; the effect on welfare of adding 
another distortion to an already distorted outcome is ambiguous. By simply allowing 
lobbying for an exogenous rent, Krueger also misses an important point made by 
Bhagwati (1980) in which he uses a Heckscher-Ohlin trade model to show that an 
endogenous tariff which has been lobbied for can improve on an exogenously imposed 
° Findlay and Wellisz (1984) regard this free entry assumption as the most serious 
weakness in this model as the right to rent-seek is often a jealously guarded privilege. 
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tariff in some cases. ' 
Bhagwati (1982) broadens the base of rent-seeking activities by proposing 
Directly Unproductive Profit-seeking (DUP - pronounced `dupe') activities as an 
umbrella term for activities which yield gain without being productive in themselves. 
He proposes four categories of DUP and looks at the welfare consequences in each 
case. Category one captures initially distorted and finally distorted situations such as 
the premium-seeking example of Krueger (1974). As suggested earlier, second best 
analysis applies so that the paradox of a beneficial outcome is possible. ' The second 
category deals with situations which are initially distorted but finally distortion-free, 
for example, a tariff destroying lobby. Again the beneficial outcome paradox is 
possible although it may also be the case that the resources used to eliminate the 
distortion are socially more valuable than the distortion-free outcome. Category three 
includes those situations which were initially distortion-free but finally distorted, such 
as the monopoly creating case discussed earlier; the total outcome is necessarily 
immiserizing. Lastly, lobbying in situations which are initially and finally distortion- 
free is immiserizing due to the resources spent. 
A further classification is provided by Bhagwati, Brecher and Srinivasan (1984) 
who divide DUP activities into (i) situations in which the policy is exogenous while 
the DUP activity is endogenous to that policy and (ii) situations in which the policy 
For a sceptical view of Bhagwati's results, see Tullock (1980). 
6 Except in the case of pure quantity distortions as shown by Bhagwati and Srinivasan 
(1982) and Anam (1982). 
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is the endogenous result of the interaction of the DUP activity with the economic 
system, for example the tariff seeking model of Brock and Magee (1978) and Young 
and Magee (1986). It is this latter category which shall be the focus of the new model 
presented in section 6.5. 
6.2 Political competition 
Models of competition among political parties can be distinguished by the 
assumption used regarding their preferences: following Downs (1957), parties could 
be office-motivated in that they care solely about gaining power, or alternatively they 
could have preferences concerning the intrinsic properties of economic policy, for 
example by representing the interests of different groups in society. ' The latter, 
`partisan' approach was first formalized by Wittman (1977) and has been applied to 
macroeconomics, and in particular economic cycles, by Alesina (1987,1988) who 
represents each party as having different attitudes to inflation and the growth of 
output. Alesina and Tabellini (1989) use the partisan approach in order to explain 
capital flight in developing countries in terms of political uncertainty; the idea here 
is that a group of `capitalists' will flight its capital in order to avoid high taxation 
should the party representing the `workers' be elected into government. Alesina and 
Tabellini (1987) and Aghion and Bolton (1989) present models in which the parties 
can attempt to reduce the extent of partisan policies followed by opponent 
governments in the future through the use of fiscal deficits and government domestic 
debt; leaving a successor government with a deficit and debt to repay reduces its 
' Alesina and Cukierman (1987) combine both of these motivations. 
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policy options. 
Models which are based upon the assumption that the political parties' sole 
objective is to win an election yield the median voter theorem (Black (1958)) in which 
the policies of each party converge fully to the preferred policy of the median voter 
(assuming that voters' preferences are known). By moving closer to the position of 
the median voter, the parties hope to (probabilistically) capture the votes of those near 
the median. One of the better known models which assumes that parties maximize 
their chances of election is the political business cycle model of Nordhaus (1975) in 
which a government stimulates the economy in the period directly preceding an 
election, with a post-election recession occurring; this can occur before and after each 
election, as voters are myopic and irrational in the sense that they forget that they are 
fooled each election time. Correcting the failings of the Nordhaus paper, Rogoff 
(1990) develops a model of the political budget cycle in which voters are rational and 
the leader scores `ego rents' for being in office. 
Brock and Magee (1978), Magee and Brock (1983) and Young and Magee 
(1986) combine DUP actors in the form of lobbies with Downsian political parties in 
their `probabilistic voting model' which shall form the basis for the remainder of this 
thesis. 
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6.3 A 'reaction' to the probabilistic voting model (Brock and Magee (1978)) 
Brock and Magee (1978) combine the rent-seeking sphere with a model of 
political competition in modelling the redistributive conflicts between two interest 
groups or lobbies, one of which prefers a tariff whilst the other has a preference for 
an export subsidy. " The endogenous policies of the two political parties clear the 
political market in much the same way that prices act as an equilibriating device in 
economic markets. In the partial equilibrium version of this model, there are assumed 
to be two political parties, two lobbies and a group of voters. 9 The voters are 
imperfectly informed and rationally ignorant in the sense of Downs (1957) so that they 
do not spend resources on information collection. It is assumed that these voters' 
choice of party can be described by a probability of election function. 
Prior to the election, each of the political parties commits itself to the policy 
platform which it considers will maximize its chance of being elected. Any active 
policy is assumed to be disliked by the voters so that an active policy enters 
negatively in the probability of election function. A positive influence on the chance 
of election is the level of political contributions which a party receives from the 
lobbies. In maximizing their expected income, the lobbies, who stand to lose or gain 
depending upon which party gets elected, may give political contributions to their 
preferred party in order to increase the chances of that party's election. The parties, 
$ Magee (1984) surveys the literature on endogenous tariff models. 
9 Magee and Brock (1983) and Young and Magee (1986) add to this two goods and two 
factors in a general equilibrium Heckscher-Ohlin framework. 
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who commit to their policy platform before these contributions are made, thus have 
an incentive to quote an active policy in order to elicit contributions from the lobbies. 
The problem of the parties is therefore to trade off the directly negative effect with 
the indirectly positive effect of active policy, whilst the lobbies must undertake that 
level of lobbying which maximizes their expected income. 
Brock and Magee (1978) have modelled this as a game in which both parties 
simultaneously choose policies under the following hypothesis about the reaction of 
the lobbies. First they prove that, in a two party - two lobby world, each lobby will 
only make contributions to one party - this is their campaign contribution 
specialization theorem (Magee and Brock (1976)). When the lobbies observe the two 
policies, they simultaneously choose their lobby contributions to their own party so 
as to maximize their expected utility. They therefore play a straightforward 
simultaneous move game for which the Nash equilibrium is the appropriate solution 
concept. Now each political party, when considering changing its policy, only takes 
into account the reaction of its own lobby in this Nash equilibrium, and assumes that 
the rival lobby's contributions remain fixed. Magee and Brock (1983) denote this the 
`limited information solution'. One justification offered for this reaction hypothesis 
is, reasonably, that the task for the party of computing the rival lobby's reaction may 
be too complicated. 10 
Brock and Magee (1978) and Young and Magee (1986) find that positive 
1° Although, it turns out in our model that this calculation is unnecessary: they need only 
be aware of Proposition 6.1. 
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lobbying activity leads the parties to adopt active redistribution policies, generating 
Pareto inefficient allocations. By only taking into account the favourable reaction of 
the own lobby, these solutions are likely to overstate the extent of active policy as in 
a full information structure, each party would also consider the adverse reaction of the 
opponent lobby in committing to a policy platform. Naturally, this would be expected 
to dampen the policies found in the limited information setup. This is demonstrated 
in chapter seven, sections 7.1 and 7.2. " 
Consider the case in which each of the parties' policies has the same adverse 
effect on their probability of election (so that policies of equal magnitude cancel out 
in the probability of election function) and assume symmetric lobbies so that neither 
is able to contribute more than the other and equal contributions are equally effective 
in the voters' reaction function. If party I proposes a policy which redistributes X 
amount of revenue from lobby 1 to lobby 2, then lobby 2 has the same incentive as 
lobby 1 to give its own party political contributions. In other words, the lobbying 
contributions cancel out in aggregate 12 and the party could only reduce its chances 
of election by proposing an active policy. 
" For the symmetric case of the Young and Magee (1986) model, Appendix 6.1 
demonstrates that the full information solution (where the reactions of both lobbies are taken 
into account in policy formation) yields an equilibrium in which there is no distortionary 
policy. For their limited information solution, however, distortion is possible in this 
symmetric case. 
t2 This is a feature of the lobbying in Becker (1983). 
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6.4 An efficiency result in a lobbying model 
In Clark and Thomas (1992), the infonnation structure in the probabilistic 
voting model is adapted so that the reaction hypothesis takes into account the full 
response of both lobbies to any change in policy. The remainder of this chapter is 
taken from that paper. We use a standard two-stage game in which, at the first stage, 
both parties simultaneously select policies, and at the second stage both lobbies 
simultaneously choose contribution levels. Payoffs are then determined by the 
resulting election probabilities and the policies. At a sub-game perfect equilibrium, 
parties are forced to take into account the reaction of both lobbies at the second stage. 
This change in the reaction hypothesis leads to completely different results. 
What we find is that provided the model satisfies certain symmetry conditions 
and with a quasi-linear specification of preferences over policies and money for the 
lobbies, then the equilibrium of the game will involve both parties choosing a policy 
which is efficient in the sense of maximizing the sum of the utilities of the two 
lobbies. If such a policy is unique then there will be no lobbying taking place in 
equilibrium since both parties choose the same policy: there is nothing to be gained 
by contributing to one of the parties. This result is in considerable contrast to some 
of the results obtained in the limited information structure. If the party additionally 
takes into account the adverse reaction of the rival lobby then, under general 
conditions, we obtain the following result: if the policy is inefficient (relative to the 
policy of the other party) in the sense that the utility gain to the own lobby is smaller 
than the loss to the other lobby then the adverse reaction of the rival lobby will 
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always at least offset any reaction of the own lobby. It follows that parties will not 
choose such inefficient policies since they can only reduce the probability of election 
success. 
Thus in a world where redistribution of income between interest groups can 
only be achieved by means of distortionary policies, such as trade tariffs/subsidies, our 
results suggest that the political game will not lead to distortionary policies. This is 
true however only when the economy can be considered as a conflict between just two 
interest groups, so that a distortionary policy involves a smaller gain to the gainers 
than the loss to the losers. It may be the case that there are other groups who do not 
actively lobby a political party who can be "squeezed" to the benefit of the two 
represented groups, so that a distortionary policy does lead to an increase in the joint 
utility of the two lobby groups. Our results show that this is all that matters for 
electoral success, and in this case distortionary policies will be followed. (Hence our 
narrow definition of efficiency need not imply efficiency taking into account all 
groups in society). Section 6.7 presents an example of the general model in which 
a group can be squeezed; it is shown there that in the case where two extreme 
distributionary policies lead to the same maximum utility sum, positive lobbying may 
be observed in equilibrium. 
6.5 The political game 
Assume there are two players ("lobbies"), i=1,2, whose payoffs u, (a) depend 
upon a policy parameter a belonging to some policy set A. The players can make 
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contributions c; to political parties: a quasi-linear form for the final payoff is 
assumed: " 
Ui(a) - c; i=1,2. 
There are two political parties, j=1,2, who commit to a policy and attempt to get 
elected. Let oc1 be the policy of party j. Given the policies of the two parties, the two 
lobbies decide upon their lobby contributions, with lobby 1 contributing to party 1, 
and lobby 2 to party 2. The probability that party 1 gets elected depends upon the 
lobby contributions and the policies: tt(c C2; a1, CO* 
Assumption 6.1: n is strictly increasing in c, and strictly decreasing in c2. 
This corresponds to the idea that lobby 1 supports party 1 and likewise for 
lobby 2.14 Magee and Brock (1983) give an interpretation of Assumption 6.1 based 
on the level of information possessed by a voter; the potential cost to the voter of 
choosing the `wrong' party may be high so the parties use their received contributions 
to unearth and distribute unfavourable (but socially valuable) information about the 
opposing parties. The more contributions a party elicits, the more adverse information 
the voters are given about the opposing party. Moreover n may depend directly on 
the policies, al and a2 : it is assumed that the more `efficient' a; is in terms of the 
13 Our results also hold if utility is separable and concave in c; i. e. u; (a) - v(c, ). 
i4 It is not necessary to make this restriction: our results go through if either lobby can 
choose which party to support. 
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sum of utilities, the greater the chance of party i being elected. More formally, 
Assumption 6.2: 
If u, (a, ') + u2(al') > u, (a, ) + u2(a, ) then 7r(c,, c2; a, ', a2) ? ir(c C2; al, a2) with 
equality in the utility sums implying equality in the probabilities. Likewise for party 
2's policy. 
The idea here is that some voters vote according to the total utility generated 
by each policy and not just according to the amount of lobbying. We can imagine 
that certain voters are not sure ex ante which group, 1 or 2, they belong to. 
Consequently they should rationally vote for the party whose policy yields the highest 
average utility 0.5 ul(a) + 0.5 u2(a) . 
Alternatively there might be voters not 
belonging to either interest group and whose utility is positively correlated with the 
sum of lobby utility. (Our formulation also allows for the case where the policies do 
not have any effect directly on the probability of election). 
Assumption 6.2 reflects two of the results in Becker (1983): that the political 
effectiveness of a group is mainly determined not by its absolute efficiency, but by 
its efficiency relative to other groups (corollary to his proposition 1); political policies 
that raise efficiency are more likely to be adopted than policies that lower efficiency 
(corollary to his proposition 2). 
More formally, the game is a two-stage game. At the first stage, both parties 
j simultaneously choose CEA. The two parties attempt to maximize their probability 
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of election, hence the payoff to party 1 is ir(cl) c2; al, a2) and that to party 2 is 
1- n(c1, c2; al, a). The lobbies maximize, by choosing c; E [0, c""x], their expected 
payoff, which for lobby i is 
it(c,, c2; al, a2) u1((11) + (1 - n(c,, c2; al, a2)) u; 
(a2) 
- ci (6.1) 
We look for pure-strategy sub-game perfect equilibria of this two stage game 
in order to determine endogenous economic policies and endogenous lobbying levels. 
A key assumption is the following. 
Assumption 6.3: n(c, c; a a2) is independent of c for all ce [0, cma`] 
Assumption 6.3 states that, given the policies, the election probability is always 
the same when the two lobbies contribute the same amount: the scale of their lobbying 
does not affect the probability. This is slightly weaker than requiring homogeneity of 
degree zero in contributions. 
6.5.1 The lobby sub-game 
To solve for the sub-game perfect equilibria of the model it is necessary to 
solve backwards, starting with the lobby sub-game in the second stage, given a choice 
of policies (a,, co. Our first step is to show that if a party has a more efficient 
policy in the sense of a larger utility sum, then it must receive at least the lobby 
contribution which the other party receives. 
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LEMMA 6.1 Suppose that { u, (a) + u2(a; ) }>{ uI(aý-) + u2(aj) ) for i 9& j, and that a 
Nash equilibrium (c;, cj) of the lobby sub-game exists. Then c; >_ cj . 
Proof We give the proof for i=1; the argument for i" =2 is symmetric. From (6.1) 
the expected payoff to lobby i can be written as 
u1(a, J + ir(c1) C2; (XI, aa) (u1(a1) - u1(ai)) - c; (6.2) 
Suppose that c2 > c,. We want to prove a contradiction. By the definition of a Nash 
equilibrium, lobby 1 cannot gain by increasing its contribution from c, to c2 : 
(7C(cv c2; c, a2) - 7G(c0 c2; a,, a2)) 
(u, ((X1) 
- U1(%)) - 
(c2 - CO 50 
(6.3) 
Likewise lobby 2 cannot gain by reducing its contribution from c2 to c, : 
(TC(c,, Cl; al, a2) - 7C(c1, c2; a,, a2)) 
(U2((X, ) - u2(a)) + (C2 - Cl) <_ 0 
(6.4) 
Using n(c,, c,; a,, a2) _ it(c2, c2; a,, a2) and adding (6.3) and (6.4): 
(7G(c,, Cl; a1, a2) - n(c1, C2; a,, a2)) 
(u, ((X, ) + u2(a, ) - u, 
(ai) 
- u2(%)) 
<- 0 
but the first factor is positive by the assumption that n is strictly decreasing in c2, 
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while the second factor is also positive by the supposition of the lemma, a 
contradiction.   
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Suppose that party I's 
policy yields a higher sum of utilities than that of party 2. If party 2 has a policy 
more favourable to lobby 2 than party 1 then it hopes to elicit contributions from its 
lobby; however because party 1 offers a higher utility sum, it must be the case that 
not only does lobby 1 prefer party 1, but by more (in terms of utility difference) than 
lobby 2 prefers party 2: lobby 1 has a larger incentive to lobby. Together with 
Assumption 6.3, which essentially implies that contributions to either lobby are 
equally effective, this means that lobby 1 will lobby at least as much as lobby 2. 
The next lemma will prove useful. 
LEMMA 6.2 Let a* be a policy which maximizes the utility sum (u, (a) + u2(a) }. 
Then if party 1 plays of it is guaranteed a payoff of at least ir(O, 0; a', a). Likewise, 
party 2 by playing a' must receive at least (1 - n(0,0; (x', a*)). 
Proof Suppose party 1 plays a* against a2 and let (c,, c2) be the contributions in the 
lobby sub-game after (a', a. ), so party 1's payoff is 7c(c,, c2; a`, a2). We have 
c1 ý c2 by Lemma 6.1, so 
it(c1, C2; a`, 00 >_ it(c2) c2; a`, a, J = 1r(0,0; a*, cc, I) >_ 700,0; a*, a) 
(6.5) 
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where the inequalities and equalities follow respectively from Assumptions 6.1,6.3 
and 6.2. Syn-mnetrically, party 2 can guarantee itself (1 - n(0,0; a`, a)).   
We shall initially also need the following. 
Assumption 6.4: There exists an a* which is the unique policy which maximizes 
{ u, (a) + u2(a)) over the policy set A. 
Assumption 6.4 implies that a* is the "efficient" policy in the sense of maximizing the 
sum of utilities. Such a policy will exist under standard assumptions: for example 
continuity of u; and compactness of A together with strict concavity of the utility sum. 
6.5.2 The political equilibrium 
Given this assumption, we can now show that both parties choosing ä is a 
Nash equilibrium. 
PROPOSITION 6.1 Assume that for each (a,, a2) a pure strategy Nash equilibrium 
of the lobby game exists. Then a, = a. 2 = a*, c, = c2 = 0, is the outcome of a sub- 
game perfect equilibrium. 
Proof Given that both parties are choosing the same policy a* the lobbies must set 
c, = c2 =0 (there is no gain from lobbying, only cost), so the election probability of 
party 1 at the proposed equilibrium is n(0,0; cc*, f). By Lemma 6.2, if party 2 plays 
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a', this probability can be no more than i(0,0; a*, a*), hence party I cannot gain by 
deviating. Likewise for party 2.   
In the equilibrium with a unique joint utility maximizer, both parties choose 
the efficient policy and there is no lobbying. By deviating from a*, it may be possible 
for a party to elicit contributions from its lobby, however these will always be at least 
offset by contributions from the other lobby. 
While the proposition states that there will be a sub-game perfect Nash 
equilibrium in which both parties choose the efficient policy, it does not rule out the 
existence of other equilibria in which policies may be different. The reason for this 
is that in the case in which the policies have no direct effect on it, policies close to 
of may lead to no lobbying by either lobby and are consequently as good for the 
parties as a*. If however the policies do have a direct effect, so it is strictly 
increasing in the utility sum offered by a, and strictly decreasing in that of a2, then 
the equilibrium must be unique. 
PROPOSITION 6.2 If it is strictly increasing in the utility sum offered by policy a,, 
{ u1(a1) + u2(a, ) ), and strictly decreasing in that offered by policy a2, then the 
outcome path identified in Proposition 6.1 is the only possible equilibrium outcome 
path. 
Proof First notice that the equilibrium probability must be n(0,0; a` (x+). This 
follows immediately from Lemma 6.2 as both parties can guarantee this probability 
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and they are playing a constant-sum game. Now suppose that the equilibrium involves 
at least one of the parties choosing a; # a'. If a2 # a', then by the assumptions of 
the proposition, the last inequality in (6.5) is strict, so party I by playing a' against 
o2 would achieve a payoff greater than n(0,0; a', a'). This means that party 2 gets 
a payoff less than it can guarantee itself by playing a' , hence this cannot be an 
equilibrium. The argument is symmetric for a, # a'. Hence the unique equilibrium 
has a1=a2=a'.   
When the probability of election function depends directly upon the policy, we 
obtain the standard median voter type result of complete policy convergence, whereas 
it is possible that there exist equilibria which do not exhibit this feature if the election 
probability is policy independent. 
6.6 Non-uniqueness of efficient policies 
The results of section 6.5 have shown that under certain conditions the 
outcome of the lobbying game will involve both parties choosing the efficient policy 
and neither lobby making contributions. The critical assumptions were firstly the 
existence of a unique efficient policy and secondly a substantial degree of symmetry 
in the model: in particular both lobbies' contributions were equally effective in the 
sense that any amount of lobbying by one lobby could be `nullified' by an equal 
amount of lobbying by the other lobby, and lobbying is equally costly in terms of 
payoffs to both lobbies. As relaxing these assumptions may lead to different results, 
we dispense with the first of these in this section and with the second in the example 
142 
of section 6.7. 
PROPOSITION 6.3 Suppose that there exists more than one policy which maximizes 
the utility sum, with the distribution of utilities varying between these policies. Then 
possible equilibria will involve any combination of such policies. 
Proof Lemma 6.2 establishes that playing a`, where a' is one of the efficient 
policies, guarantees party 1 7c(0,0; a', (x") and likewise guarantees party 2 
(1 - t(0,0; a', a')). If party 1 plays a, 
` and party 2 plays a2 , where both policies 
are efficient, neither can gain by changing policy since this argument proves that 
against a2", party 1 cannot do better than n(0,0; a2`, a2) and by playing a, " gets 
n(c1, C2; a, `, 00= 7t(0,0; a2', a2) since c, = c2 
(both a, * and a2' offer the same 
utility sum). Likewise party 2 cannot do better than aZ . This establishes that any 
combination of two efficient policies leads to an equilibrium.   
Again, it is possible to observe the median voter result of complete policy 
convergence, or alternatively policies could be opposed. If the policies have a direct 
effect on it as assumed in Proposition 6.2, then again there can be no other equilibria 
than the efficient ones in Proposition 6.3: from Lemma 6.2 the equilibrium payoff to 
party I must be it(0,0; a`, (x*), and the argument of the proof of Proposition 6.2 
establishes that playing a policy other than an efficient one would lead to a lower 
payoff. If a, ` and a2 offer different utility distributions, it is quite possible that 
lobbying is positive in equilibrium. It might, however, seem unlikely that multiple 
efficient policies would arise. In the example below we show how this might 
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nevertheless happen in an interesting fashion. 
6.7 Example: A simple redistribution game 
In this section we give an example to illustrate the results so far. Depending 
upon the parameters of the model there may be a unique maximizer of the utility sum 
where no interference takes place, or there may be multiple maximizers involving a 
third group of agents losing out to the benefit of one of the lobby groups. The 
example also allows us to consider what might happen when the symmetry 
assumptions are dropped. 
It is supposed that the agents in the economy are composed of three groups: 
lobbies I and 2 together with a third group of politically non-active agents. The 
numbers in each group are N, N and n respectively, and each agent has an endowment 
of income of one unit. The government has a single instrument of redistribution, 
namely to impose a uniform lump sum tax i, where 0 <_ i <_ t1ax < 1, and to 
redistribute the money raised to one of the lobby groups. There is however a 
deadweight loss from this policy in the form of a fraction (1 - X), where 
1 >_ (1 - A) >_ 0, of the tax revenue which simply gets "lost". There are two political 
parties and party I's probability of election success is 
K+ 
n= 
cl 
ci +c2>0 
2K +CI +C2 
1/2 c1 = c2 =0 
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where K >_ 0 is a constant; it does not depend directly on the policy chosen. We 
consider policies of the form: levy a tax i; and redistribute the tax revenue 
ß, T; (2 + n/N) to lobby i, with ti1¬ [0, e"']. (The subscript on i refers not to the party 
whose policy this is, but to the lobby which benefits; so a, = ; will mean that party 
I chooses a policy to benefit lobby 2 for example). Lobby i's utility is simply net per 
capita income. 
Given a policy il which distributes tax revenue to lobby 1, the utility of lobby 
1 becomes 
(1 -i, )+X, ß, (2+n/N) 
and that of lobby 2 is (I - t, ). The utility sum is then 
ti, (? (2 + n/N) - 2) +2 (6.6) 
which is increasing in i, if 
2X, +? n/N-2>0 (6.7a) 
The maximum is reached in this case at 't, = ti'°aX, and by symmetry also at t2 = ti"' 
(the policy which distributes all revenue to lobby 2). The utility sum is decreasing 
in i, if 
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-1 <2X + ?, n/N -2<0 (6.7b) 
The maximum is reached in this case at til = 0, or equivalently r, = 0. (If the 
expression is less than -1 any positive policy would reduce both lobbies' welfare, so 
we do not consider this case). 
We consider first the lobby sub-game after each party has chosen a policy 
favourable to its own lobby: a, = til and a2 =tie . The expected utility of lobby 1 is 
7t (1 -, cl +X cl (2 + n/N)) + (1 - n) 0- t2) - c, 
= (1 - i2) + n(ti, + z2+ i, (2), + Xn/N - 2)) - c, 
Lobby I chooses c, to maximize this expression given c2, which leads to the first- 
order conditions 
(K + c2) (T1 + T2 + T1(2A + An/N - 2)) 
(2K + cl + c2)2 
s1; c1 z0 
(6.8) 
with complementary slackness. Given the symmetric condition for lobby 2, and 
assuming an interior solution c, , c2 > 
0, we get 
(K+c) 
(K + c2) 
ýTI + TZ + T1(2). + Xn/N - 2)) 
ýT1 + T2 + T2(2) + Xn/N - 2)) 
(6.9) 
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Notice that if the utility sum is increasing in t, (or ti), that is (6.7a) holds, then we 
have cl > (<) c2 as cl > (<) i2 ; if the utility sum is decreasing in t (or i2) then 
c, < (>) c2 as i, > (<) 'c2. Taking into account the complementary slackness conditions 
we get the same relations except the strict inequality between c, and c2 becomes an 
equality when c, = c2 = 0. (This corresponds to Lemma 6.1). 
We have dealt with the lobby sub-game after each party has chosen a policy 
favourable to its own lobby. We need also to consider the case where both parties 
choose policies favourable to the same lobby, say lobby 1. Let party 1 choose policy 
i,, and party 2 policy i, +, with i, >, c, +. Then the corresponding first-order conditions 
which hold with complementary slackness are: 
(K + c2)(ti l-T i)(21 +X n/N - 
1) 
(2K + cl + c2)2 
(K + cl)(T1 - til) 
(2K + C1 + c2)2 
S1, Cl 2O 
51, C2 2O 
At an interior solution with c,, c2 > 0, we have 
K+c1 
=271 + 
In 
K+ c2 N 
and taking account of the possibility that c, = C2 = 0, this implies that when (6.7a) 
holds, c, >_ c2, and vice versa when (6.7b) holds; again this corresponds to Lemma 
6.1. 
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Finally there is the possibility that party 1 chooses a policy more favourable 
to lobby 2 than does party 2. In this case clearly c, = c2 = 0. We are now in a 
position to analyze the equilibria of the model. There are two cases to consider. 
6.7.1 Unique efficient policy 
First we take the case where (6.7b) holds, corresponding to the basic idea of 
this chapter where Assumption 6.4 is satisfied. The sum of utilities is maximized only 
when Tl = T2 = 0; the deadweight loss of redistribution exceeds the amount which can 
be raised from the third group. In this case, from Proposition 6.1, each party having 
a non-active policy followed by zero lobbying is a sub-game perfect equilibrium 
outcome. This is easily verified: at the proposed equilibrium the probability of 
election is one half and from the above derivations any deviation by party 1 will lead 
to a probability no greater than one half and likewise for party 2. This equilibrium 
is Pareto efficient and not simply efficient in the sense of maximizing the joint utility 
of the lobby groups. 
6.7.2 Multiple efficient policies and the possibility of positive lobbying 
Secondly, when (6.7a) holds, so that Assumption 6.4 fails, active policy pays 
because the two lobby groups gain at the expense of the third group by more than the 
deadweight loss. Here, by the discussion of section 6.6, both parties playing either 
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of the maximum redistribution policies, which are both efficient, is an equilibrium. " 
To see if positive lobbying is possible in equilibrium, consider the equilibrium in 
which party i plays i; = t'"' (both parties act as favourably to their lobbies as 
possible). For an interior solution, from (6.8), 
c= tm, "X(2 + n/N)/4 -K (6.10) 
needs to be positive, otherwise c, = c2 = 0. Clearly if K=0, then provided only that 
t" , 
X, n>0, we have c>0. When K is low, starting from a situation where 
cl = c2 = 0, the effect on the probability of a small increase in c; is very large, and 
provided this multiplied by the utility difference is larger than unity, some lobbying 
must occur. If on the other hand the expression given by (6.10) is non-positive, then 
CI = c2 =O is the solution: the gain from lobbying is less than the cost. 
So we have the result that positive lobbying may occur in equilibrium once we 
dispense with Assumption 6.4. In the other three equilibrium configurations, namely 
i) both play r, = t°' ', ii) both play t2 = t", and iii) party 1 plays tie = ea. party 2 
plays r, = T", there is clearly no lobbying. 16 However, in all cases an "efficient" 
policy is chosen by both parties (recall we have defined efficiency only in terms of 
the utility sum of the two lobbies, ignoring any third parties). The equilibrium with 
15 Recall that we defined "efficiency" only from the narrow point of view of the two 
lobbies. Clearly maximum redistribution is not a Pareto efficient allocation. 
16 This is because we restrict lobby i to contribute only to party i: we could easily 
dispense with this restriction in which case the latter equilibrium would be essentially 
identical to the one in which party i plays ti; = eax. 
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positive lobbying is Pareto inferior to the other symmetric equilibrium. 
An interesting feature of such multiple equilibria is that it is possible to obtain 
both the median voter result where the parties choose identical policies and the polar 
case in which "extremist" policies are adopted. 
An objection to this model is that it seems unlikely that the utility sum should 
have multiple maximizers. A positive lobbying equilibrium could nevertheless be 
obtained even in the absence of this feature if we restrict each party to choose only 
policies favouring their own lobbies. Suppose the constraints on redistribution are 
'Cl < 't, ""x 1 z2 < 111" with C lnax > ; '"ax so 'c, _ 'Cl"' is the unique maximizer of the 
utility sum - we are assuming that (6.7a) holds. Then from (6.9) and the definition 
of it, it is increasing in r, and decreasing in 'c2 (taking into account the complementary 
slackness conditions this may be weakly increasing or decreasing), hence ti, = ti, ma` 
't2 = T2`°ß` are in fact dominant strategies and so constitute an equilibrium, and this 
might involve positive lobbying as before. 
When the joint utility of the lobby groups has a unique maximizer, then the 
efficient policy - zero lobbying result is based on the idea that each party can adopt 
the position of the opponent in order to guarantee an election probability of one half. 
If it is not possible to mimic the opposing party, a positive lobbying result is possible. 
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6.7.3 Asymmetric lobbying effectiveness 
It is interesting to ask how the results vary if we dispense with the symmetry 
between the lobbying costs and benefits which has played an important role so far. 
For example suppose that the marginal cost of lobbying for lobby 1 is reduced to 
p<1: so pc, is now the utility loss. (Alternatively we could have changed the form 
of it, with similar effects). Let us return to the world of Assumption 6.4, remaining 
within the example, so assume that (6.7b) holds, with i, = i2 =0 maximizing the 
utility sum. 
First we show that i, = tie =0 may no longer be an equilibrium. Suppose that 
party 2 plays ;=0, and party 1 plays ti, > 0. The first-order conditions are 
(K + c2)(T, + TI(2A + An/N - 2)) 
(2K + cl + c2)2 
sµ, cl 0 
(6.11) 
(K + cl) T1 
s1 
(2K + cl + c) 2 
C220 
(6.12) 
with complementary slackness. Suppose that }i is sufficiently low that the following 
holds: 
1 +(2A, +A, n/N-2)>p (6.13) 
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This implies that whenever cl = C2, the first inequality in (6.12) is more likely to hold 
with strict inequality than (6.11). Then provided lobby 1 has an incentive to lobby 
when c2 = 0, that is if 
Tl + til (21 +- 2) N 
4K >IL 
(6.14) 
(which in view of the assumption in (6.13), certainly follows if additionally il >_ 4K), 
the lobby sub-game has an equilibrium with c, > c2 ." Hence by playing ti, >0 such 
that (6.14) is satisfied (always possible if T"` > 4K) party 1 pushes n above 1/2, so 
both parties playing efficient policies is not an equilibrium. 
If an equilibrium exists when (6.13) and (6.14) hold, it must be the case that 
it = 1/2 since any other equilibrium probably could be improved upon by one or other 
of the parties changing its policy to that of its rival to guarantee itself it = 1/2. In fact 
both parties playing ti, = 'c, '" is an equilibrium. Clearly party I cannot gain by 
changing its policy since there will be no lobbying and it will remain at 1/2. If party 
2 plays i, >_ 0 or T. >0 then (6.13) can easily be seen to imply c, >_ c2 so it cannot 
" This is easily seen. First, the reaction functions for both lobbies are continuous and 
bounded above with dc; /dc, > (<) 0 as c, > (<) cj ; hence there exists a unique equilibrium of 
the lobby sub-game. Second, c, = c2 =0 cannot be a solution as (6.14) would imply that 
(6.11) is violated; it cannot be that c2 > c, =0 since the first inequality in (6.12) then holds 
with equality, and (6.14) then implies that (6.11) is violated. Finally, c2 > c, >0 is 
impossible since c, > c2 at an interior solution by (6.13). 
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gain. ' 
Hence we have the result that when one lobby is more effective at lobbying, 
the equilibrium policy may necessarily be biased in favour of that lobby at the 
expense of efficiency. The party of the other lobby has no choice but to acquiesce in 
this situation and also favour the effective lobby: it cannot afford a fight. In 
equilibrium there is no lobbying. This result is in considerable contrast to those of 
Brock and Magee (1978) and Young and Magee (1986) where asymmetric lobbies do 
actually give political contributions in equilibrium and the parties set partisan policies. 
The difference between their and the current results is due once again to the 
contrasting specification of the information structure. 
The fact that asymmetric lobbying effectiveness can lead to active policy in the 
absence of any actual lobbying in equilibrium tends to suggest the lobbies in a 
punishment rather than rewarding role. In the Brock and Magee framework, the 
reward to setting active policy is the promise of lobbying contributions, whereas in the 
current model, with asymmetric lobbies, it is the threat of being punished through 
contributions to the opponent which leads to active policy. That there is no lobbying 
in equilibrium suggests an even more fundamental role for lobbies in policy formation 
than in Brock and Magee's work; the mere existence of asymmetric lobbies and the 
threat that these lobbies will dent the election chances of the parties is enough to 
create an active, and still endogenous, policy. 
'$ Again this is easily checked by showing that when c, = c2, the ratio of the marginal 
benefit from lobbying to its cost is greater for lobby I than lobby 2. 
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6.8 Summary 
This chapter has presented a general model of the political process reflecting 
the influence of interest groups. Economic policy in this setup is determined as the 
result of a political equilibrium. Young and Magee (1986) present a model where the 
endogenous policy to be determined is a tariff. Their model, however, restricts the 
reaction of the lobbies in an irrational manner. The model of the present paper allows 
agents to use all of the information available to them when making decisions and 
consequently, policy is not as distorted as Young and Magee would suggest - indeed, 
according to the narrow definition of efficiency adopted in the present paper, the 
political equilibrium often involves the parties choosing efficient policies whilst the 
interest groups do not lobby. 
The conditions under which these results hold are fairly general. Underlying 
the results is a simple mechanism: when the lobbies are symmetric and there is a 
unique maximizer of their utility sum, any attempt by a party to pursue a policy other 
than the one guaranteeing this maximum joint utility will harm the opposing lobby 
more than it benefits the own one. Consequently the party will suffer a net loss of 
lobby contributions which we have defined as important for the outcome of the 
election. Even if the sum of the lobbies' utility does not have a unique maximum, we 
have demonstrated in the general model that an `efficient' equilibrium will arise, in 
which lobbying may or may not be present. 
A simple redistribution game was used to illustrate our results. The structure 
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of the general model was enhanced by assuming the existence of a group of politically 
non-active agents who could be `squeezed' by the parties to court favour with the 
interest groups. Working within this example, we have been able to examine the role 
of our key assumptions. If the lobbies' utility sum has a unique maximizer then our 
general result (no lobbying and efficient policy) was shown to hold. In the case of 
multiple efficient policies, an equilibrium with active distortionary policy and lobbying 
is possible. This crucially depends upon the existence of the non-politically active 
agents who lose out to the interest groups in a lobbying equilibrium. Finally, when 
one lobby has the most power, both parties favour the most effective lobby so that 
policy is active even though there is no lobbying in equilibrium. Both parties 
acquiesce to the wishes of the strong lobby as neither party can afford to do otherwise. 
Although the main intention of this chapter is to demonstrate that efficient policies are 
possible in the presence of interest groups, this latter result suggests a much more 
fundamental role for lobbies in the political process than Young and Magee. In their 
model, it is the actual lobbying which leads to distortionary policy, but our final result 
suggests that the mere threat of a strong interest group using its influence may be 
sufficient to lead to distortion. 
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APPENDIX 6.1 
This appendix takes the symmetric case of the Young and Magee (1986) model 
and shows that if the reaction of both lobbies is taken into account when setting 
policy, then there will be no active redistribution policy. When only the limited 
information solution is considered, distortion is still possible in this symmetric case. 
There are two political parties and two lobbies. Each lobby has an endowment 
of E and lobby i makes c; in contributions to party i (i = 1,2) in response to the 
announcement of a distortionary policy a;. The probability that party 1 is elected is 
Cl «2 
7L = 
Cl a2 + C2 al 
(A6.1) 
Young and Magee calculate the following solution to the lobby sub-game at an 
interior solution c, > 0, c2 >0: 
Cl a2 = c2 a1 [{ (1 - (al a2)_m) (1 +E2 )J 
I/2 
-1l 
2 al 
(A6.2) 
CZ al = Cl a2 [{(1 - (al a2)-m) (1 +E 
al 
)}1/2 -1] 
cl a2 
(A6.3) 
where m is a constant. The following lemma indicates that if party 1 sets a more 
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redistributive policy than party 2, then the outcome of the lobby sub-game is such that 
the probability of election of party I is below one-half (this being the probability it 
can achieve by setting a policy of equal magnitude to the other party). 
LEMMA A6.1 If a, > a2 then it < 1/2. 
Proof Rearrange (A6.2) and (A6.3) to get 
Cl a2 + C2 al = C2 (11 (al a2)-m) +E 
a2 
/`} 
1/2 
J 
C2 a1 
(A6.4) 
Cl a2 + C2 al _ Cl a2 (al a2)-m) +E 
al 
)}1/2 
Cl a2 
(A6.5) 
Dividing (A6.4) by (A6.5) and rearranging yields 
Cl a2 
C2 al 
c2 al +Ea2 
cl a2 +Eal 
(A6.6) 
By (A6.1), showing that a, > a2 implies n< 1/2 requires that a, > a2 yields 
C2 (XL > c, a2 from the lobby sub-game. We can prove this by contradiction. Suppose 
that a, > a2 and c, c2 >_ c2 a, , then 
(A6.6) implies 
c2a, +Ea2 _ c, a2+Ea, (A6.7) 
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but E a, >E a2 and c, c >_ c2 a, so that (A6.7) is violated, a contradiction.   
This lemma demonstrates that if the parties were to take into account the 
reactions of both of the lobbies from the lobby sub-game then both parties would set 
policies of equal magnitudes. In fact the implication is stronger so that the following 
occurs: 
PROPOSITION A6.1 Given the solutions for lobbying contributions at an interior 
outcome of the lobby sub-game represented by (A6.2) and (A6.3) and the probability 
of election function in (A6.1), then the equilibrium policies of each party are 
a, = oc2 =I if the parties take into account the reaction of each of the lobbies when 
forming their policies. (a =1 is a non-active policy in this model). 
Proof By Lemma A6.1 it must be the case that al = a2. Now if al = a2 >1 then 
either of the parties can reduce its policy below this level and increase its probability 
of election by Lemma A6.1. Worthwhile deviations are not possible only if 
al = a2 = 1, so this is an equilibrium.   
158 
CHAPTER 7. VOTER MYOPIA AND EXTERNAL DEBT IN A LOBBYING 
ECONOMY 
In the previous chapter, the mechanism which drives the results works through 
the joint utility of the lobbies; the policies had an effect on lobby contributions and 
the probability of election only through the utility sum. The original formulation of 
Brock and Magee (1978) reflects voter hostility to redistributive policies in that any 
active policy is assumed to directly reduce that party's probability of election. This 
is not a feature of the model in chapter six due to Assumption 6.2. This chapter 
recasts the specific example used previously in a setting where the voters dislike being 
taxed. In determining their optimal policies, political parties therefore face a trade-off 
between pleasing the lobbies and pacifying the voters. The work in this chapter thus 
approaches that of Brock and Magee but with the important difference that each party 
takes the reaction of both of the lobbies into account when deciding its optimal policy. 
The simple taxation game is firstly solved for the full-information case and this 
solution is compared to those from the limited-information framework (Magee and 
Brock (1983)). ' Next we assume that the lobbying economy lasts for two periods: 
in the first it is possible for the political party which forms the government to borrow 
funds externally to channel to its support lobby but repayment has to be made out of 
taxation revenue in the final period. " The amount of borrowing and rent-seeking is 
shown to depend upon how far-sighted the voters are and the number of redistributive 
'A great simplification is achieved by focussing only on symmetric equilibria. 
2 Creditors are assumed able to impose a penalty which enforces repayment. 
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instruments the parties have at their disposal. 
Finally, a proposal is made which is designed to decrease the amount of rent- 
seeking in the borrowing economy with a view to decreasing the tax rate and 
improving the well-being of the ordinary citizens. The idea is that when the debt is 
in place, the lender or an organization like the International Monetary Fund announces 
a debt forgiveness schedule which is decreasing in the amount of lobbying 
contributions. This forgiveness reduces the amount of tax revenue which flows out 
of the country so increases the size of the transfer, ceteris paribus. In this case, the 
marginal cost of lobbying increases as the lobby loses each contributed unit but 
additionally, each extra unit reduces the amount of forgiveness and hence the available 
transfer. The design of the optimal contribution-linked forgiveness schedule indicates 
a critical condition which the schedule must satisfy if it is to have the desired effect 
of reducing the amount of lobbying and the size of the tax rate. 
7.1 Lobbying with direct voter hostility: The full-information case 
As in the previous chapter, we depict a two-stage game with two parties and 
two lobbies: in the first stage the parties commit to a tax rate 't, (j = 1,2) and in the 
second stage the lobbies contribute to their favoured party in order to aid its election 
campaign. We simplify by assuming that if party 1 sets an active policy then it is to 
the advantage of lobby I and likewise for the second party and lobby. In this case, 
reminiscent of the Brock and Magee formulation, each lobby will only contribute to 
its own party. In setting an active redistribution policy, the party displeases the n 
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voters in the economy who must also pay tax out of their one unit of endowment. 
The problem of the representative lobby member is examined so that with c, ?0 as 
the contribution of the representative lobby 1 member and c2 >0 for the representative 
lobby 2 member, the probability that party 1 is elected, it, is assumed to be of the 
logit form so that 
in (it/ 1-it) =a in (SK+c, ) +b In -d In (5K+c2) -e In (1--t2) 
(7.1) 
where K>0 is a constant and 5 is a Kronecker delta where 8=1 if cl =0 or c2 = 0, 
and 8=0 if c, >0 and c2 > 0.3 The magnitude 7t/1-it is the odds ratio and `a' is the 
elasticity of the odds with respect to lobby 1 contributions (b, d and e are defined 
similarly). The odds ratio is increasing (decreasing) in the contributions of lobby 1 
(2) and the amount of income left after tax paid to party 1 (2). To avoid problems 
of indeterminacy in (7.1), we assume 0S tij S t'"' < 1, j=1,2. Notice that any 
positive tax rate will directly harm that party's chances of election: this is the hostile 
voter effect. Rearranging (7.1) and assuming the (symmetric) case in which ab = de 
=1 for simplicity, the probability that party 1 is elected becomes: 
(6K+c, )(1 -T, ) 7C = 
(ax + C, ) (1 - T1) + (8K + C2) (1 - TO 
(7.2) 
This formulation for n ensures that if the contributions are identical and the policies 
3 This SK term is used to ensure that (7.1) is defined for all c; _> 
0, i=1,2. 
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are equal, then the probability of election is one half for each party. 
Assume that party I sets i, and redistributes the taxation revenue to its own 
lobby (lobby 1)4; with the fact that each of the lobby members has one unit of 
endowment, the transfer to each of the N lobby members is ti, (2+n/N) so that lobby 
I's expected payoff, taken to be per capita income can be written as 
n [(1-i, ) + til(2+n/N)l + (1 - n) (1-i2) - C1 (7.3) 
Lobby I maximizes (7.3) by its choice of c,, taking both policies and the contributions 
of the other lobby as fixed. The first-order conditions are 
(8K+c2) (1-T1) (1-T2) [t2 + til(1 + n/N)] s1, cl 
[(8K+c1) (1-T1) + (8K+c2) (1-12)]2 
with complementary slackness. Solving a similar problem for lobby 2 yields the best 
response function for lobby i as 
c -Max t 
[Ai (aK+c/) (1-tit) (1 -'V2)1112 - (1-Tj) (8K+cj) } 
i= 1-, ýt 
(7.4) 
where A; = tij + ti; (l+n/N). 
° The deadweight loss term of chapter six is ignored in this model. 
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At an interior solution ct > 0, c2 >0 we get 
Cl (t2 + Ti(1 + n/N )) 
_ 
Ai 
C2 (tit + T2(1 + n/N )) A2 
(7.5) 
Again, as in the previous chapter, Lemma 6.1 holds. The difference here is that even 
if 'ti > ti2 does imply that cl > c2 it still might be the case that C2 is the preferable 
policy due to the directly negative effect which active policy has on the election 
probability. 
At an interior solution of the lobby problem it is also the case that 
an C2 (1-t ) (1-r2) 
Cacl [cl (1 -T1) + c2 (1 -t2)]2 
- 
1 
T2+T1(1 +n/N) 
which rearranges to give an optimal interior contribution for lobby 2 ass 
(1 - w1) (1 - T2) Al A2 
c2 
[(1 - T1) Al + (1 - T2) A2]2 
(7.6) 
By symmetry, the optimal interior contribution for lobby 1 is 
5 Only the positive square root emanating from the previous equation need be considered 
as contributions cannot be negative. 
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TO Ai A2 
Cl 
[(1 - tit) Al + (1 - TO A2]2 
(7.7) 
This interior solution to the lobby sub-game is valid as long as c2 and cl given by 
(7.6) and (7.7) are greater than zero which requires A, >0 and A2 > 0, or in other 
words 
ýZ + 'cl (1 + n/N) >0 
, cl +; (1+n/N)>0 
so that c, >0 or 'r2 >O is required. The interpretation here is as follows: if cl =0 and 
i2 >0 then lobby 2 has an incentive to contribute as the promised transfer from its 
own party if elected is positive; additionally, lobby I has an incentive to contribute 
as it prefers party 1 to party 2 (party 1 being elected offers no positive benefit but 
party 2 holding office means that lobby 1 loses some of its endowment to taxation). 
If, on the other hand, i, ==0 then A; = 0, i=1,2 so that c; =0 from (7.4). 6 
Notice that in a symmetric situation when each party chooses the same tax rate c, the 
6 If we had considered a deadweight loss in transferring taxation revenue then we would 
have A; = 'cj + i; (2A, + Xn/N - 1) so that A; > 0, i=1,2, additionally requires ?> N/(2N+n) 
so that the deadweight loss must be sufficiently small to induce an interior solution of the 
lobby sub-game. 
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contributions of the lobbies are identical: ' 
ti(2N + n) 
4N 
(7.8) 
If lobbying takes place in a symmetric equilibrium, then the level of lobby 
contributions to each party by each member of the own lobby is equal to one quarter 
of the prospective per capita transfer. 8 The optimal contributions reflect the fact that 
if the tax rates (and hence transfers) are both zero then there will be no lobbying. 
When both of the parties set a zero tax rate to please the voters, there is no lobbying. 
Having found expressions for the lobbies' optimal contributions at an interior 
solution, we now proceed to examine the choice of actions by the parties who take 
the reactions of both of the lobbies into account when making their decisions. The 
goal of each party is assumed to be the maximization of its own probability of 
election taking the action of the other party as fixed. The first-order condition for 
party 1's problem under this full information setup is 
a7T acl 
+ 
a7C 2+ a7C SoT120 
1 az1 aC2 azl aTl 
(7.9) 
' In all of the following analysis we shall assume that N is large enough to ensure that 
the optimal contribution is less or equal to the amount of the endowment. 
$ The proportion one quarter comes from assuming ab = de =I in (7.1). More generally, 
this proportion is 1/(ab + de)2. 
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with complementary slackness, which, using an/ac, _- ax/ace (c? /c, ) at an interior 
solution from (7.2), rearranges to 
C37C C, ac, C37r 
ail at1 C2 atil aT1 
(7.10) 
From (7.5) we can get an expression for ac, /ac, as 
A, + c2 (1 + n/N) 3_A, c2 ac 
A2 1a 
Ti ii 
z aT 
1 A2 
(7.11) 
Substituting (7.11) into (7.10) and evaluating at a symmetric situation cl = c2, 'c, =tie 
and using (7.8) gives the following result: 
Result 7.1 An interior symmetric equilibrium sets c, = c2 = cf and i, = 'c2 = ti` 
where 
cf =n 
(2N + n) 
8N (N + n) 
(7.12) 
1_ n 
2(N+n) 
(7.13) 
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The comparative statics of the interior solution are intuitively appealing. An 
increase in either ti or n increases the size of the transfer and hence the lobby 
contribution. The larger the contribution, the greater the tax rate so that if is 
increasing in n. As the number of lobby members, N, increases, the smaller will be 
the per capita transfer and consequently lobbying is reduced which in turn lowers the 
tax rate. Result 7.1 and the ensuing comparative statics reflect the fact that the 
parties, in setting their policies, trade off between the interests of the lobbies and those 
of the hostile group of voters. 
To highlight the role which the possibility of squeezing of the voters plays in 
this model, consider the case when n=0. This gives of =0 and cf =0 (which is 
consistent with the discussion of the best response function in (7.4)). This is due to 
the fact that in this special case, the lobbies have exactly symmetric incentives; there 
is no income to be gained from the third group so that the tax rate merely redistributes 
income among the lobbies. Any gain to lobby 1 is exactly the loss to lobby 2 so that 
they would contribute equal amounts to their preferred party, with lobbying canceling 
out in aggregate. This fact precludes an interior lobbying solution under full 
information but not within the limited information framework as the next section 
demonstrates. 
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7.2 Limited information solution 
When each party only takes into account the reaction of its support lobby when 
choosing its policy then the first order condition for party 1 can be written as 
c3cl a? [ So ti Zo t act aT1 a1 
(7.14) 
with complementary slackness which is simply (7.9) without the adverse reaction of 
the opposing lobby. The lobby reaction functions for this problem are still given in 
(7.4) so that at least one of the tax rates must be positive in order for the interior 
solution to the lobby sub-game to be valid. To solve the model under limited 
information for an interior symmetric equilibrium involves differentiating the 
expression for the optimal interior contribution of lobby 1 given by (7.7) and 
substituting this expression into (7.14) which is then evaluated at a symmetric 
situation. This yields the following result: 
Result 7.2 An interior symmetric equilibrium of this game with limited information 
sets c, = c, = c' and ti, == i' where 
i_ (2N + n) (N + n) 
4N ON + 2n) 
(7. l s) 
168 
1 N+n 
3N + 2n 
(7.16) 
Whilst Results 7.1 and 7.2 yield the same intuitive comparative static 
implications, there are important differences which are stated as three corollaries. 
COROLLARY 7.1: When the lobbies have symmetric incentives to contribute, that 
is n=0, an interior symmetric lobbying equilibrium still exists under limited 
information with c' = 1/6 and t' = 1/3. Under full information, an interior symmetric 
lobbying equilibrium will not exist in this case. 
The existence of this lobbying equilibrium under limited information is due to the fact 
that only the positive response by the support lobby is taken into account by the 
parties when setting policy; although lobbying contributions cancel out in aggregate, 
this is not realized by the parties. This solution is therefore unreasonable but is akin 
to those provided by Young and Magee (1986). 
The following statement is obvious from Results 7.1 and 7.2 
COROLLARY 7.2: Active policy is overstated in the interior symmetric equilibrium 
in the limited information case, i. e. 'c' > 'C . 
This arises again as the direct result of only considering the positive lobbying impulse. 
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The limited information solution therefore overstates the `true' redistributive policy 
arising due to interest group pressure. Moreover, this implies the following: 
COROLLARY 7.3: At an interior symmetric equilibrium, c' > cf . 
Using Results 7.1 and 7.2 it is easy to verify that the lobbies have a higher 
expected income in the limited information solution which is directly at the expense 
of the taxpayers who must meet a larger taxation bill in this scenario. Conversely, a 
move towards the full information equilibrium reduces the welfare of the lobbies but 
increases that of the taxpayers. 
To summarize then, we have a model which is strategically equivalent to those 
used by Brock and Magee (1978), Magee and Brock (1983) and Young and Magee 
(1986) in which policy receives positive impulses in response to interest group 
pressure but is tempered by hostile voters. By only considering the favourable 
reaction of the support lobby, the solutions these authors find are biased. In particular, 
the level of lobbying activity is overstated as is the resulting level of the redistributive 
policy and amount of transfers. One justification for using the limited information 
framework is that these equilibria are less complex to calculate. Whilst this is 
undoubtedly true, the model of chapter six transforms the lobbying problem to a more 
manageable (and more general) setup in which the full information solutions are easily 
obtained. This general framework does not incorporate the direct voter hostility which 
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is present in the current chapter however. 9 
7.3 A two period problem with external debt 
This section extends the model to two periods; in the first period the parties 
can borrow from an external source if elected in order to reward the loyalty of the 
support lobby, with the debt being repaid in the second period. The idea here is to 
examine whether and to what extent the inherent characteristics of a lobbying 
economy lead it to contract large amounts of external debt. The results naturally 
depend upon the exact specification of the economy; in particular, the fore- (or short-) 
sightedness of the voters10 is shown to play a crucial role as is the number of 
redistributive instruments at the disposal of the parties once elected. The reason that 
borrowing may arise from this lobbying situation is that one lobby receives the funds 
(the lobby whose party has won the election) whilst the debt must be shared equally 
by all agents in the economy. Lobbying the parties to borrow externally can therefore 
be to the advantage of the interest groups. This mechanism also underlies the partisan 
political model of Alesina and Tabellini (1989) in which the parties maximize the 
utility of their own interest groups through external borrowing. 
At the beginning of the first period, each party announces its policies which 
it will follow if elected. In section 7.3.2 and 7.3.3 it is assumed that the only 
9 Voter hostility is incorporated up to a point in chapter six: if the sum of the lobbies 
utility is decreasing in the policy, then the voters react negatively to active policy. 
1° This can alternatively be interpreted as the hostile or indifferent attitude of the voters 
to external borrowing. 
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redistributive instrument in the first period is the level of external borrowing whereas 
section 7.3.4 allows for both redistributive borrowing and taxation in the first period. 
After these announcements are made, the lobbies contribute to the political campaigns 
of the parties and the voters determine the election result probabilistically. The 
elected party then carries out its proposed level of borrowing and the period ends. At 
the beginning of period two, the parties announce tax rates which are compatible with 
repaying the debt and making a non-negative transfer to one of the lobbies. We 
assume that the debt repayment is enforceable by a fixed penalty. " Upon lobby 
contributions, the election is decided and repayment is made, ending the game. Only 
full-information symmetric solutions will be considered. 
7.3.1 The second period 
In order to solve for the sub-game perfect equilibria of this model, it is 
necessary to begin in the second period assuming that an amount B* of external debt 
has been contracted which imposes a second period obligation of R(B) on the elected 
party. '2 If party 1 sets tax rate til, then the gross amount of transfer which it can 
channel to each lobby 1 member upon election is ti, (2+n/N) - R(B`)/N, where B* is 
first period borrowing. In order to be compatible with repaying the debt, this transfer 
must be at least zero. The expected income of a lobby 1 member is 
" Let P be a fixed penalty associated with default and let R(B) be the repayment to be 
made on borrowing level B. Then a rational lender will set a credit ceiling Bm" where 
R(Bmax) = P. 
12 We assume R' >0. 
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n[1-til+til(2+n/N)-R(B`)/N]+(1-n)(1-tiZ)-cl 
Using (7.2) as the reaction function of the voters, then the lobbies best 
response function is given by (7.4) with A, replaced by Gi = tij + ti; (l+n/N) - R(B*)/N. 
Solving as before for an interior solution to the lobby sub-game yields equations of 
the form of (7.6) and (7.7) for the optimal interior contributions. 
Cl = 
(1 - T1) (1 - T2) Gi G2 
[(1 - r1) G1 + (1 -t2)G2]2 
(7.17) 
C2 = 
T2) Gl ß'i2 
[(1 -T1)Gl +(1 -T2)G212 
(7.18) 
For the interior solution of the lobby sub-game to be valid requires G; >0 
i=1,2. As the debt is enforceable, the announced tax rates must be compatible with 
repaying the debt obligation which requires t; >_ R(B*)/(2N+n). In fact it is easily seen 
that G; > 0, i=1,2, as long as one of the tax rates is strictly greater than 
R(B')/(2N+n). This is parallel to the existence condition in section 7.1 where it was 
found that if both tax rates are zero then neither lobby can expect to receive a transfer 
so that lobby contributions were equal to zero. Here if t; = R(B`)/(2N+n) i=1,2 then 
just enough tax revenue is taken to repay the debt leaving nothing as a transfer. The 
best response on the part of the lobbies is c; = 0, i=1,2. 
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Using (7.17) and (7.18), at a symmetric interior solution with 't1 = tie = 'r the 
optimal interior contribution is given by 
T+ (2N + n) - R(B") 
4N 
(7.19) 
Solving as in section 7.1 for the tax rate at an interior symmetric equilibrium under 
full information yields 
n+R(B') 
2 (N+n) 
(7.20) 
so that the amount of lobbying decreases with the size of the obligation as this lessens 
the second period transfer, whilst the amount to be repaid must increase the tax rate 
set. Comparison of (7.19) and (7.8) and (7.20) and (7.13) highlights the way in which 
the debt obligation changes the results of section 7.1. For the tax rate to be 
compatible with repaying the loan requires I' (2N+n) >_ R(B`): using (7.20) this just 
reduces to (2N+n) z R(B) which simply says that national income must be large 
enough to repay the debt. It would seem reasonable to accept this condition as 
satisfied as the amount of borrowing in most countries is only a small proportion of 
national income. Furthermore, no rational lender would loan more than the country 
has the resources to repay in this two-period model. Moreover, we must check that 
with tax rate 'C, the conditions for the existence of an interior solution of the lobby 
sub-game are satisfied. In the symmetric case this requires that i+ (2N+n) > R(B'). 
174 
Substituting for ti+ from (7.20) reduces this condition to 2N+n > R(B) so that the 
interior symmetric equilibrium is valid if national income is greater than the debt to 
be repaid. 
The interior lobbying solution gives the parties a payoff of 1/2 in the second 
period whilst substituting the lobbying and policy outcomes into the lobbies expected 
income equations yields that each lobby can expect X+Z R(B) where 
X= 1/2 + n2 Z 
(ZN + n) <0 
8N (N + n) 8N (N + n) 
so that the expected payoff of the lobbies is decreasing in the amount to be repaid. 
In the following sections, four cases will be considered: i) borrowing is the 
only first period instrument and voters are Myopic (relevant variable indexed by a bm 
superscript); ii) rational voters and borrowing only (br); iii) Myopic voters and the 
possibility of taxation and borrowing (tbm); and finally iv) rational voters with the two 
policy instruments (tbr). In all cases, the lobbies are pictured as rational players who 
realize that borrowing in the first period imposes an obligation on them via taxation 
in the second period. 13 
13 Discussion of the results is deferred to section 7.4. 
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7.3.2 Borrowing with myopic voters 
When voters14 are myopic in the current model, it is taken to mean that they 
do not realize that borrowing undertaken in the first period imposes an increased 
taxation burden in the second. When borrowing is the only instrument of 
redistribution in the first period, the voters reaction function at this time takes the 
form 
, Rbn = 
6K+cbm 
ý" 28K+c +c2"` 
which is similar to the example used in chapter six so that the methods introduced 
there are appropriate here. In this case, the voters are not hostile to the first period 
policy of the parties. Myopic voters can be rationalized in this setup by considering 
that their utility is positively correlated with national income; as borrowing increases 
national income, this may increase the voters' utility. Assume that party 1 chooses 
to borrow B, "' and redistribute these funds to lobby 1; with a as the common discount 
factor, the two period expected lobby utility sum in this case is 
2+B, b"/N + 2a(X +Z R(B, v°)) 
which increases in B, ei' if 
14 Voters here refer to the n non-lobby members, as the votes of the lobbies cancel out 
in aggregate. 
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1/N + 2acZ R' (B, bm) >0 (7.21) 
The lobbies are pictured as rational players who realize the second period implication 
of first period borrowing. In this case, the optimal policy for the parties is the one 
which trades off the first period gains of the lobbies with the second period losses. 
Let ß be the level of borrowing which makes (7.21) hold with equality; in fact this is 
the optimal level of borrowing at an interior lobbying solution. To see this, assume 
that party 1 proposes to borrow Blbm >ß whilst party 2 sets B2bm = P. By the 
definition of ß it must be the case that the utility sum is decreasing in the amount 
borrowed after (3 so that, by Lemma 6.1 C2bm > c, bm so that party 1 could gain by 
setting B, ' _ (3. If party 1 sets B11'm <ß on the other hand, the utility sum is 
increasing in the amount borrowed up to ß so that party 2 playing ß would still get 
more contributions. Both parties playing B1 = (3 is therefore the equilibrium 
outcome. It is exactly this level of borrowing which balances the gains to the lobbies 
of borrowing in the first period with the losses incurred due to second period 
repayment. 
If the country is constrained in its amount of borrowing, that is Bmax <ß then 
it is optimal to borrow B111 as the utility sum is increasing at this amount of 
borrowing. If the country is unconstrained then it will borrow ß unless ß <_ 0 in 
which case no borrowing will be undertaken. 
The members of lobby 1 choose their amount of contributions in order to 
maximize expected income which is given by 
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11 bm [1 +B bm/N] + (1 - , bm) - clnm + a[X +Z{, Xb" R(B, bm) + (1 - Cbm) R(B2bm)}] 
(7.22) 
where 7tbm is the first period probability of election of party 1 (the second period 
probability having been set equal to its equilibrium value of 1/2). This equation 
reflects the fact that if party 1 wins the election each lobby 1 member will receive a 
transfer of B, bm/N with no transfer being made to lobby I if party 2 forms the 
government. The second period payoff depends upon the amount of borrowing in the 
first period which depends upon which party wins that election. The first-order 
conditions for a maximum are given by 
brn aýbw Hlsi ; cý'ýO 
ail 
(7.23) 
with complementary slackness and a symmetric condition for lobby 2 members 
replacing H, by H2 where 
H, = B, bm/N + aZ [R(B1bm) - R(B2bm)I 
H2 = B2I»/N - aZ [R(Blbrn) - R(B2bm)] 
These first-order conditions yield a best response function for lobby i of the form: 
Cb` =Max { (ax+c; ")'AHi 112 -2öK-c b^, o} 
(7.24) 
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Again, the interior optimum contribution of lobby i can readily be determined to be 
c; bm = 
H2 Hj 
[H1 + H2] 2 
(7.25) 
so that the interior solution to the lobby sub-game is valid if H; >0i=1,2. This is 
certainly true if the parties choose a symmetric level of borrowing Bbin > 0. If the 
parties both choose a zero level of borrowing then the best response by the lobbies is 
to set c; = 0, i=1,2 as neither party is pursuing a policy which benefits either of the 
lobbies. On the other hand, if both parties choose Bbm >0 then contributions by both 
lobbies will be positive as both lobbies attempt to get their own party elected in order 
to benefit from the foreign borrowing. In fact, it was shown earlier that as long as 
ß>0 we have Bbm >0 so the interior solution of the lobby sub-game is valid. 
Setting Bbm as the common policy of both parties from the discussion earlier 
and using (7.25), an interior symmetric lobbying equilibrium gives cb`° = Bbm/4N so 
that the contribution of each lobby member is one quarter of the potential transfer. 
7.3.3 Borrowing with rational voters 
If the voters are rational, then they realize that any borrowing to benefit the 
lobbies will lead to a higher second period tax rate. Assuming that voters react in a 
hostile manner to this obligation and using a logit probability of election function, the 
probability that party I is elected is 
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7c b_ 
(6K +c) (aRM + R(B2 r)) 
($K+cbr)(8RM+R(Bi)) +(8K+C )(8RM+R(Bir)) 
(7.26) 
where M>0 is a constant and i' is a Kronecker delta equal to one if R(B, ) =0 or 
R(B2) =0 and zero if both of these magnitudes are positive. Notice that the larger the 
obligation imposed by party i's borrowing (the higher the borrowing) the lower the 
chance that this party is elected. Lobby 1's expected income in this case is identical 
to (7.22) with the bm superscript replaced by br. Likewise, the first-order conditions 
for the lobby problem are given in (7.23) with the change of superscript and replacing 
H; by J; where J, = B, "/N + aZ [R(B, 
b) 
- 
R(B2b`)], J2 = B2br/N - ccZ [R(B, b`) - R(B2br)l 
These first-order conditions yield a best response function for lobby i as 
cý=Max( 
[(aK+cj')*Ji]1R-(aK+cb`)(8RM+R(B )) 
ý0} $RM + R(B r) 
(7.27) 
where v= (SRM + R(BI"D)(SRM + R(B2b`)). 
At an interior solution of the lobby sub-game, c b` > 0, i=1,2 we have 
cb = 
4rJi it 2 
j [, ]1 ($RM + R(B2 )) + J2 (BRM t R(Bi r ))ý2 
(7.28) 
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For this interior solution to be valid requires Jl >0 and J. > 0. Whilst in general this 
may not hold, the interior lobbying solution is certainly valid in the symmetric case 
as long as the symmetric level of borrowing is strictly positive. If both parties set 
their level of borrowing at zero then (7.27) indicates that the best response is for 
neither lobby to give any contributions as there is no transfer to be gained by 
lobbying, only cost to be incurred. 
In a full information symmetric interior equilibrium, the amount of borrowing 
per lobby member can easily be shown to satisfy 
Bbr 
R(Bbr) [+ 2aZ R'(Bbr)] 
N 
N R'(B') 
(7.29) 
with lobbying given by cb` = B"74N. 
7.3.4 A choice of redistributive policies 
In this section we consider the possibility that the parties can not only borrow, 
but may also use taxation policy to channel funds to their support groups after an 
election victory. The parties thus announce both a level of borrowing and a tax rate 
prior to the lobbies making their contributions. When the voters are myopic (or 
simply not hostile to borrowing) then the voters' reaction function is given by (7.2) 
(adding a tbm superscript). Lobby 1 now not only stands to gain a potential transfer 
from the external borrowing, but also from the other agents in the economy through 
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taxation revenue so that each member chooses the level of contribution to maximize 
,, `hm [I - ti, wm + B, wm/N + tiluým(2+n/N)] + (1 - em) [1 - ti2wm] 
+ a{X +Z [n'bmR(B, `bm) + (1 - n`bm)R(BZb')] }- cl`b°' (7.30) 
where the tbm superscripts denote that both taxation and borrowing are possible and 
that the voters are Myopic. 
Letting Pl = , c2tbai + til'b°' (1+n/N) + B1thm/N + aZ [R(Bl`bm) - R(BZ`hm)] and 
P2 = 'c, `hm + ti, 'b°' (l+n/N) + B2 /N - aZ [R(B, `h'°) - R(B2`tm)], then at an interior 
solution of the lobby sub-game c, '°' > 0, i=1,2, the optimal contribution of lobby 
i is 
) Pj Pi ) (1 - . r2 tbm 
- 
(1 - tit 1 
[(1 -¶ebm)Pl +(1 -T2"')P2]2 
(7.31) 
which is valid for P, >0 and P2 > 0. Again, in a symmetric equilibrium this is 
satisfied as long as the symmetric tax rate or the symmetric level of borrowing is 
strictly positive. If both of these policies are at zero then no lobbying occurs as no 
transfer will be granted. As long as one of the policies is positive, implying -a positive 
transfer, the lobbies become active. At the interior symmetric equilibrium with the 
tax rate set at i`b' and the level of borrowing at B`hm, the amount of lobbying by each 
lobby member is 
182 
(2N + n) +B tbm 
4N 
(7.32) 
so that each lobby member spends one quarter of the prospective transfer on lobbying; 
the larger the transfer, the more the amount of lobbying. 
Turning to the choices of the parties, as the voters do not care about first 
period borrowing in this case, the optimal interior B is the one which trades off the 
short-term gains of the lobbies with the longer-term losses; this is precisely Bthm =0 
from section 7.3.2, assuming that this level of borrowing is feasible. The interior 
equilibrium symmetric tax rate in response to lobby contributions is easily found to 
be ti`hm = (n - B)/2(N + n). Notice that the equilibrium tax rate is decreasing in the 
amount of borrowing. The voters do not care about the level of borrowing but are 
concerned that a low tax rate should be set, therefore the parties use their external 
borrowing to placate the lobbies and adjust the tax rate downwards to please the 
voters. 
Taking the case where voters rationally take into account the future burden of 
current borrowing leads to a probability that party I is elected into office in the first 
period as 
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Ir thr - 
(8K + cite') 4 
(8K + cithr) 4) + OK + ci ') ii 
where 0= (SRM+R(B2 )) (1-, c, `h`) and Tj = (SRM+R(Bl bD) (1-ti2`h`). Lobby 1 
maximizes (7.30) (with for replacing the tbm superscripts), with interior lobbying 
contributions of lobby i being derived as 
2 
cthr40 
TI QjQi 
[Q1 4+ Q2 T, ]2 
again valid for Q; >0i=1,2 where 
Q1 = 'LZwr + Lttbr 
(I+n/N) + Bttbr/N + aZ [R(Bltbr) - R(B2tb )] 
Qz = , Gl`br + . Lzwr (1+n/N) + B2wr/N - aZ [R(Blcbr) - R(B2'"7} 
As in case tbm, this is valid at a symmetric situation as long as at least one of the 
policies is strictly positive. At a symmetric interior situation (assuming both policies 
are positive), we find an expression similar to section 7.3.2 for the symmetric 
contribution as 
c thr _ 
Trb. (2N +n) +B' 
4N 
(7.33) 
In choosing its policies, party 1 requires 
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anfbr + a. thr 
&+ aýthr so ac aTýr acs ' aTl' aT1, r 
tbr 
tii o 
(7.34) 
with complementary slackness and 
a7Cýý ihr 
+ 
37C`hr &+a, tbr 
s 
act 8B 
thr 
act asth' 0B; hr 
B thr 
(7.35) 
with complementary slackness, to be satisfied simultaneously. Tedious calculation 
reduces this to the requirement that the following two equations are satisfied 
simultaneously in an interior symmetric equilibrium 
rar (2N + n) + Brbr 
R(B'b°) [N + 2aZ R'(B`b`)] 
N R'(B`b') 
(7.36) 
ti`b` = (n - BID/2(N + n) (7.37) 
At this interior, the parties are using both of their redistributive instruments to trade 
off the interests of the lobbies and the voters. Notice that the parties use their 
borrowing to reduce the tax rate. 
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7.4 Implications 
Now that we have characterized the symmetric interior equilibria of the 
different `regimes', we are in a position to carry out some comparative analysis. As 
we are concerned with the extent to which a lobbying economy would carry out 
borrowing if able, we examine the case where the country's access to funds is 
unconstrained in this two period model. 
Result 7.3 Assuming that Bm 1 >_ ß>0, so that borrowing is unconstrained, at an 
interior symmetric lobbying equilibrium it is the case that 
R=Bbm=BWm>Bb*>- BWI>O 
Proof That 0= Bbin = B`hm is proved earlier in the text. To show 0> Bb`, first notice 
that (3 = Bb` is not a solution to (7.29) so that f# B". Given positive lobbying, it 
must be the case that B"> 0 so that the left-hand side of (7.29) is positive. As 
Z<0, R'(. ) >0 and given the definition of ß, the right-hand side of (7.29) can only 
be positive if ß> Bb` as claimed. Next we show B br >_ B`h`. When r=0 we get 
B' = B' from (7.29) and (7.36) - although this can only be an equilibrium outcome 
if B=n solves these two equations. From (7.37), as f"` increases so B`b` falls, 
indicating that if t' >0 then B`b' < Bb`. Putting these results together gives Bb` >_ B`I`. 
Finally, assume Bb' = 0. Then the right-hand side of (7.36) equals zero which implies 
, c`b` = 0. But ti`h` =0 only if Bb' =n>0, a contradiction.   
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Some interesting observations emanate from Result 7.3. Irrespective of the 
number of redistributive instruments under the control of the government, an economy 
which has myopic voters15 will borrow more than one in which the voters rationally 
include the future when deciding the current election. 16 The reason for this is 
obvious: when voters do not realize (or care about) the future burden imposed by 
present borrowing, the parties promise to contract debt solely as a means of eliciting 
pre-election campaign funds from the lobbies - there is no hostile voter effect of 
borrowing. The optimal level of borrowing in this case is independent of the 
availability other redistributive instruments and is set at the level which balances lobby 
gains in period one with lobby losses in period two. If the lobbies themselves were 
myopic (or perceived that the repayment obligation cannot be imposed upon them), 
then the parties, in the absence of the hostile voter effect, would borrow up to the 
maximum level permitted by the credit market. This overborrowing would naturally 
reduce the overall efficiency of the outcome if the debt indeed had to be repaid. 
Instead of regarding voters as myopic, the above remarks also hold in 
(undemocratic) countries where the policy preferences of the voters hold little 
relevance for policy formulation. In this case, the size of the policies determines who 
forms the government only through the amount of induced lobby contributions; the 
's Or, as suggested earlier, voters whose utility is positively correlated with the size of 
national income. The important point is that voters do not react in a hostile manner to 
borrowing. 
16 Guttentag and Herring (1985) indicate that large amounts of external debt could result 
as a consequence of the banks being myopic - disaster myopia in their terms. Result 7.3 
suggests that if the myopia were on the part of the citizens (voters) of an economy then 
external debts would be large. 
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party with the most lobbying support will gain power. In this case, the parties would 
maximize the utility of the support lobby (akin to a partisan model) so that borrowing 
would optimally take account of first period gains and second period losses, but the 
tax rate (and hence redistribution) would be maximal. 
When voters are far-sighted and so react in a hostile manner to borrowing, then 
the number of policy instruments available to the government can potentially affect 
the size of the economy's external borrowing. If there are two channels through 
which income can be redistributed in the first period and the parties choose not to 
avail themselves of the taxation option, then borrowing is the same as the case where 
this is the only option. On the other hand, equation (7.37) shows that taxation and 
borrowing move in different directions so that redistributing income via taxation will 
lessen the need to borrow externally. The fact that BW"' > B" implies that ti`b" < ti`b` 
so that the composition of redistributed revenue in myopic voter economies has a 
larger borrowing and smaller taxation component than in an economy characterized 
by rational voters. 
The amount of lobby contributions in the different regimes are related by the 
following result: 
Result 7.4 At an interior symmetric equilibrium, with borrowing unconstrained: 
Ltbm > Cbm > `br > Ctbr >O 
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Proof That c`bm > cbm follows from the fact that 
C_ Ttbm 
(2N + n) +ßZp= 
cbm 4N 4N 
When the level of borrowing is the only instrument, the level of contributions is equal 
to one quarter of the amount of borrowing per lobby member. The fact that Bb, > Bb` 
gives that cbm > cb` Finally, notice that when ti`b` =0 we have the level of transfers 
(T), T `b` =T b`. When ttbr >0 we have from (7.36) and (7.37) 
T'b' =n 
(2N + n) + ry$ for 8Ttbr 
>O 
2(N+n) aB&' 
An increase in 'c" causes Bb' to fall which in turn reduces T `b` below T b`. Therefore 
T b` >_ T `br which implies cb` >_ c" as c" = (T '/4N), w= tbr, br.   
In the myopic voter economies, where borrowing incurs no hostile reaction, the 
greatest amount of transfers are granted and hence the amount of resources spent on 
capturing these contrived rents is large. Additionally, the availability of a 
redistributive tax rate will tend to (weakly) increase the level of redistributive activity. 
The reason for this is clear: when borrowing incurs no hostile voter reaction, the 
parties take on credit to please the lobbies but additionally set a tax rate in order to 
trade off the interests of the lobbies and the voters as in the model of section 7.1 (or 
the second period of this model in section 7.3.1). 
Where voters are rational, the seemingly perverse result obtains that transfers, 
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and rent-seeking contributions are largest when only borrowing is possible; if a tax 
rate is available too, then this (weakly) decreases the transfer size. It was noted 
earlier that the tax rate and level of borrowing move in opposite directions in order 
to balance the opposed interests of the voters and lobbies. The reason that the 
economy with both instruments available exhibits least rent-seeking is that voters react 
negatively both to a positive tax rate and to a positive level of borrowing. 
Equilibriating these two negative forces with the benefit of (net) lobbying 
contributions leads the economy towards less rent-seeking. Even when setting a tax 
rate is not an option in the rational economy, the level of redistributive activity is 
lower than in the myopic economy due to the adverse reaction of the voters. 
If the debt obligation is perceived as non-binding (and the penalty incredible), 
then the parties can borrow with no fear of the hostile voter effect. Borrowing up to 
the maximum permitted would occur if the lobbies too regarded costless default as an 
alternative to repayment. This links in with the profligate economy of chapter five 
which borrows and never repays. Such an economy, it was suggested earlier, can 
obtain loans due to the lender having incomplete information about its customer type. 
7.5 Debt forgiveness and lobbying economies 
The previous section has highlighted the types of lobbying economies which 
are most likely to contract a large amount of external debt and hence be likely 
candidates for repayment difficulties. In particular, borrowing countries in which the 
voters are myopic or have very little influence may accumulate debt quickly in order 
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to purchase the loyalty of the lobby groups but it is the average citizen who must bear 
the burden of the repayment through taxation. One possible solution to these 
difficulties would be to forgive a proportion of the debt in order to reduce the tax rate. 
Whilst the creditor may not wish to carry out such a policy, an organization such as 
the International Monetary Fund may see this tax reduction as a reasonable objective. 
The IMF could then agree to repay some of the debt itself (subject to its conditionality 
requirements). In the literature on debt forgiveness there are two approaches to debt 
forgiveness: " one which seeks to link the amount of debt forgiveness to an 
endogenous variable such as output, and the other which makes the amount forgiven 
dependent on an exogenous magnitude such as the world price of oil. The former 
often leads to an incentive problem as the country may aim to affect a variable under 
its control in order to influence the amount of forgiveness. " 
Whilst the latter proposal fares better in this respect, it would not seem to 
solves the ills afflicting a rent-seeking economy. When the debt falls due, the political 
parties are forced into a policy of high taxation to repay the debt and attempt to elicit 
contributions from the lobbies, displeasing the voters. It may be thought that reducing 
the repayment burden would allow the parties to set a lower tax rate but, in this rent- 
seeking society, the parties may keep the tax rate unchanged in order to fund more 
transfers to the lobbies and gain contributions. Debt forgiveness would therefore do 
very little for the ordinary citizen or the level of rent-seeking. 
" See for example, Krugman (1988) and Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1988). 
18 By reducing output if forgiveness depends inversely on output, for example. 
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With the debt already in place, 19 one way of avoiding this problem would 
be to link the level of forgiveness to the amount of lobbying contributions in the 
economy: 20 the lower the level of contributions, that is the less the amount of rent- 
seeking, the more the forgiveness would be. In other words the proposal makes 
forgiveness conditional on reform of the political process. The debt forgiveness 
schedule would then be a function F(c) with F<0. In this situation, the larger the 
proposed redistributive transfer, the larger is the lobby contribution and the lower 
would be the amount of forgiveness. By reducing the initial transfer, a party may be 
able to `buy' an increased election probability through a larger level of forgiveness 
making the taxation policies more palatable to the voters. The fact that the debt 
repayment burden has been reduced means that even though the tax rate is lower, the 
lobbies may not lose out too much since transfers are the difference between taxation 
revenue and repayment obligations. The overall winner from this scheme is the 
ordinary citizen who pays less tax. 
Without the outside option of forgiveness then, any welfare improvement for 
the taxpayers comes at the expense of the lobbies and vice versa. With the 
forgiveness option, it may be possible to simultaneously increase the welfare of both 
groups, with the welfare increase being `funded' by the IMF for instance. An 
additional beneficial effect occurs if the resources which are not spent on rent seeking 
are released into productive rather than DUP activities so that the economy will be 
19 If the agents were able to anticipate the amount of debt forgiveness then this would 
affect their behaviour and the amount of debt contracted in the first period. Here we join 
Krugman (1988) in examining the case in which the debt is already in place. 
20 This idea arose from conversations with Prof. W. A. Brock. 
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able to grow faster. 
This type of debt forgiveness schedule introduces another mitigating effect into 
the policy selection process: previously, the only force keeping the redistributive 
policies `low' was the displeasure of the voters, but now in addition, we have the 
possibility that announcing less redistributive policies can lower the repayment 
obligation. The parties may receive less contributions but will be able to reduce their 
announced tax rates to placate the hostile voters. 
If the aim of the forgiveness schedule is to reduce lobbying contributions and 
hence provide less of a positive impulse to taxation policy, care must be taken in the 
design of the schedule. If the level of forgiveness falls quickly to zero at low 
lobbying levels, then the existence of forgiveness will do little to alter the incentives 
of the interest groups so that the original (high contribution) equilibrium will obtain. 
If, on the other hand, the level of forgiveness is positive even at high lobbying levels, 
we may get the undesired result that the introduction of a contribution linked 
forgiveness schedule will, by reducing the repayment obligation, increase the level of 
transfers and hence the amount of lobbying leading possibly to a higher tax rate and 
lower welfare for the ordinary citizens. In order to have the desired effect of reducing 
lobbying and hence the tax rate, the forgiveness schedule must balance these two 
concerns. 
Before proceeding to an algebraic statement of these points, some 
diagrammatic analysis can be used to illustrate in the lobby sub-game. When the debt 
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becomes due, assuming the absence of any forgiveness schedule, the marginal cost to 
the lobbies of contributing is MCNF =1 and the marginal benefit (assuming a positive 
symmetric tax rate for simplicity) is 
MBNF =T 
(2N + n) - R(B) 
4N C NF 
(7.38) 
so that the lobby sub-game solution equates marginal cost and marginal benefit from 
contributing. This is depicted as ci''E' in Figure 7.1. When a contributions-linked 
forgiveness schedule is in place, F(c) with F'(. ) < 0, F"(. ) > 0, F'(0) =0 and 
F(c z x) = 0, the marginal cost of contributing is 
MCF= 1-Fý) 21 csx 
MCF= 1 Czz 
(7.39) 
The extra marginal cost for c <_ x reflects the fact that by contributing (up to 
x) the lobbies reduce the amount of forgiveness and hence, for a given tax rate, the 
amount of the transfer which is given by r(2 + n/N) - R(B)/N + F(c)/N per lobby 
member. After x, the amount of forgiveness is zero so that the marginal cost of 
contributing reverts to one. Notice that there is a discontinuity in the marginal cost 
schedule at c=x (which, as indicated below, leads to the possibility of two solutions 
to the lobby sub-game for a symmetric tax rate). 
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With a forgiveness schedule in place, the marginal benefit to the lobbies of 
contributing, again for a given symmetric tax rate is 
MBF =T 
(2N + n) - R(B) + F(cF) 
4N cF 
(7.40) 
For a given tax rate, from (7.38) and (7.39) it is clear that MB' = MB' when c=x, 
so that for any contribution less than x the MBF schedule lies above the MB"Fline but 
at and after x they are equal as forgiveness has fallen to zero. 
Figure 7.1 
marginal benefit 
marginal cost 
MB 
m 
MCF 
NF 
MC =1 
contributions 
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We can use Figure 7.1 to illustrate the earlier point that the level of forgiveness 
must not be set `too high' or `too low'. As indicated, the critical magnitude appears 
to be x, the contribution level at which forgiveness falls to zero. Assume that x= x' 
then the marginal benefit schedule is gbMB"' and the marginal cost is discontinuous 
at b so that it follows ab and then dMC. Two equilibria are now possible - one with 
c= x' and one with c= c'am'. The forgiveness schedule in this case is insufficient to 
rule out the high lobbying (and hence high taxation) equilibrium. For all x< x', the 
MCC' and MBF do not cross until they have reverted to MC`P' and MBN' so that cam' is 
the only equilibrium. The forgiveness proposal is completely ineffective in this case. 
For all x such that c1' >_ x >_ x', there are two possible outcomes of the lobby 
sub-game - one with OF and the other with a lower level of contributions. On the 
other hand, if we have x+ >x> c'''", then there is only one outcome, cF, and 
furthermore this has cw >_ cF (with equality at x= x+). The level of contribution x+ 
is such that the MB" and MC'P' schedules cross at cam. For x in this range, the MBF 
line reverts to MBNF after the no-forgiveness equilibrium c"' has been surpassed, 
ruling out this original outcome and hence leading to a lower level of contributions 
and tax rate. Although additionally there is at most one equilibrium for x> x+, this 
equilibrium yields a crossing point for the marginal benefit and cost schedules to the 
right of c1''F implying a higher level of lobbying so that the forgiveness schedule does 
not lead to a smaller impulse to taxation policy. Setting x too high therefore leads to 
even more lobbying! This occurs in the lobby sub-game because the amount of 
forgiveness increases the transfer available (the tax rate is taken as constant in the 
lobby sub-game) and the larger the transfer, the greater the lobbying contributions. 
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The optimal forgiveness schedule will be indexed by a cut-off point x' such 
that xx >_ x> c''F in order that the level of forgiveness is high enough to impose a 
cost on the lobbies, but low enough that the transfer is not increased at high levels of 
contributions. In fact, as long as x+ > x` > OF, then the outcome of the lobby sub- 
game will yield less contributions to the political system, that is, less of a positive 
impulse to taxation policy. A decrease in the tax rate makes the n ordinary citizens 
better off, but of course this improvement in their welfare has been funded by the 
creditor through its forgiveness. If one views the commercial banks as not being quite 
so benevolent, then the same result could be achieved by an organization such as the 
International Monetary Fund repaying (or writing off if the debt is owned by the IMF) 
part of the obligations for this country conditional on the level of rent-seeking. If one 
of the aims of the IMF is to improve the well-being of the ordinary citizen in a 
borrowing country, then such a contribution-based system appears to be effective for 
lobbying economies. The fact that less resources will be spent on lobbying, means 
additionally that more can be released into productive activities, with implications for 
the growth of an economy. 21 
Let us turn now to some more formal analysis of the debt forgiveness issue in 
this lobbying economy. For simplicity assume that the lender (or IMF) implements 
a forgiveness schedule which writes off an amount of debt F modified by a constant 
(f > 0) amount of the total lobbying in the economy in the repayment period. The 
forgiveness schedule is then r=F- Nf(cl+c2) ? 0, so that r/N benefits each lobby 
member. If lobbying is too large so that F< Nf(c, +c2) then I' =0 as forgiveness 
21 See Terrones (1990) for the effect of rent-seeking on growth. 
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cannot be negative. The problem for lobby 1 is now to choose its level of 
contribution to maximize its expected income per member given by 
n (1 -, cl + til(2 + n/N) - R/N + F/N - f(cl + c2)) + (1-nc)(1-T, 2) - cl 
where R is the size of the obligation due. The first order conditions for an optimum 
are 
f 
[-r2 + T1 (1+n/1) - RIN + F/N -f (cl+c2)] s1+ of cl k0 
i 
(7.41) 
with complementary slackness. Notice that the forgiveness schedule has increased the 
marginal cost of contributing to l+nf for lobby 1 (and (1 + (1-n)f) for lobby 2). It 
is straightforward to show that at an interior optimum we have 
C1 
C2 
(1 + (1-7c)f) Yi 
(1 +tf)Y2 
(7.42) 
where Y, = [t2 + i, (1 +n/N) - R/N + r/N] and Y. = [i, + (1 +n/N) - R/N + r/N]. 
Using (7.41) and (7.42), the following optimal interior contributions can be derived 
(1-v) (1-'C2) (1+ (1-n)f) Yi Yz 
cl 
[(1+(1-7C)f) Yl (1-re) + (1+nf) Y (1-tz)]2 2 
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C2 = 
ý1-T1ý ýý-T2) (1+7Cf) Y2 }'i 
[(1+(1-n). f) Yl (1-ti) + (1+vf) YZ (1-iß)]2 
which are valid for Y, > 0,1 = 1,2. As F- Nf(c, +c2) >_ 0 we have that Y; >0 as long 
as i (2N+n) > R. In other words there is only an interior symmetric solution to the 
lobby sub-game if a positive transfer will be granted. Using these contributions to 
evaluate the first order conditions of party 1 (7.9) at a symmetric interior equilibrium 
yields the following results for the lobby contributions and the tax rate under the 
proposed forgiveness schedule 
CF= n[2N+n-R+F] 4N [(1+f/2) (2N+n) + n(1 tf )] 
n(1+f)+(1+f/2)(R-F) 
(1 +f/2) (2N+n) + n(1 +f ) 
Notice that if f=F=0 then we return to the case of no forgiveness depicted in 
equations (7.19) and (7.20). To demonstrate the importance of the setting of the cut 
off point for the debt forgiveness schedule, we shall assume f=2 and look for the 
critical setting of F. In this case we obtain 
ýF =n 
[2N +n_-, g_+ F] 
4N (4N+5n) 
TF _ 
3n + 2R - 2F 
4N+5n 
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The fact that c' is increasing in Fidemonstrates the point made graphically in 
Figure 7.1 that a forgiveness schedule which is too generous will lead to more 
lobbying in an interior symmetric equilibrium than if there were no forgiveness. As 
the tax rate is decreasing in F, this increase in lobbying will not increase the size of 
the tax rate further. In fact, the parties use the amount of forgiveness to reduce the 
tax rate and placate the voters. 
For this scheme to have an effect, we require that the level of forgiveness be 
positive at the equilibrium. This requires that F- 2Nfc' > 0. Furthermore, 
comparison of c' and the contribution level without forgiveness from (7.19) (denote 
this contribution by c) implies a further restriction upon the size of F. These two 
conditions imply 
(2N+3n)(2N+n -R) >F> n(2N+n -R) 
2(N + n) 4(N + n) 
(7.43) 
Comparing t'' with the tax rate without forgiveness from (7.20) indicates that the tax 
rate under forgiveness is indeed smaller as long as F is greater than the magnitude on 
the right hand side of (7.43). It is therefore possible to design a schedule of debt 
forgiveness for a lobbying economy which reduces the amount of lobbying and the 
size of the tax rate at an interior symmetric equilibrium. 
As indicated earlier, for some values of F in the range given by (7.43), two 
interior equilibria exist: one with positive forgiveness and the other being the original 
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equilibrium of equations (7.19) and (7.20). From the discussion of Figure 7.1, in 
order to rule out the original (high lobbying) equilibrium requires F- 2Nfcr'' > 0, 
which yields a range for F in which there is only one equilibrium: in this equilibrium, 
both lobbying and the tax rate are less than in the case with no debt forgiveness. The 
range for F is given by 
(2N +3n)(2N+n -R) >F> nRN+n -R) 
2(N + n) 2(N + n) 
In the lobbying economy considered here, debt forgiveness linked to an 
endogenous variable (lobby contributions) can improve the welfare of the ordinary 
citizen in an interior symmetric lobbying equilibrium by reducing the tax rate and 
additionally it allows resources to be channelled away from DUP towards productive 
activities. The effect of the introduction of a contributions-linked forgiveness schedule 
on the welfare of the lobbies is ambiguous in this model. There are two reasons why 
contributions fall in the presence of the proposed schedule of forgiveness: i) higher 
marginal cost of contributing; ii) lower transfer to be gained. So the lobbies make a 
saving (in terms of resources not spent rent seeking) but to balance this is the lower 
potential transfer should the favoured party be elected. Whether the saving outweighs 
the cost will depend upon the exact nature of the forgiveness schedule. 
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7.6 Summary 
In this chapter, a lobbying model has been presented which incorporates direct 
voter hostility to the redistributive policies announced by the political parties. This 
was not a feature of the general model of chapter six. The model here was solved for 
the interior optimal lobbying contributions and the optimal policies (tax rates) arising 
from a politico-economic symmetric equilibrium under both limited and full 
information. Although the comparative statics of both interior symmetric solutions 
appeal to intuition, the limited information solution was shown to be unreasonable 
where the lobbies have symmetric incentives to contribute. Additionally, this solution 
predicted too much lobbying too often and policies which are too high in comparison 
with the `true' model. This is due to the fact that the parties only consider the 
positive impulse from the own lobby under the limited information structure, ignoring 
the adverse reaction of the opposing lobby. This adverse reaction is explicitly 
accounted for in the full information solution. 
The model (under full information) was then extended to two periods linked 
by external borrowing which the parties could promise to use if elected to purchase 
the loyalty of their lobbies. Different cases were analyzed depending on whether the 
parties had both a tax rate and borrowing available as policy options or just one of 
these, and whether the voters realized that borrowing increased the tax rate in the 
second period. It was shown that economies in which voters are myopic (or have 
utility positively correlated with national income) are most likely to incur large 
external debts then those in which the voters react in a hostile way to borrowing for 
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redistributive purposes. When voters are myopic, borrowing is undertaken simply to 
please the lobbies, with the optimal level trading off between current lobby gains and 
future lobby losses due to repayment. The availability of a tax rate makes no 
difference to this calculation. 
When voters are rationally hostile, the parties must trade off the interests of 
the lobbies and those of the voters. Here, the number of policy instruments can also 
affect the level of borrowing, with less debt being contracted if a tax rate is available 
as a means for redistributing income. With hostile voters and a choice of policy 
instruments, the parties set each policy to trade off the interests of the voters and the 
lobbies: borrowing yields a large gain to the lobbies in period one but imposes a cost 
in period two, whereas redistribution by taxation benefits the lobby whose party wins 
power without imposing a cost. It seems as if the lobbies would rather have income 
redistributed via the taxation system, but due to the hostile voter effect, the parties will 
not increase the tax rate above a certain level so they begin to borrow. The larger the 
tax rate, the less the borrowing component of redistributed income. 
The amount of lobbying is greatest in myopic voter economies where parties 
have two policy instruments as this is the case in which the transfer is greatest. When 
voters are hostile, the number of instruments weakly decreases the level of lobbying: 
voters react negatively to both policies causing a lower transfer and hence less 
lobbying. 
If the voters take the debt obligation to be non-binding, then they do not act 
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in a hostile manner to borrowing even if they are `rational'. Furthermore, if the 
lobbies too regard debt repudiation as an option, then the parties will borrow up to the 
maximum permitted. This is the behaviour of a type P economy in chapter five which 
was able to obtain loans due to the informational imperfections in the international 
credit market. 
Most debt forgiveness schedules appear to be designed for countries which 
borrow in order to invest. The picture is different in the type of lobbying economy 
depicted here. In order to make the average citizen (a taxpayer) better off, the 
positive impulse to high taxation policy through contributions needs to be reduced. 
Indexing forgiveness to an exogenous variable or granting unconditional forgiveness 
to a lobbying economy will decrease the repayment obligation and could actually 
increase the redistributive transfer which raises the amount of lobbying and will not 
decrease the tax rate. The proposal in this chapter has been to link the amount of debt 
forgiveness to the level of lobbying. Some insights on an optimal contributions-linked 
forgiveness schedule were gleaned with the help of a diagram before proceeding to 
an algebraic solution. The apparently crucial importance of the level of contribution 
at which forgiveness falls to zero was demonstrated. Forgiveness must strike a 
balance between restraint and generosity. If the schedule is too tight, then it has no 
effect, if it is too generous then an increase in lobbying will result (although it was 
shown that no increase in the tax rate will occur). Implementing such a forgiveness 
schedule can make the average citizen better off, in terms of paying less tax, and can 
also free resources for productive purposes which can increase growth. 
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CHAPTER S. SUMMARY 
In its treatment of sovereign debt, this thesis has focussed on a debtor which 
borrows to finance investment and one which borrows as a result of the working of 
the political system. Whilst a great deal of work has appeared in the literature 
concerning the former country type, chapter two was still able to highlight important 
issues for research. 
An important feature of the work of chapters three, four and five is that a 
borrower, if it has access to the international credit market at all, cannot expect this 
access to be permanent or continuous. Chapters three and four assumed that the bank 
was aware of the identity of the customer which it was facing but was unable to 
observe the realized investment returns in that country. This feature built in a natural 
role for the willingness of the borrower to repay. The main differences between the 
model structures of these two chapters is that the former allows the bank to optimize 
over an infinite horizon, requiring repayment to be all or nothing, whilst the later 
assumes that the creditor must expect to break even each period with the country 
choosing the amount to repay on its debt. 
In both of these models, the borrowing country must pass some strict criteria 
in order to obtain access to external funds; failing to meet these conditions leads to 
a no lending equilibrium. When the bank can optimize over the longer term, a 
lending equilibrium requires that it be patient enough not to close credit lines after an 
isolated case of default (which may just be caused by a poor investment return). 
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Additionally, the country must have an adequate investment technology which can 
produce sufficient returns sufficiently often to repay the debt; furthermore, the 
borrower must want to repay the debt with a high probability. In chapter four, where 
the bank is short-sighted, the investment technology of the debtor must produce 
returns more frequently than when the creditor is patient in order for a lending 
equilibrium to exist. 
The model of chapter three is explicitly Markovian so that current actions 
depend upon the past only in as much as the past affects the current state of the 
system which evolves according to a first-order Markov process. Assuming that a 
Markov Perfect Lending Equilibrium exists, it is possible for a debtor to choose to 
default but such action will incur a punishment in the form of a reduced loan 
probability in the next period. The extent of the punishment depends upon the 
efficiency of the equilibrium played as multiple equilibria were shown to exist. A 
period of exclusion can thus result which is finite or infinite: the former class of 
equilibria are automatically missed by models which assume that default leads to an 
immediate and permanent credit embargo. By allowing the punishment periods to be 
endogenously determined, the lulls in activity in the international credit market 
described by Eichengreen (1989) and Cole, Dow and English (1989) can thus be 
modelled. Whether the market for external funds is in a phase of activity or inactivity 
depends upon the repayment action of the borrowing country. A default will most 
often lead to a period of exclusion - numerical analysis demonstrated that this may be 
long - but it is perfectly possible for voluntary lending to resume again after the 
punishment period has elapsed. 
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In chapter three, the lending action of the bank is state dependent, so that the 
probability of it granting a loan depends upon the current state, which in turn depends 
upon actions in the previous period. The extent to which default is punished hinges 
on the exact equilibrium played. In all cases, the bank must strike a balance between 
giving a high enough reward for repayment and making the punishment strong enough 
following default. There is a distance which the bank must keep between the `reward' 
loan probability, the `punishment' loan probability (following default) and the 
probability that lending resumes after a period in which no loan is made. If the bank 
reduces its loan probability following a repayment, then it must also reduce the loan 
probability following default and the loan resumption probability. 
The most efficient equilibrium was demonstrated to be the one in which a 
repayment was rewarded with a loan for certain next period with the other two loan 
probabilities also being relatively high in striking the balance between reward and 
punishment. Consequently, the most efficient equilibrium was shown to be the one 
in which the country has the greatest degree of access to external funds, whereas in 
the less efficient equilibria, the country cannot guarantee itself a loan in the following 
period even by making a repayment. The least efficient equilibrium displays a high 
probability that the credit relationship will be terminated. This equilibrium appears 
to correspond most closely to those which have previously been examined in the 
sovereign debt literature as it prescribes a complete and permanent credit embargo 
following default. There exist a class of equilibria which are more efficient, however, 
as neither reputation nor access to the international credit market are ever permanently 
lost. 
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I 
The extent to which default is excusable in the sense of Grossman and van 
Huyck (1988) was measured in chapter three by the difference between the loan 
probabilities following default and repayment. Whilst it is always the case that the 
latter is greater than the former, a numerical example demonstrated that the distance 
between the two is always large so that default can never be regarded as excused. 
Although it is still possible for a loan to be made in the period immediately after a 
default has occurred, this is a result of the bank's randomization process and does not 
imply that default has been excused. 
Chapter four examined the relationship between excusable default and access 
to the international credit market in more detail. Whilst initially no restriction was 
placed upon the strategies of the players, it was demonstrated that an equilibrium 
existed in Markov strategies so that the results would be comparable to chapter three. 
The repayment options of the borrower were extended so that it could decide how 
much of its obligation to repay. In equilibrium, the country was found to repay a 
constant optimal amount when it received a good investment return, whilst it is unable 
to repay anything when investment fails. Such an optimal repayment was shown to 
lead to a loan for certain next period and default (or a non-optimal repayment) was 
punished through a lower loan probability. 
Multiple lending equilibria were again shown to arise, distinguished by the 
punishment to default and the probability of lending resuming after a period of no 
lending. As optimal repayment is always rewarded with a loan for certain, giving the 
country the correct incentives to pay this optimal amount involves adjustment of the 
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default punishment and the loan resumption probability. In chapter three, the bank has 
three loan probabilities which it chooses according to its optimal strategy, setting the 
optimal distance between the reward loan probability and the other two probabilities. 
In chapter four, the bank cannot vary its reward loan probability (as it is equal to one 
in all equilibria) but can adjust the probabilities of a loan following default and no 
lending so that, if the immediate punishment to default is low (i. e. the loan probability 
following default is high) then the loan resumption probability is low. When default 
is punished least immediately, that is when default is most excusable, lending will 
never resume once it has ceased. The `most excusable default' lending equilibrium 
therefore exhibits the greatest chance that the borrower will lose its access to the 
international credit market and consequently has the lowest payoff for the country. 
Excusing default actually harms the borrower! On the other hand, by punishing 
default through a low loan probability in the period following default, that is by 
excusing default the least, the equilibrium value of the loan resumption probability 
was found to be positive so that the country would not permanently lose access to the 
international credit market. Punishment intervals of exclusion could still be long, 
however, rendering commercial bank lending unsuitable for development purposes. 
While chapters three and four suggest that lending breakdowns and resumptions 
can occur in equilibrium, the results of chapter five indicate that there is a limit to the 
tolerance of the creditor to default in a less certain environment. This chapter 
considered the possibility that there are certain types of borrowers who are inherently 
not creditworthy and inflict an externality on borrowers of the kind discussed in 
chapters three and four. The bank was assumed to be faced with a customer of 
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initially unknown identity but which could be learned through time. Naturally, the 
bank would only be willing to learn its type of customer if credit would be extended 
with complete information about the country's type. Therefore the credit market was 
assumed to be populated by countries which would receive loans according to the 
model of chapter three (type I) and those which would always default (type P). The 
problem was to characterize the actions of a type I country in optimally releasing its 
private information and the bank in attempting to learn the identity of its debtor. 
The actions of both players in this framework depend on the degree of 
certainty with which the creditor believes that its customer is of type I; this belief is 
in effect the borrower's reputation for creditworthiness. A critical level of reputation 
was shown to exist in this model, below which the bank will permanently exclude the 
borrower from funds. A numerical example (carried over from chapter three) 
suggested that this critical value would be extremely high. The further the type I 
debtor's reputation is above this critical level, the greater is the temptation to default 
through choice so the lower the repayment probability is set. As the bank revises its 
belief in the country downwards following default, the type I country becomes more 
concerned with revealing itself, through repayment, in order to avoid the permanent 
embargo which ensues should reputation fall too low. The fact that the type I country 
can only reveal itself when it realizes a successful investment means that it sets a high 
repayment probability at all levels of belief, with this probability rising as the belief 
falls. It is still possible for a type I country to be permanently barred from receiving 
funds in this model if it fails to make the correct signal in time. This contrasts to the 
work of Cole, Dow and English (1989) where the stable borrower always has the 
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funds available to signal its type. 
The number of loans granted until the lender believes the borrower's type to 
be revealed depends on the critical belief, the initial belief, the repayment actions and 
the size of the revisions of the prior. In this way, we have presented a dynamic model 
of sovereign lending and borrowing in the presence of a negative externality imposed 
by the existence of bad debtors. The size of the revisions in reputation following 
default is increasing in the interest rate charged, suggesting a reaction to adverse 
selection on the part of the bank. The higher the interest rate, the less willing is a 
good debtor to contract sovereign debt obligations so that the customer is most likely 
to be a bad debtor. To reflect this fact, the bank revises swiftly downwards its belief 
in the creditworthiness of the country. 
Having considered the possibility that debtors are fundamentally dissimilar, 
chapters six and seven move towards a depiction of a borrowing country which does 
not necessarily contract external debt for investment purposes. Rather, the political 
parties in a country are persuaded to promise to take on external obligations in order 
to reward their support groups after an election. Prior to the election, these support 
groups spend resources in trying to get their favoured party elected in anticipation of 
a transfer from borrowed funds if this preferred party forms the government. 
The underlying framework for the analysis of chapters six and seven is the 
probabilistic voting model of Brock and Magee (1978). In only taking the positive 
reaction of the support lobby into account when considering its policy, the parties in 
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the Brock and Magee model set high redistributive policies. Underlying their `limited 
information' assumption is a desire to avoid computational complexity. Chapter six 
presented a general formulation of the political process in the presence of interest 
groups and non-hostile voters which allows the parties to account for the positive 
reaction of the own lobby and the negative reaction of the opposing lobby in deciding 
its policy (the `full information' solution). Where voters are not directly hostile to 
redistributive policy (but may be indirectly hostile when their utility is positively 
correlated with the sum of the lobbies utility, if the latter is decreasing in the policy) 
it was shown that the outcome depends critically on the multiplicity of the maximizers 
of the sum of the lobbies' utilities. Where this maximizer is unique, both parties were 
shown to choose the single 'efficient' (in terms of maximizing the lobbies' utility 
sum) policy whilst no lobbying would take place in equilibrium. If this joint utility 
possesses multiple maximizers, the parties can choose different polices (but both 
efficient as they offer the same maximal utility sum). In this case, it was indicated 
that lobbying may occur in equilibrium. 
A simple one period taxation game was used to illustrate this general model. 
In the context of this example, the assumption regarding the symmetry of the lobbies 
was relaxed so that one of the interests groups had a lower marginal cost of making 
political campaign contributions. It was shown that in equilibrium there will be no 
lobbying and both parties will set policies favouring the strong lobby. This contrasts 
strongly with Brock and Magee (1978) and Young and Magee (1986) where each 
party will still favour its own lobby in this asymmetric case. The crucial difference 
between these two models is that those authors present limited information solutions 
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whilst chapter six makes the more reasonable assumption of full information. 
Continuing this theme in chapter seven, the one period taxation game was 
solved for the case where the voters are directly opposed to the political parties 
making redistributive transfers to their support lobbies on taking governmental office. 
In equilibrium, the parties were shown to trade off the interests of the voters and those 
of the lobbies in attempting to get elected. In the context of this model, the 
relationship between Brock and Magee's limited information solution and the full 
information outcome was demonstrated. With a limited information structure, 
lobbying was predicted at too high a level, leading to redistributive policies being too 
large in relation to the full information solution. 
This model, with a full information structure, was then extended to two periods 
connected by a debt obligation. In the first period, the party which formed the 
government was able to borrow externally in order to transfer funds to its support 
lobby; in anticipation of these funds, the lobbies would contribute to the political 
campaigns of the parties in order to help them get elected into governmental office. 
The debt had to be repaid in the second period out of taxation revenue. The amount 
of borrowing taken on by a lobbying economy of this kind was shown to depend upon 
whether the voters were directly hostile to borrowing or not, and whether the 
government in the first period was able to fund its loyalty transfer by means of an 
endowment tax. 
Reasonably, economies in which voters are hostile to borrowing tend to 
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contract less debt than economies with non-hostile voters (or where voter utility is 
positively correlated with national income). Additionally, it is only where voters are 
hostile that the availability of a redistributive tax makes any difference to the amount 
of borrowing. An external debt imposes a second period obligation on all agents 
whether they are ordinary citizens (voters) or lobby members, whereas taxation in the 
first period does not impose an obligation on the lobby which receives the government 
transfer (it has its tax payments reimbursed). The lobbies then prefer to have income 
redistributed via a tax but the hostile voter effect places an upper limit on how high 
the parties are prepared to set the tax rate. Once the maximum politically viable tax 
rate is reached, the government funds its transfers through external borrowing. It was 
shown that the larger the promised transfer, the greater is the amount expended by the 
lobbies on capturing this transfer. The amount of lobbying is greatest in non-hostile 
voter economies where the parties have access to borrowing and a tax rate with which 
to redistribute income. When voters are hostile, the number of instruments weakly 
decreases the level of lobbying: voters react negatively to both of the redistributive 
policies which leads to a lower level of transfer and so less lobbying. 
In the type of lobbying economy depicted in chapter seven, it is the ordinary 
citizen who must share in the burden of the debt repayment, without realizing any 
direct benefits from the borrowing. The higher a party sets its tax rate, the more the 
support lobby will contribute to this party, increasing its chances of election. If one 
wished to make the ordinary citizens better off, it would be necessary to reduce the 
positive impulse to tax policy provided by the lobbies. In other words, the level of 
rent-seeking activity by the lobbies needs to be reduced. Linking the amount of the 
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required debt repayment to the level of political contributions was suggested as a 
means for doing this. The idea is that the creditor, or an organization such as the 
IMF, would agree to give the country some debt forgiveness depending inversely upon 
the rent-seeking impulse to taxation policy. If the amount of the repayment required 
were reduced unconditionally or linked to an exogenous variable, this would only 
increase the size of the potential transfer, increasing the amount of lobbying and 
possibly the tax rate. By making debt relief inversely dependent upon the level of 
political campaign contributions, it is possible to impose an additional cost on the 
lobbies: by lobbying an extra unit they not only spend that extra unit but increase the 
amount of the debt obligation due, reducing the potential transfer. 
Critical in designing a debt forgiveness schedule for this type of economy 
appears to be the level of contributions at which the level of forgiveness sinks to zero. 
It was shown that if this value were too high, then the original high lobbying/high 
taxation equilibrium could still obtain. By setting the cut-off point too high, the 
potential transfer is increased so that the lobbies actually contribute more, so that the 
impulse to taxation policy is not reduced. A diagram was used to demonstrate a range 
for the cut-off point which would lead to the desired effect of reducing the amount of 
lobbying and hence the tax rate. It was shown algebraically that a contributions-linked 
debt forgiveness schedule can, in principle at least, improve the well being of a the 
ordinary citizens in an economy which borrows as a result of lobby pressure. There 
are two benefits of such a scheme: firstly, less resources are spent on DUP lobbying 
activities so that more is available to channel towards production; secondly, lower 
lobbying contributions lead to a reduced tax rate which benefits the ordinary citizens 
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in the economy. 
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